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ABSTRACT
Chapter 1 briefly introduces the concept of cognitive emulation, 
and outlines its current status. Chapter 2 reviews psychological 
research on human expert thinking. First, the study of expert thinking 
is placed in the context of modern cognitive psychology. Next, the 
principal methods and techniques employed by psychologists examining 
expert cognition are examined. The remainder of the chapter is given 
over to a review of the published literature on the nature and 
development of human expertise. Chapter 3 reviews the main arguments 
for and against cognitive emulation in expert system design. The 
tentative conclusion reached is that a significant degree of emulation 
is inevitable, but that a pure, unselective strategy of emulation is 
neither realistic nor desirable. Chapter 4 examines the prospects for 
cognitive emulation from a more pragmatic angle. Several factors are 
identified that represent constraints on the usefulness of a cognitive 
approach. However, a second set of factors is identified which should 
facilitate an emulation strategy - especially in the longer term. Some 
guidance is given on when to seriously consider adopting an emulation 
strategy. Chapter 5 presents a critical survey of expert system 
research that has already addressed the emulation issue. Six basic 
approaches to cognitive emulation are distinguished and evaluated.
This helps draw out in more detail the implications of an emulation 
strategy for knowledge acquisition, knowledge representation and system 
architecture. The chapter concludes by discussing the issues that arise 
when different approaches to emulation are combined. Some guidance is 
offered on how this might be achieved. Chapter 6 summarizes the main 
themes and issues to have emerged, the design advice contained in the 
thesis, and the original contributions made by the thesis.
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PREFACE
This thesis is about the emulation of human thinking in knowledge-based 
expert systems. It is thus an exploration of the interface between 
cognitive psychology and knowledge engineering. While the differences 
between psychological modelling and expert system design have 
occasionally been discussed, a detailed assessment of the viability 
and implications of a cognitive approach to knowledge engineering has 
yet to be carried out. The present thesis addresses this issue. It is
also intended as an introduction to the subject.
The bulk of this thesis has already appeared as a book, namely :
"Building Expert Systems : Cognitive Emulation" by Philip E. Slatter, 
Chichester ; Ellis Horwood (1987).
Earlier versions of of Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis also appeared in 
the article :
"Cognitive Emulation in Expert System Design" by Philip E. Slatter, 
Knowledge Engineering Review, 1985, 1(2), 28-40.
Various individuals made valuable comments on these earlier efforts, 
and I would like to take this opportunity to collectively thank them. 
Some remarks by Ben du Boulay early on proved especially helpful.
Thanks must also go to my supervisor at the Open University, Tim O'Shea. 
I am particularly indebted to John Fox, of the Imperial Cancer Research 
Fund, who acted as external supervisor in this research project.
However, neither he, nor anyone else referred to, is responsible for the 
thesis’s shortcomings - these are entirely attributable to the author. 
Finally, I would like to thank the chairman of Telecomputing pic,
Bernard Panton, for making available the company’s resources in 
producing this manuscript.
Through prior permission, the thesis differs from the book in only 
limited respects : the addition of an Abstract and a Section 6.3 - 
which summarizes the original content of the manuscript; and the removal 
of the Author Index and Subject Index. There are no other significant 
changes to the manuscript. Consequently, the term "book" appears in the 
manuscript where "thesis" or "manuscript" would normally be used.
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 WHAT IS COGNITIVE EMULATION?
Expert systems use artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to solve 
problems ordinarily requiring human expertise. Cognitive emulation 
refers to a strategy in expert system design which seeks to emulate 
human thinking. A cognitive approach to knowledge engineering has 
several distinctive features :
(1) It attempts to embody in an expert system not just the human 
knowledge of a domain expert, but also the way an expert 
represents, utilizes and acquires that knowledge.
(2) The principle of cognitive emulation is usually defined to 
include the cognitive processes of system users, in addition to 
those of domain experts.
(3) It is explicit. It enables the issues of expert and user 
emulation that may arise during an expert system development to 
be tackled in an explicit and principled fashion.
(4) It attempts to emulate, using AI techniques, any aspect of human 
thinking that could assist in the construction of an expert 
system. This might include details of human memory organization, 
information processing limitations, problem solving and reasoning 
strategies, etc. It may also include emulation of the overall 
organization, or "architecture", of human cognition.
(5) It draws inspiration from empirical and theoretical 
investigations of human thinking - in particular, from research 
in Cognitive Psychology. The theories, hypotheses, computational 
models, methods and techniques of this branch of psychological
science are adapted for knowledge engineering purposes.
(6 ) It is a concern with the practicalities of knowledge engineering 
(e.g. computational efficiency, modifiability, usability), 
which prinicpally distinguish cognitive emulation from the 
cognitive modelling of psychologists,
(7) At present, the influence of cognitive psychology on the expert 
systems field is essentially as depicted in Fig. l.l; with the 
influence filtered through AI research. [AI scientists have 
capitalized on productive ideas derived from the study of human 
intelligence and developed them into a technology for creating 
artificial intelligence. Expert system designers employ this 
technology.] Adopting a cognitive approach implies supplementing 
this existing link with a more direct one, as shown in Fig 1.2.
(8 ) Finally, 'cognitive emulation' is both a descriptive concept and a 
presciptive principle. As a descriptive concept, it can be argued 
that most expert systems incorporate - albiet unintentionally _ 
many features characteristic of human knowledge processing (see 
section 3.1.1). As a prescriptive principle, 'cognitive emulation' 
refers to expert system work in which an explicit strategy of 
emulating human cognitive processes is followed. Furthermore, the 
attempt should be based on some testable method, technique or 
model - that is, not solely on the casual observations or intuitions 
of the designer. It is with this latter, prescriptive definition 
of 'cognitve emulation' that this book is primarily concerned.
1.2 CURRENT STATUS OF THE EMULATION APPROACH
Throughout their brief history expert systems have been loosely
Artificial
Intelligence
Cognitive
Psychology
Expert
Systems
Fig. 1.1 - Existing indirect link between cognitive psychology and the 
expert systems field.
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Fig. 1.2 - Additional direct link between cognitive psychology and the 
expert systems field implied by the cognitive emulation 
principle.
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modelled on the behaviour of human experts. However, systematic 
attempts at simulating experts’ decision processes have only rarely 
been reported. Two early exceptions are : INTERNIST (Pople,
1982),which modelled the clinical reasoning of a diagnostician in 
internal medicine, and PSYCO (Fox, Barber and Bardhan, 1980), a system 
for diagnosing dyspepsia that incorporated various known principles of 
human information processing. The number of research projects 
involving a significant element of cognitive emulation has tended to 
increase in recent years (see, for example, papers in the volume 
edited by Coombs (1984) and Chapter 5 of this book). Similarly, the 
last few years has seen a growing awareness of the potential benefits 
of modelling human cognition more closely in expert systems, among 
leading researchers (e.g. Clancey, 1984; Gaschnig et a l .. 1983; Fox, 
1982; Kuipers and Kassirer, 1984). Research is also underway to see 
how techniques developed in cognitive psychology can be used to 
facilitate knowledge acquisition from experts (e.g. Boose, 1984;
Breuker and Wielinga, 1984; Gammack and Young, 1984).
However, despite this upsurge of interest, applications of the 
emulation principle in knowledge engineering are still the exception 
rather than the rule. Most of the best known systems - including 
MYCIN (Shortliffe, 1976), PROSPECTOR (Duda, Gaschnig and Hart, 1979), 
DENDRAL (Buchanan and Feigenbaum, 1978) and Rl/XCON (McDermott, 1982)
- were constructed with little or no explicit aim of modelling expert 
thinking. Outside of research-oriented establishments there is, if 
anything, even less explicit concern with cognitive emulation. In 
commercial applications of today’s expert systems technology the 
emphasis is firmly on achieving expert-level performance using formal
11
problem solving methods. This viewpoint is expressed in the 
technology-based definition of expert sytems offered by Johnson (1984, 
p.15) : "a set of computer programs wich emulate human expertise by 
applying the techniques of logical inference to a knowledge base" (my 
italics).
One reason for the current status of the emulation strategy 
appears to be a general lack of appreciation among practioners of the 
possibilities and issues associated with the emulation approach. But 
it could be argued that such an appreciation is not necessary. After 
all, if an explicit strategy of emulation is not a precondition of a 
successful expert system development - as systems such as DENDRAL and 
XCON appear to demonstrate - what justification can there be for 
adopting a cognitive approach? The pros and cons of emulation are 
dealt with in Chapter 3 and 4. For now, it is sufficient to point out 
that the objective of a well-articulated theory of knowledge 
engineering will only be achieved once all the relevant aspects of the 
subject - including cognitive emulation - have been properly 
evaluated. This book is intended as a contribution to this process of 
evaluation.
1.3 OBJECTIVES
This book is designed to perform a number of complementary roles:
(1 ) Introductory text It is intended to introduce the subject of 
cognitive emulation in a way that is accessible to the wider 
knowledge engineering community - not just to research workers 
familiar with this field.
12
Decision support By making explicit the possibilities that exist 
for cognitive emulation, to help knowledge engineers make more 
informed decisions about adopting an explicit strategy of 
emulation in their own work. At the very least it should provide 
an informed basis for the handling of the emulation issues that 
can arise during an expert system development.
(3) Feasibility study To investigate the viability of a strategy of 
cognitive emulation by exploring in detail the issues that arise 
when a cognitive approach to expert system design is attempted. 
This requires consideration of such questions as:
how do human experts actually solve problems? 
is cognitive emulation a theoretical possibility? 
what factors are likely to facilitate and constrain a 
cognitive approach?
how to decide when an emulation approach is worth adopting? 
what are the different approaches to emulation that have 
been tried?
) Information source By supplying detailed references and an 
extensive bibliography of some 2 0 0  items, to provide the reader 
with the means to pursue particular lines of interest.
1.4 SCOPE
The scope of this book reflects these objectives :
First of all, the question of cognitive, emulation is examined 
primarily from an (knowledge) 'engineering' perspective. So, although
13
the long-standing, and essentially philosophical, debate about the 
possibility of emulating human thinking in artificial systems is 
briefly referred to, this book is not directed to a further 
consideration of such meta-issues. Clearly, though, a book about 
cognitive emulation in expert systems is making a key assumption : 
namely, that in principle at least, computational models of human 
thinking are possible. Fortunately, this is an assumption shared by 
most workers in AI and cognitive science.
Second, this book is selective in which aspects of human cognition 
it deals with. Discussion focuses on cognitive processes relating to 
the 'core' expert system topics of knowledge representation, knowledge 
acquisition, inferencing methods and system architecture. In the 
future, the human-like capabilities of expert systems are likely to be 
significantly enhanced by developments in such AI fields as natural 
language processing, vision and robotics. But these areas are not 
among the central concerns of knowledge engineers at present, and so 
are outside of the scope of this book.
The emulation principle is concerned with modelling human thinking 
in general, and the cognitive processes of selected categories of 
people in particular. Clearly, for the designers of computer systems 
intended to simulate expert-level performance, human experts are of 
primary interest. A whole chapter of this book is thus devoted to 
reviewing our present understanding of human expert thinking - as 
revealed by research in cognitive psychology. The other group to be 
singled out consists of the users of expert systems. It is now widely 
acknowledged that the acceptance of an expert system can critically
14
depend on the system being designed in accordance with the 
expectations, knowledge and preferences of its intended users.
However, questions of user emulation can arise with most kinds of 
interactive computer system - not just expert systems. So it is not 
surprising that the subject of user cognition and its emulation have 
long been of interest to researchers in human-computer interaction 
(see, for example, Hammond and Barnard, 1985). The discussion here is 
restricted to user emulation as it relates to expert system design.
In general, the subject of cognitive emulation in this book is 
dealt with at a conceptual rather than a detailed implementational 
level. So, in discussing applications of the emulation principle, 
attention is centred on the ideas and concepts involved, the success 
or otherwise of the project, and any general problems encountered in 
implementing cognitive constructs. For details such as the 
programming techniques employed, the reader should consult the 
supplied references. Similarly, the results of research in cognitive 
psychology are presented in a condensed format. Such a presentation 
is necessary here - but at the risk of masking the true complexity of 
the psychological issues involved. Again, the interested reader 
should consult the supplied references to obtain a fuller analysis.
1.5 PREVIEW
The remainder of this book is organized as follows :
Chapter 2 reviews psychological research on human expert thinking. 
This provides a baseline for comparisons with machine expertise in 
subsequent chapters. To provide some background for those new to this
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area, the study of expert thinking is placed in the context of modern 
cognitive psychology. Next, the principal methods and techniques 
employed by psychologists examining expert cognition are examined.
The remainder of the chapter is given over to a review of the 
published literature on the nature and development of human expertise.
Chapter 3 reviews the main arguments for and against cognitive 
emulation in expert system design. The tentative conclusion reached 
is that a significant degree of emulation is inevitable, but that a 
pure, unselective strategy of emulation is neither realistic nor 
desirable.
Chapter 4 examines the prospects for cognitive emulation from a 
more pragmatic angle. Several factors are identified that represent 
constraints on the usefulness of a cognitive approach. Special 
emphasis is given to detailing areas of conflict with other knowledge 
engineering objectives. However, a second set of factors is 
identified which should facilitate an emulation strategy - especially 
in the longer term. Some guidance is given on when to seriously 
consider adopting an emulation strategy.
Chapter 5 is the longest chapter. It presents a critical survey 
of expert system research that has already addressed the emulation 
issue. Six basic approaches to cognitive emulation are distinguished 
and evaluated. This helps draw out in more detail the implications of 
an emulation strategy for knowledge acquisition, knowledge 
representation and system architecture. The chapter concludes by 
discussing the issues that arise when different approaches to 
emulation are combined. Some guidance is offered on how this might be
16
achieved.
Chapter 6 , the last chapter, summarizes the main themes and issues 
to have emerged. This is followed by a summary of the design advice 
contained in the book, and a summary of the original contributions of 
the thesis.
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2 HUMAN EXPERT THINKING
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents an overview of research on expert thinking and 
how it develops. The principal source is research in cognitive 
psychology. The chapter has three main objectives;
(1 ) Appreciation It will indicate what a full commitment to a 
strategy of cognitive emulation in expert systems development 
could entail. This should provide an informed basis for the 
discussion of the emulation strategy in later chapters.
(2) Heuristic It attempts to fulfil a heuristic role - showing
how cognitive psychology can function as a useful source of ideas 
in expert system design.
(3) Corrective It will aim to correct certain common misconceptions 
about the nature of expert thinking and what distinguishes it 
from novice thinking.
The following statements reflect some widely-held beliefs about 
human expertise:
Human expertise is acquired through experience.
Human expertise is something mysterious and inexplicable.
The superior performance of experts is based on 
superior intellectual ability.
Experts reach conclusions by making a series of logical 
deductions based on the available evidence (Sherlock 
Holmes is a classic example from popular fiction of this
18
view of the expert).
The problem solving skill of physicists and engineers 
is attributable to "physical intuition".
A rather more subtle set of beliefs about human expertise - based 
largely on casual observation, introspection, and the knowledge-based 
conception of human intelligence stemming from AI - is apparent in the 
expert systems field. [The role of expert systems development work as 
a stimulus to expertise research over the last decade needs to be 
acknowledged. The knowledge engineering enterprise has supplied 
cognitive psychology with new models of expert thinking - not to 
mention a rationale for research funding.] The collection below are 
all taken from the knowledge engineering literature (e.g. Buchanan, 
1982; Davis, 1982; Hayes-Roth, Waterman and Lenat, 1983):
Expert performance depends on large amounts of domain 
knowledge.
Experts know when a problem is outside their area of 
competence, or when to break general rules in order to 
handle exceptions.
Experts can reorganize their knowledge into more 
appropriate forms.
Experts are capable of reflecting on their own cognitive 
processes (meta-cognition), and know about their own state 
of domain knowledge (meta-knowledge).
Experts’ reasoning and knowledge is frequently 
inaccessible.
Expert cognition lacks both computational and
19
representational power.
As should become clear, most of these statements are broadly 
consistent with cognitive research - after due elaboration and 
refinement. [The main restriction in evaluating such assertions has 
been the lack of coverage of certain topics in the psychological 
literature. Given the differing concerns of knowledge engineers and 
cognitive psychologists, however, such a mismatch is not altogether 
surprising.)
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 
aims to place the study of human expertise in the context of modern 
cognitive psychology. Section 2.3 comments on the principal methods 
and techniques adopted by psychologists interested in expert thinking. 
Section 2.4 is the longest section: a review of cognitive research on 
the many aspects of human expertise and its development. Section 2.5 
summarizes the picture of expert cognition to emerge from the 
preceding review. Finally, Section 2.6 provides some pointers to 
further reading.
2.2 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE STUDY OF EXPERTISE
Cognitive psychology is currently the dominant approach within 
mainstream psychology. However it is still a young field, achieving a 
coherent identity only in the I960’s. Prior to this. Behaviourism - 
with its emphasis on observable behaviour and animal learning - 
significantly retarded research on human thinking over several 
decades: the notion of ’mind’ was anathema to Behaviourists.
Cognitive psychology supplanted Behaviourism as the difficulties of
20
explaining human behaviour without resort to such concepts as 
’memory’, ’imagery’, ’reasoning’, ’intelligence’ and ’knowledge’ 
became increasingly apparent.
Cognitive psychology is today a vigorously pursued subject 
employing scientific methods (see Section 2.3), but not yet with a 
coherent body of accepted theory. Many different theories, models and 
hypotheses are currently being explored, and some of the general 
principles underlying human thinking and performance are becoming 
clearer.
While there is not yet a coherent body of accepted theory, most 
cognitive psychologists adopt a common approach based on an 
information processing view of human cognition. An information 
processing system consists of a set of memories, receptors and 
affectors, and processes for acting on them (Simon, 1979). According 
to this approach, cognitive processes can be analyzed into sequences 
of ordered stages. This entails identifying the sequence of mental 
operations through which information flows (and is transformed) in the 
performance of a particular cognitive task. Figure 2.1 illustrates an 
information processing analysis of the stages involved in pattern 
recognition (it should not be taken too seriously).
Expert thinking is studied within this framework. The study of 
expertise has emerged as an identifiable area of psychological 
investigation only in the 1970’s. Studies of changes in cognition 
from domain novice to domain expert - sometimes referred to as the 
"novice-expert shift" - now comprises a well-defined field within 
cognitive research. Indeed, one textbook on cognitive psychology
21
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(Anderson, 1985) devotes a separate chapter to the subject.
While expertise research represents an identifiable subfield, it 
is also heavily dependent on developments in other areas of cognitive 
psychology: i.e. research on memory, reasoning, problem solving, 
learning, etc.. This is because novice-expert differences are 
apparent in virtually all aspects of cognitive processing.
Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly clear that the development 
of, on the one hand, specialist expertise, and, on the other, rather 
more mundane cognitive skills such as school arithmetic or driving a 
car, have many cognitive features in common (Anderson, 1985).
The close integration of expertise research with the rest of 
cognitive psychology implies that a satisfactory account of expert 
thinking will not be achieved independently of a general theory of 
human cognition. No attempt is made in this review to disguise the 
absence of a unifying theory, or indeed to develop one. As a 
consequence, conflicting explanations of key findings are sometimes 
presented. What we do attempt, however, is to identify the key 
elements of human expertise, and arrive at a coherent picture of how 
experts think.
2.3 METHODS AND TECHNIQUES
While this review is not primarily concerned with technical and 
methodological issues, an appreciation of the ways psychologists study 
expert cognition will nevertheless prove helpful. First, it will 
facilitate a proper assessment of the cognitive research reviewed 
below. Second, it may help make the technical literature a little
23
more accessible.
Two main approaches to the study of novice-expert differences in 
cognition can be distinguished: the traditional psychological 
experiment, and a more recent ’Cognitive Science’ approach relying 
more on protocol analysis and computer simulation.
The main ingredients of the traditional psychological experiment are:
Formulate a hypothesis (possibly an attempt to falsify some 
existing theory or to establish a new one).
Deduce testable propositions from the theory - the 
Experimental Hypothesis.
Assign subjects to Control and Experimental groups in an 
unbiased (e.g. random) fashion.
Minimize the effects of all extraneous sources of variation 
and confounding variables.
Systematically manipulate one or more Independent Variables 
and observe the effects on some measure of behaviour (called 
the Dependent Variable).
Apply tests of statistical significance to results to see if 
they are properly attributable to the effects of "chance", 
or to the manipulation of the Independent Variable.
Make an inference from the experimental findings to accept 
or reject the experimental hypothesis and the tested theory.
Doubts have been expressed about the appropriateness of a rigorous 
experimental approach to the study of human problem solving (e.g.
Card, Moran and Newell, 1983; Newell and Simon, 1972), and expert
24
problem solving in particular (e.g. Larkin, McDermott, Simon and 
Simon, 1980). Criticisms include:
(1) Lack of ecological validity. The controlled/contrived 
situation of the typical psychological experiment can lead 
to a gross distortion of normal problem solving behaviour.
(2) An overemphasis on hypothesis-testing at the expense of 
quantitative measurements of cognitive processes.
(3) Standard experimental metrics such as reaction time 
are incommensurate with either the speed or 
richness of the cognitive processes underlying problem 
solving. For example, 15 minutes or more may elapse between 
the presentation of a problem statement to a laboratory 
subject and a solution being offered.
The limitations of a purely experimental approach are one reason for 
the emergence of an alternative approach in which protocol analysis 
and computer simulations of mental processes are the prime techniques. 
(This kind of research is sometimes called Cognitive Science.)
In expertise studies, protocol analysis involves making a verbatim 
recording of experts and novices as they "think aloud" during a 
problem solving exercise, and analysing the transcripts for 
similarities and differences. Verbal data obtained in this way 
provide a rich source of information about human thinking. The main 
limitations of this technique are:
(1) Verbal protocols, because they have to be interpreted, are
25
not well suited to the objective quantitative comparisons 
required in formal hypothesis testing.
(2) Verbal protocols are often incomplete and inaccurate because 
of: the inaccessibility of ’automated’ knowledge (see 
Section 2.4.2(3)), interpreting rather than reporting by the 
subject, cognitive overload induced by the task, etc.. 
Problems with verbal data are dealt with in more detail in 
Section 5.2.
(3) Ambiguity. The results of a protocol analysis may be 
consistent with several distinct process models (Patel and 
Groen, 1986).
Protocol analysis is often used to provide the raw data for a 
computer simulation of cognitive processes under investigation. For 
example, a verbal protocol of a problem solving effort can be used to 
infer a set of production rules which, implemented as a production 
system, simulates the behaviour recorded in the protocol. Among the 
benefits claimed for cognitive modelling are:
(1) Modelling a psychological theory in a computer program 
introduces a requirement for explicitness and clarity into 
theory building that was not there before (Johnson-Laird and 
Wason, 1977).
(2) It enables dynamic interactions between elements of a model 
to be studied and better understood by researchers (Slack, 
1984).
(3) The need for explicitness and unexpected behaviour produced
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by the system can help generate new hypotheses (Slack, 1984)
(4) It gives credibility to a psychological explanation by 
showing that it is not dependent on vague mentalistic 
concepts, but instead can be operationalized in a working 
system (Larkin et a l .. 1980).
Difficulties with computer simulations include:
(1) A lack of consensus in cognitive science as to the proper 
relationship between a program and the theory it seeks to 
embody (Slack, 1984). (An extreme position associated with 
Newell and Simon, is to identify the program as the theory.)
(2) Ad hoc assumptions inserted into a program to ensure that it 
works can be hard to distinguish from the central 
theoretical ideas (Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1977).
(3) Published accounts of research do not necessarily correspond 
to any single working program (c.f. Cendrowska and Bramer, 
1984).
Virtually all the studies of expert thinking reviewed in this 
chapter conform to either the traditional experimental approach (e.g. 
Adelson, 1984; Murphy and Wright, 1984), or the protocol/simulation 
approach (e.g. Anderson, 1983b; Larkin et a l .. 1980) or some 
combination of the two (e.g. Chi, Feltovich and Glaser, 1981). The 
two approaches are complementary rather than conflicting. For 
example, experimental studies are well-suited to testing hypotheses 
about particular expert-novice differences, whereas computer 
simulation can be used to model the development from novice to expert.
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Note that the methods and techniques just outlined have an obvious 
bearing on the main theme of this book: Namely, the possibility of 
cognitive emulation in expert system design. The methodological 
issues surrounding the emulation strategy are dealt with more directly 
in Chapter 5.
There is insufficient space in a review of this sort to give 
technical details of all the studies cited. It is possible, however, 
to give some indication of the range and variability of psychological 
research on expertise.
Subjects
In a typical experiment on expert cognition the main variable of 
interest is the level of expertise of the experimental subjects. The 
performance of groups of novices and experts on a cognitive task is 
compared. Occasionally subjects of intermediate expertise - 
'journeymen' - comprise a further experimental group (e.g. Murphy and 
Wright, 1984). Subjects are normally real specialists in some domain, 
but expertise is sometimes defined operationally; for example, in 
terms of how "knowledgeable" a subject is about a topic (c.f. Arkes 
and Freedman, 1984). The number of subjects involved can vary from one 
or two individuals studied intensively (Chase and Ericsson, 1982) to 
larger groups of around 50 (Adelson, 1984, Experiment 2), or even 100 
or more (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). Generally, studies in which 
protocol analysis and simulation are the central techniques rely on 
far fewer subjects than purely experimental studies (e.g. Anderson, 
1983b).
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Domains
An impressive range of specialist skills have been studied:
Chess (e.g. Chase and Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1965).
Other boardgames such as Go and Gomoku (e.g. Eisenstadt and 
Kareev, 1975; Rayner, 1958).
Mental calculation experts (Hunter, 1975).
Medicine (e.g. Johnson et a l .. 1981; Kassirer and 
Gorry, 1978).
Physics (e.g. Chi et a l .. 1981; Larkin, 1981).
Algebra (Lewis, 1981) and geometry (Anderson, 1983b).
. Computer programming (e.g. Anderson, Pareil and Sauers,
1984; Jeffries, Turner, Poison and Atwood, 1981). 
etc.
Tasks
In studies employing protocol analysis (e.g. Larkin et a l .. 1980), the 
primary task performed by novices and experts is usually an 
appropriate problem solving exercise; for example, simulated clinical 
diagnosis by medical practitioners. The secondary task is 
simultaneously giving the verbal protocol. In contrast, it is in the 
nature of experimental studies to focus on a single aspect of 
specialist expertise such as fact retrieval (e.g. Arkes and Freedman, 
1984; Chase and Ericsson, 1982), devising a suitable experimental task 
for the purpose. Conceptual sorting, attribute listing, sentence 
recognition, and reconstructing a chess position after a brief 
exposure to it, are representative of the cognitive tasks employed.
The measures of performance selected depend on the particular
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task. They include; error rates, comprehension time, number/size of 
sorted categories, eye movements, number of correctly repositioned 
chess pieces.
Treatment of results
Experimental data of the sort just discussed are quantifiable, and 
hence amenable to tests of statistical significance. Analyzed 
protocols yield more qualitative data, a popular use of which is in 
the building and testing of computer models of the development of 
expert cognition (e.g. Johnson et a l .. 1981; Larkin et a l ., 1980). 
Production systems have proved an especially popular formalism for 
implementing ideas about human expertise (e.g. Anderson, 1983b; Fox, 
Barber and Bardhan, 1980; Larkin, 1981) - although this may not imply 
a committment to production systems at the theoretical level (Young,
1979). Models of clinical expertise have made greater use of frame 
networks as a formalism (e.g. Pauker, Gorry, Kassirer and Schwartz, 
1976; Pople, 1982).
2.4 RESEARCH FINDINGS
Psychological research on expertise is reviewed here under the 
headings of Long-Term Memory, Mental Operations and Working Memory. 
These headings correspond to the three basic architectural elements in 
both contemporary models of human information processing and expert 
systems (e.g. Card et a l .. 1983; Hayes-Roth and Waterman, 1978): viz.
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COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE EXPERT SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Working-Term Mermory Current Status Database
(or Short-Term Memory) (or Dynamic Database)
Long-Term Memory Knowledge Base
(or Permanent Memory) (or Static Database)
Mental Operations Inference Engine
(or Cognitive Processor) (or Interpreter)
The material is organized in this way to emphasize the relevance of 
cognitive research on human expertise to knowledge engineering. For a 
detailed assessment of this model of the human cognitive architecture, 
and its relation to expert system architecture, see Section 5.6.2.
2.4.1 Long-term memory
An expert’s store of permanent knowledge changes in various ways as 
he or she learns about a domain. Rumelhart and Norman (1978) distinguish 
three modes of change :
. Accretion. The accumulation of new knowledge within the 
framework set by existing memory structures.
Tuning. Slight adaptations in existing memory structures to the 
naturally occuring variability of events in some domain.
• Restructuring. A major reorganization of memory structures 
prompted by inefficiency and over-complexity in the existing 
organization.
Accretion is a purely quantitative change, whereas tuning and 
restructuring are qualitative changes. Sections (1) and (2) below are
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included to illustrate the massive accretion of domain knowledge 
associated with becoming expert. In reality, though, the three types of 
learning tend to overlap - as sections (3) to (6) should make clear.
(1) Facts
Through attending lectures and seminars, reading textbooks and other 
formal channels, experts have accumulated a massive store of factual 
information that can be used in problem solving. The amounts involved 
are difficult to quantify, but appear huge. Consider for example the 
case of medical students, who may spend years studying and acquiring 
textbook knowledge about human physiology and diseases. Pauker et a l . 
(1976) give a figure of between 1/2 and 1 million as the number of 
core facts in general internal medicine alone - although there is no 
suggestion that the average intern will have acquired all this 
information! Similarly, Larkin et a l . (1980) estimate that a single 
one-year course in American high school physics requires a student 
learning about 300 "things" - physics concepts and laws - from 
standard textbooks. Multiplied over several parallel courses and many 
years it is clear that prodigious quantities of factual knowledge must 
be acquired by many specialists.
(2) Rules
Quantitative estimates of expert knowledge are more often given in 
terms of the number of 'rules' acquired than by the number of facts.
Thus Simon and Gilmartin (1973) estimate that chess masters have 
learned in the order of 50 000 different chess patterns, i.e. 
recurring arrangements of pieces on the chess board. The recognition
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of such a pattern on the board is said to invoke stored knowledge 
about appropriate lines of action in that position. Production rules 
have frequently been used to model the development of expert skill as 
the acquisition of this kind of "pattern-action schemata" (Larkin et 
a l .. 1980). Hence the rule measure of expertise.
(3) Object categories
Real-world objects can be perceived at several levels of abstraction; 
for example, the same item can be seen as a "piece of furniture", a 
"chair", a "kitchen chair", etc.. Human memory for object concepts 
appears to be organized in this kind of hierarchical fashion (Rosch, 
Mervis, Gray, Johnson and Boyes-Braem, 1976). Rosch et a l . suggest 
that experts are capable of making finer categorical distinctions than 
novices, and thus have more lower-level categories. Some research by 
Allan Whitfield and myself (Whitfield and Blatter, 1978, 1979) 
supports this suggestion. We found that whereas interior design 
experts identified Art Nouveau and Georgian as distinct furnishing 
styles, nonexpert subjects did not. Rather, the nonexperts judged 
exemplars of these two styles as belonging to a single - "Traditional" 
- style category.
Together with this ability to make finer categorical 
discriminations, the expert is sensitive to more attributes of domain 
concepts (Murphy and Wright, 1984). This sensitivity can blur concept 
boundaries, however, as attributes previously associated with only one 
particular concept are recognised in exemplars of another concept, and 
vice-versa. Usually when people learn a new concept they focus on the
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distinguishing features first. Thus, for example, training in medical 
diagnosis tends to start with classic textbook cases, before a more 
representative selection of case histories are encountered. As a 
consequence, experienced diagnosticians have concepts that are 
relatively fuzzy, in contrast to the more crisp concepts of the 
novice (Murphy and Wright, 1984). As single attributes become less 
predictive of category membership, experts may place geater emphasis 
on the predictive value of familiar configurations of attributes (see 
Section 2.4.1(5)).
Changes in conceptual organization are also likely as expertise 
develops (Murphy and Medin, 1985). New and more accurate 
interconnections between domain concepts are formed (e.g. Feltovich e^ 
a l .. 1984). Moreover, even the correct concepts of novices may be • 
organized differently. In one study (McKeithen et a l .. 1981) novice 
programmers, when given the choice, chose to organize ALGOL reserved 
words alphabetically, whilst the experts favoured a semantic method 
of organization - grouping BEGIN with END, and so on.
(4) Mental models
In performing a complex task such as predicting the dynamic behaviour 
of a liquid, or using an interactive computer device, people access 
some kind of mental model (see, for example, the papers in Gentner and 
Stevens, 1983). Mental models help guide understanding and actions in 
dealing with artificial or natural systems. There is a lack of 
agreement at present among researchers as to the exact nature of 
mental models. A consensus position might be that mental models are 
more or less definite representations embodying structural and/or
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functional properties of the entity modelled.
Mental models appear to play an important role in expert problem 
solving. A study by Larkin (1983) compared how physics novices and experts 
modelled problems. Her findings suggest that novices only have access 
to a 'naive' problem representation composed of objects that 
exist in the real world (e.g. pulleys, blocks). By contrast, the 
experts had access to an additional, 'physical' representation 
containing imaginary entities such as momenta and forces. Thus the 
experts had developed a powerful second model which they could call 
upon. Other research has investigated expert circuit analysts' mental 
models of electronic circuits (de Kleer and Brown, 1983), the causal 
models of mechanisms of the human body employed by experienced 
physicians (Kuipers and Kassirer, 1984), and so on.
In summarizing this literature Forbus and Gentner (1986) make the 
following observations :
In physical domains experts often acquire quantitative 
representations, e.g. mathematical models.
Experts who have access to quantitative representations 
continue to update and use knowledge acquired at earlier stages 
of expertise acquisition, i.e. perceptual schemata, heuristic 
rules and qualitative models.
Some domains, such as child-rearing, have no definitive models - 
forcing the expert to rely heavily on heuristic knowledge.
Another interesting point to emerge is that, unlike the elegant models 
found in textbooks, peoples’ mental models tend to be deficient in
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various respects. That is, they are often messy, incomplete, and may 
include contradictory and erroneous concepts (Norman, 1983). However, 
through comparison with experiential knowledge gained on a relevant 
task, some debugging may take place (Williams, Hollan and Stevens,
1983).
To recapitulate: both novices and experts access mental models of 
entities in their subject domain. Experts' mental models are more 
accurate and domain-adapted, and they may have a larger range of 
models to choose from.
(5) Indexing of knowledge
Another cognitive correlate of the development of expertise is the 
ability to access knowledge rapidly as it becomes relevant to the 
present state of a problem solution. It can reach the point where 
access is almost instantaneous, and achieved with little or no 
conscious awareness (Larkin et a l .. 1980).
This ability depends on the acquisition of a large number of 
perceptual patterns, or chunks (Miller, 1956), that directly index 
part of the expert's knowledge store. A chunk is a familiar 
configuration of elements that through repeated exposure comes to be 
recognized as a single unit. Chess research provides a good example: 
chess masters’ ability to perceive a group of related chess peices on 
a board is well documented (e.g. Chase and Simon, 1973). Similar 
chunking effects have been reported over an impressive range of expert 
domains (see Chase and Ericsson, 1982, for references).
With experience, experts learn to associate task-relevant
36
knowledge with each pattern. Depending on the expert domain, the 
stored knowledge indexed can take a variety of forms; for example, 
appropriate lines of chess development (Chase and Simon, 1973, de 
Groot, 1965), physics principles (Larkin, 1981), facts relevant to 
programming design (Jeffries et a l .. 1981), medical diagnostic 
categories (e.g. Szolovits and Pauker, 1978; Johnson et a l .. 1981).
Cognitive scientists have modelled the development of indexing as the 
acquisition of production rules (e.g. Anderson, 1983b; Larkin, 1981).
The condition part of the rule represents the indexing pattern which 
when "matched" evokes the attached action (knowledge). For instance, 
according to Larkin (1981), physics problem solvers gradually learn 
the conditions under which a particular principle is successfully 
applied, such that the appropriate principle is triggered 
automatically when the same conditions are detected again on a later 
occasion.
In conclusion: indexing reduces the need for an expert to solve a 
problem by exploring a large search space of possibilities. Rather, 
useful knowledge is retrieved from long-term memory at the time it is 
required.
( 6) Proceduralization of knowledge
Declarative and procedural representations of knowledge can be 
distinguished (Winograd, 1975).
As expertise develops, there is a shift towards procedural forms 
of knowledge representation. For example, some evidence suggests that
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the arithmetic skills of school teachers are stored in memory as 
unanalyzed procedures or "macros" (Brown and Burton, 1978). That is, 
while teachers are expert in performing arithmetic operations, they 
cannot readily verbalize what the operations are. Other research 
indicates that the declarative knowledge of problem solvers in physics 
(Chi et a l .. 1981; Larkin et a l .. 1980) and geometry (Anderson, 1983b) 
becomes increasingly proceduralized as expertise is acquired.
Anderson (1983a) presents a three stage theory of skill 
acquisition which aims to account for these changes. Briefly the 
stages are:
(a) DECLARATIVE STAGE Initially all new information is acquired 
in a declarative form; for example, facts from a textbook 
(modelled as the growing of semantic network structure). 
Declarative knowledge is interpreted by domain-independent 
problem solving procedures such as means-ends analysis.
(b) KNOWLEDGE COMPILATION STAGE In this stage the declarative 
knowledge is transformed into a procedural form (although 
the declarative representation may also be retained). The 
process is seen as analogous to the compiling of a computer 
program. Domain-specific procedures are acquired by 
recording the conditions under which a piece of declarative 
knowledge proves useful (modelled using production rules). 
Individual productions combine to form composite 
productions.
(c) PROCEDURAL STAGE In this stage procedures become more 
automated (see Section 2.4.2(2)) and faster. The ability to
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verbalize knowledge is lost. Procedures continue to be 
refined, or tuned. For example, a strengthening process 
increases the probability of successful productions being 
invoked on a later occasion. Unsuccessful productions 
gradually fade in strength, but are never lost entirely.
In summary; the development of expertise involves the 
proceduralization of domain knowledge initially encoded in a 
declarative form. Through repeated use, these procedures are 
gradually refined and combined into large units.
2.4.2 Mental operations
(1) Fact retrieval
Experts are far better than novices at recalling facts about a 
domain (Arkes and Freedman, 1984). This robust finding presents a 
challenge to theories of memory that predict interference between 
facts during retrieval. That is, since experts know a massive number 
of facts about a domain, they ought to exhibit poorer memory than 
novices. The contrary is true however : experts generally retrieve 
domain knowledge with far greater speed and accuracy (e.g. Reder and 
Ross, 1983). This is the so-called ’paradox of interference’ (Smith, 
Adams and Schorr, 1978).
This phenomenon is open to a number of, not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, explanations:
(a) INDEXING Perceptual patterns in the current state of the
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problem solution automatically trigger the activation of 
relevant bits of knowledge. Indexing has already been 
discussed in Section 2.4.1(5).
(b) INTEGRATION With growing expertise associated facts become 
integrated into large knowledge units such as scripts (Smith 
et al.. 1978). (A script is a frame-like structure 
describing an appropriate sequence of events in a particular 
context). Smith et al. suggest that script facts are accessed 
as a unit, which would reduce the scope for interference 
dramatically. There is also plenty of evidence that in some 
domains (e.g. electronic circuitry, architecture) experts 
develop hierarchical structures for organizing their knowledge 
and are able to use these structures to facilitate recall (see 
Chase and Ericsson, 1982).
(c) EFFECTIVE ENCODING Skilled individuals may have learned to 
encode information such that when it is required in some 
context, the retrieval cues are sufficient to achieve recall 
(Chase and Ericsson, 1982; Jeffries et al.. 1981). Novices, 
on the other hand, often fail to retrieve knowledge in 
long-term memory that is relevant to the solution of some 
problem.
(d) PLAUSIBLE INFERENCE What experts may be doing in memory 
experiments is not so much recalling facts as inferring them. 
That is, experts seem able to make use of their extensive 
domain knowledge to infer what a correct or plausible response 
should be (Arkes and Freedman, 1984). Thus a chess master can 
make use of his knowledge of familiar positions to 
"reconstruct" the board after seeing it very briefly (Chase
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and Simon, 1973). More generally, people sometimes "recall" 
facts they have not encountered, but which are thematically 
related to facts they have encountered (Reder and Anderson,
1980).
To summarize; experts retrieve domain facts more quickly and 
accurately than novices. Several cognitive mechanisms may contribute 
to this superiority.
(2) Automated and controlled cognitive processes
The chess master's ability to play lightning chess against several 
opponents simultaneously illustrates an important component of cognitive 
skill - the automatization of cognitive processes with practice.
The distinction between controlled and automated mental processes 
(e.g. Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977) is now widely accepted within 
cognitive psychology. In sharp contrast with controlled processes 
(which are best exemplified by higher-level decisions and strategies), 
automated processes;
are often parallel and independent in nature
are unconstrained by working memory limitations
run to completion automatically once initiated
require considerable practice to develop, but are difficult
to modify once learned
are unavailable to introspection
speed up gradually as the automated sequence is learned
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The last point is worth elaborating on, since it constitutes a 
very robust phenomenon. In fact the time needed to perform a 
cognitive task is consistently found to decrease as a log power 
function of practice on the task. This implies that performance will 
continue to benefit from practice, but by ever diminishing amounts 
(see e.g. Card et a l .. 1983). The benefits of speed up with practice 
are well illustrated in physics problem solving, where expert 
performance has been reported as four times faster than novice 
performance (Larkin et a l .. 1980).
Newell and Rosenbloom (1981) propose a "chunking model" (see 
section 2.4.1(5)) to explain speed up with practice. Assuming the 
time needed to perform a task depends on the number of knowledge 
chunks accessed, then skilled individuals - who have encoded their 
task knowledge in fewer, larger chunks - will perform the task faster.
The above research indicates that some control processes are subject 
to automatization with practice. At the same time, experts appear to 
develop a flexible control over their reasoning processes at a high 
strategic level. For example ;
experts are often able to give a clear indication of how the 
main task is decomposed into sub-tasks, and of the temporal 
relationships between these sub-tasks (McDermott, 1982). 
like novices, experts can see when a particular strategy is 
failing, and 'repair' or switch strategy accordingly in order to 
overcome the impasse (Jansweiger et al.. 1986). 
experts are not necessarily restricted to a single, fixed 
strategy for performing a task. Rather, they seem able to
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adapt the way they decompose the task into sub-tasks, depending 
on the problem at hand (Wielinga and Breuker, 1986).
The distinction between the automatization of cognitive skills and 
the proceduralization of knowledge (see Section 2.4.1 (6)) is probably 
more one of emphasis than of substance (Anderson, 1983a; Lesgold,
1984). Lesgold (1984) goes on to suggest that because of cognitive 
processing limits, complex skilled performance requires the prior 
proceduralization of component skills. Sternberg (1984) makes a 
similar point;
...complex verbal, mathematical, and other difficult tasks 
can feasibly be executed only because many of the operations 
involved in their performance have been automatized. Failure to 
automatize such operations, either fully or in part, results in a 
breakdown of information processing and hence less intelligent 
task performance, (p. 153)
To summarize; the cognitive skills of an expert become 
increasingly automatized with practice. Automatization can account 
for the greater speed and complexity of expert performance, but also 
for the inaccessibility of expert reasoning and task knowledge. (See 
next section.) While some processes become automated, experts are able 
to achieve flexible control over high-level strategic processes.
(3) Accessibility of cognitive processes
The cognitive changes reviewed so far have been essentially 
beneficial in their effects on expert performance. However, the well-
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documented inability of experts to verbalize about their cognitive 
processes (e.g. Welbank, 1983) is harder to view as a benefit - 
especially from the standpoint of the knowledge engineer.
Experts are not unique in having difficulty reporting on their own 
thinking, however. A review by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) concluded 
that people generally have little or no introspective access to higher 
order cognitive processes. Rather, Nisbett and Wilson argue that 
introspective reports are based on a priori, causal theories which 
plausibly explain how a particular stimulus leads to a particular 
response.
These conclusions have been qualified somewhat by later research. 
In particular, Ericsson and Simon (1980) reported findings indicating 
that a problem solver does have privileged access to what is at the 
focus of his or her attention at any moment; but is no better able to 
explain shifts of attention than an external observer. Furthermore, 
people are rarely able, when asked later, to give accurate reports 
on what they were thinking about during a problem solving exercise.
If, as it appears, people in general have only limited conscious 
access to their cognitive processes, the position of experts in this 
regard is more serious still. The main reason is the automatization 
of cognitive skills with practice (described in Section 2.4.2(2)), and 
the accompanying proceduralization of domain knowledge (Section 
2.4.1(6)). The knowledge acquisition literature (e.g. Weibank, 1983) 
testifies to the difficulty experts have in articulating their domain 
knowledge and reasoning strategies.
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Experimental research on this topic is scarce, although a study by 
Berry and Broadbent (1984) has considered the effects of several 
variables, including practice, on the ability of subjects to verbalize 
about their performance on a cognitive task. No increase in ability 
to verbalize about task knowledge with practice was found - indeed, 
there were some indications of a decrease in this ability.
In the absence of direct introspective access, experts may rely on 
a priori models of their own thinking of the kind suggested by Nisbett 
and Wilson (1977), and discussed above. Investigations of diagnostic 
reasoning by Kassirer and Gorry (1978), and others, supports this view. 
Clinicians often report that they use what amounts to a forward- 
chaining strategy, keeping many different hypotheses in mind (as 
prescribed in medical textbooks). In contrast, their observed 
behaviour suggests that they infact employ a strategy more 
accurately described as 'hypothesize-and-test’; i.e. they appeared to 
"guess" a particular hypothesis quickly, and then reason backwards to 
try to prove it.
In summary; people’s awareness of their own mental processes is 
rather limited. The proceduralization of knowledge and automatization 
of cognitive skills that accompany the development of expertise, serve 
to make expert thinking even less accessible to introspection.
(4) Mode of reasoning
Characteristic differences exist in the reasoning styles of 
experts and novices in such domains as physics (Larkin, 1981; Larkin 
et a l .. 1980) and geometry (Anderson, 1983b). The novices tend to
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reason backwards, whereas the experts tend to reason forwards.
The backward chaining approach of the novice appears to reflect 
their reliance on "weak" domain independent methods such as means-ends 
analysis (Larkin, 1981). To illustrate (from Larkin et a l .. 1980, 
p.1338); when confronted with the problem of determining the velocity, 
V, of an object, the physics novice starts with this unknown.
However, to determine v the acceleration, must first be determined. 
If a is also uninstantiated then an equation is found with as the 
resultant; and so on, backward chaining until a set of equations is 
found from which a solution can be derived.
The cognitive load imposed by backward reasoning is heavy; 
managing goals and subgoals, storing and retrieving partially solved 
equations. Thus one advantage of the shift towards reasoning forward 
is that it greatly reduces this cognitive load in problem solving. The 
transition from backward to forward reasoning is gradual, and may 
depend on the indexing of knowledge described in Section 2.4.1(5). To 
reiterate briefly; when the novice is solving a problem in backward 
mode, and a bit of knowledge is found useful, the conditions under 
which it proved useful are stored; so that when on a later occasion 
similar conditions recur, the same bit of knowledge is automatically 
triggered. Forward chaining is effective only because the expert has 
learnt through experience which of the many alternative forward 
inferences are required for the final solution (Anderson, 1985).
Some other findings relevant to the relation of forward and 
backward reasoning include;
(a) Intermediate experts may start off using forward
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inferences, but complete a problem using backward chaining.
(b) Particularly awkward problems, or problems on the boundaries 
of the expert’s domain, may require the expert to revert to 
a general problem solving strategy in order to solve them 
(Larkin et a l .. 1980; Szolovits and Pauker, 1978).
(c) It is widely accepted in cognitive psychology that for any 
but the most rudimentary tasks, skilled human performance 
depends on a flexible intermixing of forward and backward 
reasoning (c.f. automated and controlled processes).
It is important to realise that forward reasoning will only develop in 
domains where this is the most effective strategy. Physics and 
geometry are such domains - in each there is a rich set of "givens" 
which are more predictive of a solution than the goal statement is 
(Anderson, 1985).
This is not true of, say, computer programming, where the problem 
statement is richly predictive, whereas the "givens" of a particular 
programming language are not. Empirical studies of program design 
(Anderson, Pareil and Sauers, 1984; Jeffries et a l .. 1981) have found 
instead that both experts and novices adopt what amounts to a backward 
chaining stategy: i.e. top-down program design. The interesting 
contrast noted in this domain is between the depth-first approach 
favoured by novices, compared to the breadth-first development 
strategy employed by the expert programmers. A breadth-first approach 
is advantageous because it enables the dependencies (and conflicts) 
among sub-goals to be detected at each design level before preceding 
to the next.
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Clinical diagnostic medicine is another domain with distinctive 
features and a characteristic reasoning style to match (e.g.
Pauker et a l .. 1976; Kassirer and Gorry, 1978). Among 
these features is the fact that a diagnosis can sometimes be confirmed 
or rejected only by performing particular clinical tests. Moreover, 
each test is relatively costly - in terms of money, time and risk to 
the patient. These tests must be weighed against each other to 
determine which tests, if any, to administer. It is also known that 
certain patterns of symptoms are imperfectly associated with certain 
diagnostic categories, and that experienced diagnosticians make use of 
these.
Such domain characteristics suggest the need for a strategy 
incorporating elements of backward chaining (test confirmation), 
uncertainty handling (test administering decisions, empirical 
disease-symptom links), and forward inference (diagnostic hypotheses 
evoked by patterns of clinical data). The results of this domain 
analysis are consistent with the hypothesize-and-test strategy 
observed amongst clinical diagnosticians (Elstein, Shulman and 
Sprafka, 1978; Kassirer and Gorry, 1978). Typically, a pattern of 
clinical data might prompt a diagnostician to "guess" initially one or 
more hypotheses. These are then tested using backward chaining and 
taking into account the uncertainties involved. Clinicians employ 
various strategies to eliminate invalid hypotheses, and discriminate 
among others.
To summarize: Experts adopt reasoning strategies appropriate to 
the problem domain. They come to rely less on deductive reasoning and
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more on pattern recognition-based approaches.
(5) Handling uncertainty
In many expert domains decision making is characterized by an 
unavoidable element of uncertainty. Judgements are made about the 
likelihood of such uncertain events as the outcome of a medical test 
(see above) or the movement of share prices on the Stock Exchange. A 
line of research initiated by Kahneman and Tversky (see the collection 
of papers by Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982) has focused on 
comparing the uncertainty judgements of human subjects with outcomes 
based on statistical theory and the laws of probability. This 
research reveals that people are frequently insensitive to statistical 
variables such as sample size, correlation and base rate 
probabilities. Nor do people tend to analyze daily events into 
exhaustive lists of elementary possibilities (from which compound 
probabilities can be aggregated). Thus Bayes' Rule, and other well- 
established statistical techniques, have been effectively refuted as 
psychological hypotheses about everyday decision making.
Rather than grapple with the computational complexities demanded 
by formal methods, people appear to rely on a small set of heuristics 
- of which representativeness and availability are the best understood 
(Kahneman et a l .. 1982).
Availability refers to the tendency of judging the likelihood of 
an event by how readily related information in memory can be 
retrieved. This can distort probability estimation as when someone 
overestimates the likelihood of being struck by lightning after
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reading a particularly vivid newspaper report on the subject.
Representativeness describes a human strategy for judgement under 
uncertainty where the likelihood of an item belonging to a particular 
class is based on how representative or typical an example of the 
class the item is. So, for example, a shy young woman might be judged 
more likely to be a librarian than a shop assistant, despite the fact 
that there are far more shop assistants than librarians in the 
population at large.
A training in statistics may insulate a person from making naive 
statistical errors such as the Gambler's Fallacy - the erroneous 
belief that, for example, the next in a series of coin tosses is more 
likely to be heads because the preceding few were all tails. However, 
experts are liable to the same biases in probabilistic judgement as 
laymen - especially in more subtle and complex cases (Kahneman et a l ., 
1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). This is not to deny that a 
statistical training can increase the likelihood of someone adopting a 
statistical approach, and producing a better solution as a result; but 
even where this is the case, it may have more to do with adherence to 
subcultural norms within a professional group, than to a greater 
appreciation of variability and uncertainty within a domain (Nisbett, 
Krantz, Jepson and Kunda, 1983).
The confidence an expert expresses in his or her own beliefs 
appears to depend on more than just representativeness and 
availability:
(a) Redundancy of knowledge The greater the redundancy of
stored information about an event the greater the certainty
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in judgements relating to that event (Chase and Ericsson, 
1982).
(b) Lack-of-knowledge inference This is a meta-inference based 
on knowledge about ones own knowledge, in which the absence 
of knowledge relating to an hypothesis is taken as evidence 
that an assertion is false. There is evidence that experts 
may place greater reliance than novices on this meta­
inference (Centner and Collins, 1981).
(c) Self-generated stimuli Experts, but not novices, are capable 
of inferring the presence of non-existent stimuli (see Arkes 
and Freedman, 1984). It was noted in Section 2.4.1(5) that 
the development of expertise is often accompanied by an 
integration of isolated facts into schemata. Schematic 
knowledge undergoes dynamic changes and distortions in 
memory (e.g\ Bartlett 1932; Schank, 1982) - changes that 
tend to exaggerate distinctive features and "smooth out" 
unremarkable features in line with stored prototypes.
This account goes some way to explaining why, for example, a 
clinician might "remember" that a patient was suffering from 
non-existent symptoms, should those symptoms confirm an 
earlier diagnosis; and "the rampant overconfidence of 
experts in many real-world judgement tasks" (Arkes and 
Freedman, 1984, p.439).
The research reviewed so far suggests that human (expert) 
judgement of uncertain events invariably compares unfavourably with 
formal statistical approaches. This impression needs to be qualified 
somewhat. While it is true that human experts are generally rather
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poor at making quantitative judgements, they appear far more 
successful when it comes to the qualitative handling of uncertainty. 
The following examples are from Zimmer (1984): livestock judges are 
able to handle up to ten variables simultaneously; it has been found 
that where data is highly configurai, subjective judgement can be 
better than statistical prediction; exchange rate prediction by German 
bank clerks was more accurate where forecasts were made verbally 
rather than numerically. Further, a computer simulation of clinical 
reasoning by Fox et a l . (1980) found that a nonprobabilistic approach 
involving pattern-matching on configurations of medical symptoms, 
produced diagnostic results comparable with results derived from a 
Bayesian statistical model.
To summarize: In making quantitative estimates about uncertain
events, experts and laymen tend to rely on heuristic strategies such 
as Availability rather than computationally-demanding statistical 
rules. Within a domain, experts appear better at making qualitative 
assessments, since these appear to rely heavily on learned 
configurations and pattern recognition.
2.4.3 Working memory
(1) Working memory capacity
Experts have larger working memories for domain knowledge than novices.
Cognitive psychologists have long considered the capacity of 
working memory as a major bottleneck in human thinking. Its 
restricted capacity imposes a fundamental limitation on people’s 
ability to think, reason and process information generally (e.g.
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Johnson-Laird, 1982; Miller, 1956; Newell and Simon, 1972). While a 
consensus as to the precise nature of working memory has yet to emerge 
(Chase and Ericsson, 1982), there is general agreement that its 
capacity is no more than about seven unrelated symbols.
However, as Miller (1956) pointed out, each symbol comprises a 
meaningful chunk (see Section 2.4.1(5)). This allows for considerable 
variation in the amount of actual information held in working memory, 
depending on chunk size. In particular, experts' chunks tend to be 
larger than novices. The classic demonstration of this comes from 
chess research (Chase and Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1965). In these 
experiments the task was to reconstruct a chess middle game position 
of some 25 pieces after viewing it for a few seconds. Chess masters 
were able to reconstruct the board position with about 90 percent 
accuracy. Novice players, on the other hand, struggled to replace 
more than 5 or 6 pieces correctly. The chess master’s superior 
performance is based on an ability to process familiar configurations 
of pieces as single chunks; for the weak player each separate piece is 
a chunk. Thus when the task is repeated with a completely scrambled 
board postion - containing no meaningful configurations - experts 
perform no better than novices. Analogs of this experiment in many 
other domains have produced comparable results (see Chase and 
Ericsson, 1982, for references).
Chunking is not the only mechanism accounting for the larger 
working memory of the expert. As cognitive processes become 
automatized (see Section 2.4.2(2)) they make less demands on working 
memory capacity, which in turn leaves more space available for
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information storage. This can explain why skilled readers have 
expanded working memories for what they read, but not for information 
in general (Daneman and Carpenter, 1980).
Chase and Ericsson (1982) found a dramatic speed up in encoding 
and retrieval operations for information in long-term memory with high 
levels of practice (hundreds of hours). At these levels of skill, 
retrieval times from long-term memory come to approach those from 
working memory. The result is that the effective size of working 
memory can exceed normal capacity many times over. Chase and Ericsson 
(1982) claim this extra workspace as one reason why expert performance 
is superior to that of novices in so many domains.
In summary: the expanded working memory of experts is domain- 
specific. It is attributable to factors associated with practice - 
chunking, automatization and directly retrievable long-term 
information.
(2) Problem formulation
How a problem initially gets represented is crucial in determining 
how, and even if, it eventually gets solved (a point that emerges 
clearly from the AI literature). It is therefore worth considering 
the different ways experts and novices formulate problems.
One difference is in the time spent in arriving at a working 
representation of the problem. There is evidence that experts in such 
domains as physics (e.g. Larkin et a l .. 1980), political science (see 
Lesgold, 1984, p.35) and computer programming (e.g. Jeffries et a l ..
1981) take longer than novices in formulating a problem. This
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investment in attempting to understand the problem fully before 
proceeding is rewarded by a faster solution time overall, and an 
increased likelihood of achieving a correct solution. [The longer 
length of time experts take in problem formulation is the main 
exception to the earlier claim that expert processing is faster than 
novices (Section 2.4.2(2)). Experts nevertheless obtain their 
solutions more quickly overall.]
A second important difference concerns the relative abstractness 
of the problem representations. Research on the novice-expert shift 
in algebra (Lewis, 1981), chess (e.g. Chase and Simon, 1973), computer 
program design (Adelson, 1984) and physics (Chi et a l .. 1981) 
indicates that the working representations used by experts are in 
general more abstract than those employed by novices. This expresses 
itself in different ways in different domains. For example, Chi ejL 
a l . (1981) found that physics novices represented problems in terms of 
features contained explicitly in the problem statement (e.g. falling 
bodies); whereas the experts categorized problems by the major physics 
principle used in the solution (e.g. the conservation of energy). In 
the domain of computer programming, the distinction is between 
representations reflecting what a program does (experts), as against 
how a program functions (novices) (Adelson, 1984).
The shift from concrete to abstract ways of representing problems 
depends on acquiring a new set of concepts for the purpose. With 
regard to programming, this means new concepts to support language- 
independent representations of problems (Anderson, 1985).
One advantage of abstract representations is that they hide
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detail, and thus allow more complex problems to be accomodated within 
the limited capacity of working memory. In the case of algebra, for 
example, a complex mathematical expression may be replaced by a single 
variable (Lewis, 1981).
A further advantage is that experts should be better able to reason 
by analogy - since abstract coding facilitates the analogical transfer 
of knowledge from one domain to another (Gick and Holyoak, 1983). 
Moreover, as experience in a domain increases, the basis of similarity 
matches shifts from massive feature overlap and surface-oriented 
matches, to matches based on fewer, but more abstract features (Forbus 
and Gentner, 1986).
What are the stages involved in formulating working 
representations of problems? Chi et a l . (1981) present an account 
that stresses the role of problem categorization in the formulation 
process of physics experts:
extract surface features directly from statement of 
problem
derive abstract features from surface features using domain 
knowledge *
categorize problem according to solution principle involved, 
using derived features
verify categorization using tests specified by the category 
("schema")
use knowledge in schema to complete formulation of problem
(At least step 2 is not applicable to novices.) The completed 
representation supports a forward reasoning solution method (Chi e^
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a l .. 1981). Larkin’s (1983) account is similar. Physics experts 
select from memory a general schema embodying a relevant physics 
principle (e.g. a forces schema). A working representation is then 
constructed by instantiating the schema slots. Bhaskar and Simon 
(1977) also adduced evidence for the role of stored problem templates in 
expert problem formulation.
To recapitulate: experts take longer than novices to achieve an
initial representation for a problem. Experts’ working 
representations are more abstract and solution-oriented, and may 
depend on access to indexed problem schemata.
2.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has reviewed psychological research on the development of
expert thinking. Many facets of cognition change as expertise is 
acquired. Table 2.1 summarizes the principal changes covered in this 
review, classifying them as either ’benefits’ or ’costs’ depending on 
their impact on expert performance. From the table it is clear that 
the changes are predominantly beneficial.
One important point to emerge is that the cognitive correlates of 
expertise, whether beneficial or otherwise, are essentially domain- 
specific in effect. Thus outside his or her specialist area any 
cognitive advantage the expert may have enjoyed inside the domain 
quickly disappears.
It is also possible to say that an expert’s thinking becomes 
increasingly domain-adapted. That is, many aspects of expert thinking
get progressively more tailored to the unique characteristics of a
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particular domain. We examined the tendency to domain-adaptivity with 
regard to changes in reasoning style (2.4.2(4)) in particular. But it 
applies equally to, say, the development of appropriate mental models 
(2.4.1(4)) and working representations of problems (2.4.3(2)).
Another underlying theme in the development of expertise is a 
greater reliance on pattern recognition and memory (stored knowledge) 
at the expense of deductive reasoning. Indeed, at one level acquiring 
expertise can be seen as an adapting to the "natural" processing mode 
of the human brain - which has often been characterized as a highly 
parallel, pattern-oriented system (e.g. Anderson, 1983a). At another 
level, though, experts often show an impressive ability to reflect on, 
and flexibly control, their high-level task strategies. But precisely 
how automated skills and control strategies combine in expert problem 
solving remains poorly understood.
A review of this sort can only hint at the subtlety and complexity 
of human cognition in general, and expert cognition in particular.
For example, little has been said about individual variation in how experts 
think. This is mainly because in psychological studies of expertise 
the principal comparison of interest is between various groups of 
subjects: usually experts and novices. Expert differences have 
received more attention in the knowledge engineering field, as we 
shall see later. The present chapter has focused instead on what is 
distinctive in expert thinking. As the theme of cognitive emulation 
in expert system design is elaborated on in subsequent chapters, there 
will be cause to examine aspects of human cognition not yet 
considered.
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Table 2.1
Cognitive changes with expertise classified as benefits and costs
Change Section
BENEFITS
Increase in quantity of domain knowledge: facts 2 .4.1(1)
rules 2 .4.1(2)
concepts 2.4.1(3)
Refinement of domain knowledge: fuzzier categories 2.4.1(3)
debugged mental models 2.4.1(4)
Development of specialised representations: mental models 2.4.1(4)
Integration of domain knowledge : chunking 2.4.1(5)
schemata 2 .4.2(1)
hierarchies 2 .4.2(1)
cross-referencing 2.4.1(3)
composite procedures 2 .4.1(6)
More efficient fact retrieval 2 .4.2(1)
More flexible control over task strategies 2 .4.2(2)
Speed up and tuning of cognitive skills 2 .4.2(2)
Development of domain-specific reasoning strategies 2.4.2(4)
Improved qualitative handling of uncertainty 2.4.2(5)
Enhanced working memory capacity 2.4.3(1)
More solution-oriented problem representation 2 .4.3(2)
More abstract coding of knowledge 2 .4.3(2)
COSTS
Reduced ability to report on cognitive processes 
Inaccessability of proceduralized task knowledge 
Overconfidence in quantitative judgement
2.4.2(3)
2.4.2(3) 
2.4.2(5)
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2.6 SUGGESTED READING
Lesgold (1984) and Anderson (1985, Chapter 9) both review the 
literature on expert thinking. They should be consulted for an 
alternative perspective. Anderson (1985) is also a readable and up- 
to-date textbook on cognitive psychology in general. The book by Card 
et a l . (1983) provides a good introduction to applied cognitive 
psychology for those familiar with interactive computing. These 
authors present a simplified model of human information processing for 
the purposes of designing effective human-computer interfaces.
Breuker and Wielinga (1983a) and Welbank (1983) discuss psychological 
research as it relates to knowledge acquisition from human experts.
For an integrated theoretical account of the development of expertise 
see Kol^dner (1984).
Papers on expert cognition are carried by a large variety of 
technical journals (see references to this chapter), including 
Cognitive Science. Cognitive Psychology and The International Journal 
of Man-Machine Studies. Much of the literature on clinical expertise 
is to be found in medical journals. A  good collection of papers to 
start on are those by Chase and Simon (1973), Chi et a l . (1981),
Larkin et a l . (1980) and Chase and Ericsson (1982). Finally, the 
references to this chapter should be consulted for further information 
on specific topics of interest to the reader.
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3 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST EMULATION
This chapter reviews the main arguments for and against the principle 
of cognitive emulation. Consideration of other, more pragmatic issues 
is reserved until the next chapter.
3.1 ARGUMENTS FOR COGNITIVE EMULATION
3.1.1 Cognitive emulation is inherent in knowledge engineering
As presently conceived expert systems almost inevitably approximate 
human expert thinking to a significant degree. This is because expert 
systems make use of domain knowledge ordinarily elicited from a human 
expert for solving problems. Indeed, knowledge-based techniques are a 
defining characteristic of the current generation of expert systems. 
Cognitive research clearly shows how dependent human expert 
performance is on the use of large quantities of specialist knowledge 
acquired over many years (see Chapter 2).
Knowledge-based approaches have evolved for sound pragmatic 
reasons and should thus endure. Initially, Al researchers sought to 
solve problems normally requiring human expertise using formal, 
domain-independent methods. It was the ineffectiveness of such 
methods, coupled with the subsequent success of experimental systems 
employing domain knowledge, that has led to the present emphasis on 
knowledge-based techniques. The history of the DENDRAL project 
(Buchanan and Feigenbaum, 1978), clearly illustrates this change.
Many expert system builders would go further and argue that it is 
necessary to capture something of how the expert represents his or her
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knowledge, and the reasoning strategies employed, in order to 
construct an effective system (Welbank, 1983).
Rule-based approaches, and in particular production systems, can 
be seen in this light. Rule-based formalisms are currently the most 
popular approach to knowledge representation, and the term 'expert 
system’ is sometimes formally defined as using rule-based techniques 
(Simons, 1983, p.115). Psychological validity has been claimed for 
this formalism by expert system researchers (e.g. Leith, 1983), 
reference usually being made to Newell and Simon’s (1972) pioneering 
use of production systems for simulating human problem solving. 
Subsequently, production systems have been employed in modelling a 
variety of cognitive processes (Young, 1979). Anderson’s (1976, 1983a) 
ACT* represents an ambitious attempt to model human cognition using an 
architecture based on production systems. Regarding ’rules’ 
generally, there is a large volume of psychological research 
indicating that certain types of expert knowledge may be mentally 
represented in a rule-like form, i.e. empirical associations, pattern- 
indexed schemata, procedural knowledge, etc. (see Chapter 2). Despite 
these clear claims to psychological plausibility it is clear that 
rule-based formalisms have evolved as a major technique principally 
because of their knowledge engineering virtues (e.g. modularity) (Barr 
and Feigenbaum, 1981; Davis and King, 1977).
Other knowledge representation formalisms are supported by 
commercially available expert system packages (Hayes-Roth, Waterman 
and Lenat, 1983), for example, frames and semantic networks. As with 
production systems, these formalisms are taken very seriously as 
psychological models (e.g. Anderson, 1976; Anderson and Bower, 1973;
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Minsky, 1975).
An equivalent point can be made about inferencing methods. A deep 
analysis of expert systems indicates that they typically solve problems 
by the method of ’heuristic classification’ (Clancey, 1985). [Briefly, 
this method relates a specific problem to a specific solution in three 
steps, by ; (1) abstaction from case-specific data to a general 
problem class ; (2) an heuristic match, based on experience, from the 
problem class to a solution class; and (3) refinement of the solution 
class to yield a case-specific solution.] This inference structure is 
found to correspond closely to psychological models of expert problem 
solving (see Clancey, 1985).
The use of machine induction techniques to produce a knowledge 
base does not represent an exception to the inevitability of cognitive 
emulation in knowledge engineering. This is because a domain 
specialist’s knowledge is usually employed in the initial selection of 
concepts, attributes and exemplars. So, consequently, these 
selections will reflect the experts’ underlying conceptualisation of 
the domain. Moreover, at least one well-known machine induction 
product - Donald Michie’s Expert Ease - is derived from an algorithm 
originating in psychological research : Hunt’s Concept Learning System 
(Hunt, Marin and Stone, 1966).
Breuker and Wielinga (1983a) effectively encapsulate the present 
argument when they observe:
In general there is a large overlap between knowledge-based 
systems and psychological models of the same task for the simple
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reason that up to now it is hard to conceive of more general, 
intelligent methods than those used by human(expert)s . (p24)
3.1.2 Cognitive emulation offers a principled approach to design
Probability theory, predicate logic and other formal methods are 
problem solving techniques founded on established mathematical and 
logical principles. This helps explain the attractiveness of such 
techniques to many expert system practitioners. Research is also 
underway (e.g. Fox, 1984a, 1984b) towards formulating a knowledge- 
based theory of decision-making comparable in rigour to statistical 
decision theory, but relying more on qualitative rather than 
quanitative techniques. While this work is informed by a concern for 
human intelligibility and fidelity to human modes of reasoning, it 
also aims at integrating knowledge-based and formal methods where this 
seems appropriate.
However, even without the buttressing of formal methods, cognitive 
emulation can offer a principled approach to knowledge engineering.
In cognitive modelling exercises (see e.g. Hayes-Roth, Waterman and 
Lenat, 1978; Young, 1979) the known or presumed characteristics of 
human information processing are translated into a set of simplicity 
and purity constraints on program design. In production systems used 
as simulation programs this can take the form of self-imposed 
limitations on rule size and complexity, condition-driven control, 
uniformity in the rule base, etc. The main problem that with such a 
purist approach is the loss of computational power that often results. 
While this may even be an advantage in cognitive modelling (Young, 
1979), in applied expert systems it is usually unacceptable.
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To avoid such conflicts, the emulation principle may be invoked 
more selectively (Fox, 1982). This results in a correspondingly 
less principled approach to design, but one which remains informed by 
a unifying conception - human cognition.
3.1.3 Performance
Expert systems seek to achieve expert-level performance. Often 
the only available criterion for assessing the effectiveness of a 
built system is to compare its behaviour with that of one or more 
human experts - the so-called 'gold standard* (Hayes-Roth et a l ., 
1983). In the absence of more objective criteria, a plausible 
strategy for achieving expert-level performance is thus to model the 
underlying (cognitive) processes. The view of Gaschnig et al. (1983, 
p.255) is relevant here:
There is increasing realisation that expert-level performance may 
require heightened attention to the mechanisms by which domain 
experts actually solve the problems for which the expert systems 
are typically built. It is with regard to this issue that the 
interface between knowledge engineering and cognitive psychology is 
the greatest.
3.1.4 User acceptance
Gaining acceptance for a built system is now a major consideration in 
expert system design (Duda and Shortliffe, 1983; Hayes-Roth et a l ., 
1983). This stems from the failure of such famous expert systems as
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MYCIN to be accepted in daily use by the intended users, leading to 
the realisation that the achievement of expert-level performance per 
se is insufficient to guarantee user acceptance. In so far as it 
leads to greater intelligibility in the system's knowledge and the 
processes using it, and to a greater tolerance of intervention by the 
user, cognitive emulation can be expected to promote user acceptance 
(Aikins, 1983, p.199; Fox, 1982).
In addition, the 'cognitive coupling* (Woods, 1986) between user 
and system also has implications for user acceptance. Earlier expert 
systems were often technology-driven problem-solvers, with the user s 
role merely that of data gathering and filtering out poor system 
solutions. Users have tended to reject such a passive role (Coombs 
and Alty, 1984). Recent research is directed to supporting a far 
wider range of cognitive functions (see Section 5.4), with 
acceptability a major criterion.
A related argument is that cognitive emulation is morally or 
socially desirable: it could help humanise what might otherwise become 
an alien, machine-oriented technology (e.g. Fox, 1983; Michie, 1980).
3.1.5 More effective knowledge acquisition and representation
Building any non-trivial expert system is a difficult and time- 
consuming process. It has recently been argued that a major 
contributory factor is the inappropriateness of techniques currently 
used by system builders to both elicit and represent experts’ 
knowledge (Gammack and Young, 1984; Young, 1985). Even within a 
narrow domain an expert's knowledge can be of many different types;
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much of it difficult to capture and express as empirical rules. It is 
thus possible to argue for the use of a variety of psychologically- 
orientated techniques in both knowledge elicitation and knowledge 
representation. For example, Wilkins, Buchanan and Clancey (1984) 
have advocated modelling the expert's knowledge acquisition and 
knowledge organization methods in order to facilitate system 
development. (See Chapter 5.)
3.2 ARGUMENTS AGAINST COGNITIVE EMULATION
3.2.1 Human cognitive weakness
Human cognition compares unfavourably with computer systems in a 
number of respects;
Human memory is prone to forgetting and distortion of stored 
information (Baddeley, 1976; Bartlett, 1932).
The rationality of human thinking (in the formal logical sense) 
can be questioned. Certainly, aspects of deductive reasoning 
such as negation prove highly problematical for human subjects 
(Johnson-Laird, 1982; Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1977).
People experience difficulties with probabilities, especially in 
handling combinations of uncertain evidence (Kahneman et a l ., 
1982).
Human information processing capacity is severely limited 
(Miller, 1956).
Put another way, computer systems already outstrip human capabilities 
in tasks such as arithmetic, rote memory and the application of
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standard problem-solving procedures; and they now perform comparably 
well in such areas as chess and text recognition (Sowa,1984),
While it is valid to make these observations about the comparative 
weaknesses of human thinking, any conclusion regarding the superiority 
of formal computer systems needs strong qualification. First, people 
are able to employ a wide variety of ’heuristics’ and other knowledge- 
based capabilities, which may effectively compensate for a lack of 
computational power (Anderson, 1983a; Kahneman et a l .. 1982).
Moreover, for many interesting problems in Al all the known algorithms 
take an exponential amount of time ; whereas practical heuristics 
derived from observing human performance can produce adequate 
solutions in reasonable amounts of time (Sowa, 1984). Second, the 
difficulties people experience with memory retrieval does not imply 
that computer-based storage systems are superior. That is to say, 
human memory - despite problems of forgetting, distortion, etc. - 
appears better adapted than existing computer systems to maintaining a 
huge database of millions of facts, whilst enabling rapid access to 
all its knowledge (Anderson, 1984).
To conclude: The greater power and accuracy of formal computer
systems argues against an unselective strategy of cognitive emulation. 
However, it does not provide a conclusive argument against a more 
selective strategy, because human cognition has compensatory 
strengths.
3.2.2 Inefficient and suboptimal representations
It can be argued that people make suboptimal decisions because their
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are incapable of using certain types of (optimal) representations of 
problems. This assertion has yet to be demonstrated however (Fox,
1982). Neither has it been shown that computer programs can 
invariably support more satisfactory problem representations.
A related, and more plausible argument is that computer programs 
can represent an expert’s knowledge in a highly compact form; 
certainly more efficiently than a human expert is capable. A familiar 
knowledge engineering practice is to elicit knowledge from an expert 
in modular chunks (facts, rules, etc.), and at a later stage compile 
these into a more efficient representation such as a decision tree or 
network. This has lead some researchers to opt for efficiency rather 
than fidelity to an expert’s representation in expert systems design 
(Welbank, 1983). They recommend translation to and from a more 
natural representation purely for the user’s benefit.
3.2.3 Improving on expert performance
Human experts are known to be inconsistent, unreliable and to disagree 
with their colleagues on important matters (Gaschnig et a l ., 1983; 
Welbank, 1983). Such observations suggest that a reasonable goal for 
expert system design is not merely the achievement of expert level 
performance but, ultimately, an improvement on human expertise.
Results presented by Michalski and Chilausky (1980), where machine- 
induced rules proved better at diagnosing soybean diseases than rules 
derived from an expert, indicate that this is already the case for 
some simple types of task. And logically, it is difficult to see how 
the objective of improving on human performance could be achieved in 
an expert system modelled purely on an expert’s thinking, weaknesses
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as well as strengths.
3.2.4 Multiple expert systems
In knowledge engineering there is often a requirement to embody the 
expertise of specialists from different areas within a single expert 
program. This requirement is reflected in the commercially available 
’blackboard’ architecture for expert systems. [Problem-solving in a 
blackboard system involves a set of independent ’specialists’ or 
knowledge sources co-operating in developing and testing possible 
solutions. Communication is via a shared working memory : the 
blackboard.] Even in the more general case - where only the expertise 
of one particular type of domain specialist is at issue - it is 
considered that to be useful an expert system should be capable of 
embodying the expert skill of several individuals (Welbank, 1983).
This ’multiple expert’ feature constitutes an argument against 
cognitive emulation in its strongest form. That is to say, whilst 
general principles underlying human thinking are discernable, the 
cognitive processes of different individuals cannot be combined or 
averaged very meaningfully. Not least this is because individual 
variation is such a salient characteristic of human cognition (see 
e.g. Newell and Simon, 1972). Even within a particular specialty 
different experts can be expected to employ idiosyncratic reasoning 
strategies and knowledge representations (Kuipers and Kassirer, 1984).
3.3 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has presented the major arguments for and against
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cognitive emulation as an expert system design strategy. Taken 
together the force of these arguments is that neither extreme attitude 
to cognitive emulation is tenable.
Thus, on the one hand, a pure, unselective application of the 
strategy is untenable because:
it would entail a commitment to emulating human cognitive 
weakness (3.2.1)
experts' representations of problems may be sub-optimal or 
inefficient (3.2.2)
it implies that expert systems cannot aim to improve on human 
expert performance (3.2.3)
some expert systems require the expertise of several domain 
specialists (3.2.4)
Equally, the opposite view that cognitive emulation should be avoided 
or ignored as a design strategy can also be discounted since:
cognitive emulation seems inherent in knowledge engineering 
(3.1.1)
cognitive emulation offers a principled approach to expert system 
design (3.1.2)
a plausible strategy for achieving expert-level performance is to 
emulate the underlying cognitive processes (3.1.3) 
cognitive emulation can promote user acceptance (3.1.4) 
effective knowledge elicitation often requires psychologically - 
orientated techniques (3.1.5)
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A more pragmatic attitude is called for: one that acknowledges 
both the potential usefulness and the limitations of cognitive 
emulation for knowledge engineering purposes. The next chapter 
considers factors likely to further constrain and facilitate a 
cognitive approach.
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4 FACTORS FACILITATING AND CONSTRAINING COGNITIVE EMULATION
The arguments reviewed in the previous chapter suggest that a 
significant degree of cognitive emulation is inherent in expert system 
design, but that a pure unselective strategy of emulation is both 
unrealistic and undesirable. In this chapter we discuss several 
rather more pragmatic considerations: some constraining, others 
facilitating, the viability of an emulation approach.
4.1 CONSTRAINTS ON COGNITIVE EMULATION
4.1.1 The emulability of human expertise in artificial systems
It is not yet clear what limits (if any) there are on modelling the 
cognitive processes underlying expert behaviour in an artificial 
system. This issue is essentially a specific instance of the wider 
debate about the comparative nature of artificial and human 
intelligence (e.g. Boden, 1977).
An influential development in this debate has been the notion of a 
’Physical Symbol System* proposed by Newell and Simon (1976). This 
notion defines a broad class of system capable of having and 
manipulating symbols, or more generally, symbolic structures, yet that 
are realisable as physical entities. Newell and Simon’s central 
hypothesis is that Physical Symbol Systems have all the necessary and 
sufficient means for intelligent action. In their view, human beings 
and computers are prime instances of such systems. If this meta­
theory is correct then in principle there should be no limitation on 
cognitive emulation in expert systems.
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On the other hand, it may be as some critics of Al contend, that 
in essential respects human cognitive processes cannot be adequately 
captured in computer programs (Searle, 1984; Weizenbaum, 1976). 
Clearly, if these critics prove right then the prospects for a 
modelling approach are poor.
It seems doubtful whether this fundamental issue can be resolved 
to universal satisfaction solely by resort to a priori arguments. Any 
'conclusive' argument is liable to be overthrown by empirical 
developments in cognitive psychology or the expert system field. An 
alternative view, intermediate between the two above, is that 
different aspects of human cognition vary in their emulability in 
computer systems. For example, cognitive scientists have found it 
relatively straight forward to simulate the acquisition of arithmetic 
skills using rule-based techniques (e.g. Young and O'Shea, 1981).
By contrast, reasoning by analogy and the representation of 
spatial concepts have proved difficult to model computationally 
(Hayes-Roth, 1984; Pinker, 1984). One underlying factor is the 
fundamental difficulty of simulating continuous mental processes by 
digital means, i.e. on digital computers (Sowa, 1984). Again, though, 
it is to early to tell whether aspects of expert thinking currently 
unamenable to emulation will remain so in the future. [This book 
adopts the working hypothesis that, in at least some significant 
respects, human cognition can be emulated on digital computers.]
4.1.2 The state of cognitive psychology
Another potential source of difficulty for system builders adopting a
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strategy of emulation stems from the current state of development of 
cognitive psychology. The difficulties for a modelling approach 
include:
1. Ignorance
Despite a certain amount of progress, it is apparent that many key 
questions about human cognition have yet to be tackled, let alone 
answered, to general satisfaction. Norman (1981) maps out many of 
these gaps in our present knowledge of the human mind. Problem: One 
cannot emulate what is not known.
2. Diversity, of approaches
In Kuhnian terms psychology is an immature science, in a 'pre- 
paradigmatic’ stage of development (Boden, 1977). This is reflected 
in the confusingly varied range of theories, models, knowledge 
representation formalisms, etc. presented in the cognitive literature 
- often as explanations of the same phenomenon. Problem: Which 
theory/model/formalism does one choose to emulate?
3. Scientific Status
As a science the theories and hypotheses of cognitive psychology are 
constantly subject to revision, obsolescence and falsification by 
empirical research findings (Popper, 1963). That is, our knowledge of 
human cognition is provisional in nature. Problem: The cognitive
model emulated today may be refuted by later research.
4. Implementabilitv
The main criterion of an explanation’s acceptability in cognitive 
psychology is experimental corroboration: in AI it is implementability 
(Hayes, 1984). As a consequence AI researchers have often found
75
psychological models not sufficiently robust or predictive to implement 
as working programs. This problem has constrained expert systems 
research (Coombs and Alty, 1984; Hasling et a l .. 1984).
4.1.3 Expert systems technology
The existing technology for building expert systems - both hardware 
(e.g. Von Neumann architectures) and software (languages, shells and 
other system building tools) - is unequal to the task of modelling 
some influential and potentially useful ideas in cognitive psychology. 
[The tutorial article by Hayes-Roth (1984) provides a clear summary of 
the state of the art in knowledge engineering, and what notions it can 
handle].
To take one example: 'spreading activation’ (e.g. Anderson, 1983a; 
Collins and Loftus, 1975). In this theory, memory is represented as a 
network of nodes. When one or more nodes become active (perhaps due 
to a sensory input or memory probe) activation spreads out in parallel 
to the nearest nodes, forming an expanding sphere of activation around 
the original node(s). Roughly speaking, activation decreases the 
further one gets from the initial source(s) of activation. Anderson 
(1983a) argues that activation can function as a ’relevancy 
heuristic’, on the reasonable assumption that knowledge associated with 
what is being processed is likely to be relevant to that processing. 
However, spreading activation is essentially a parallel mechanism 
requiring parallel machinery for its efficient implementation. And 
"until such machinery becomes available, this potentially good idea 
will not see extensive use in pure artificial intelligence
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applications (applied knowledge engineering)" (Anderson, 1983a, p.88). 
This restriction applies equally to other cognitive mechanisms that 
are believed to be parallel processes (see Table 4.2).
On the software side, Hayes-Roth (1984) mentions analogues, meta­
knowledge, naive physics and first principles as types of human 
knowledge not yet available in state-of-the-art expert systems. Table
4.2 provides other examples.
4.1.4 Individual variation in expert thinking
Cognitive psychologists seek to identify general principles of human 
thinking. Individual variation in cognitive performance is accounted 
for with reference to these principles. Whilst a strategy of 
cognitive emulation based purely on general principles of human 
(expert) cognition might be possible, any such approach has its 
limitations.
The cognitive research giving rise to generalisations about the 
human mind (and even the decision processes of a particular group of 
domain specialists), is usually based on experimental results gathered 
from many subjects and analyzed using standard statistical techniques. 
In cognitive simulation psychologists may thus model a 'prototypical' 
or representative subject (Simon, 1979). From the point of view of 
cognitive emulation, the danger is that this kind of application of 
general principles will fail to do proper justice to the known 
richness and variety of reasoning strategies, knowledge 
representations, etc. of individual experts (Kuipers and Kassirer,
1984; Newell and Simon, 1972). The problem-solving capability of an
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expert program might suffer accordingly.
An alternative methodology for cognitive emulation is to model a 
system on the thinking of particular expert(s) using detailed 
techniques (e.g. protocol analysis). However, this is essentally what 
many knowledge engineers would claim to be doing already.
Perhaps the answer lies in combining these polar approaches. That 
is to say, eliciting knowledge from individual experts using standard 
knowledge acquisition techniques like interviewing and protocol 
analysis, followed by the tailoring of knowledge formalisms and 
inferencing methods (selected from a 'toolkit' of psychologically 
plausible alternatives) to reflect the distinctive cognitive processes
of individual experts. Unfortunately, the current state of expert
systems technology (see Section 4.1.3) would not support such an
application of the emulation principle at present.
4.1.5 Knowledge engineering objectives
The final constraining influence considered is that posed by the 
apparent conflict between a strategy of cognitive emulation and other 
knowledge engineering criteria. Textbooks (Barr and and Feigenbaum, 
1981, 1982; Hayes-Roth _et a l .. 1983) and review articles (e.g.
Buchanan, 1982; Davis, 1982; Duda and Shortliffe, 1983) discuss 
various system design criteria. For present purposes only five are 
distinguished;
a. Efficiency
To minimise costs and response times, knowledge engineers aim to build 
computer systems that are maximally efficient in their use of
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computational resources, i.e. memory, time.
b. Modifiability
It is considered highly desirable that the knowledge embodied in an 
expert system be easy to add, delete and amend. This reflects the 
slow, iterative nature of the knowledge acquisition process; which 
typically requires numerous alterations and extensions to the 
knowledge stored in the system.
c . Simplicity
Simplicity of design has several advantages. By keeping the knowledge 
representation, inferencing techniques, etc. as simple as possible, it 
is hoped that the resulting system will be easier to develop and 
maintain, cost less and be more intelligible.
d. Understandability
Understandability is sought because it facilitates all stages of 
expert system construction, and, by making the basis of the system's 
behaviour more intelligible, helps promote user acceptance.
e . Correctness
In order to achieve expert-level performance techniques yielding 
provably correct conclusions are favoured. Consistency and 
completeness in the knowledge base is also sought. Moreover, users 
may express more confidence in the decisions of a system whose 
judgments are perceived as rationally derived.
Table 4.1 attempts to show how these five design criteria, together 
with the constraints on emulation discussed earlier, favour a variety 
of design features commonly found in expert systems. In Table 4.2 the
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Table 4.1
Knowledge engineering factors favouring typical expert system features
EXPERT SYSTEM 
FEATURE
KNOWLEDGE
ENGINEERING
FACTORS(S) COMMENT
1. Uniform Simplicity Each formalism requires its own
Representation inferencing mechanism
of Knowledge Efficiency Computational resources needed to
store and communicate between many 
formalisms
Technology Availability of uniform
implementation languages e.g.
2. Modular Modifiability Enables knowledge to be added,
Representation deleted and amended with minimal
of Knowledge effects on remainder of knowledge in
system
3. Natural 
Representation 
of Knowledge
Understandability A declarative formalism such as rules 
can make the individual items of 
knowledge easier to understand
4. Unrestricted 
Working Memory 
Capacity
Correctness
Understandability
Potentially valuable facts, etc. 
could be lost maintaining limit on 
store size
Imposing a WM restriction might 
appear perverse or irrational to 
users
5. Boolean Simplicity Imposes constrained format '
Representation Efficiency Boolean algebra very efficiently
of Patterns processed by digital computers
Correctness Guaranteed 'correct' reasoning using
Boolean algebra 
Technology Psychological nature of pattern
representation poorly understood
6. Complete Simplicity A more complex interpreter required
Pattern to handle partial matching
Matching Correctness Full matching requirement facilitates
accuracy
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7. Probabilistic Correctness Probabilistic methods offer the
Handling of promise of accuracy (but see e.g.
Uncertainty White, 1984)
Technology A range of established formal methods
are available (e.g. Bayes Thereom, 
fuzzy set theory)
8. Undirectional Simplicity
Control
Structure Technology
e.g. backward-chaining nature of 
Prolog
The flexible intermixture of forward 
and backward reasoning characteristic 
of human thinking difficult to 
emulate
9. Serial 
Processing
Technology Parallel architectures still at the 
prototype stage
10. Direct . Modifiability Ability to directly add, delete and 
Manipulation of alter units of knowledge required for
Knowledge ease of system development and
maintenance
11. Static Technology Absence of techniques for dynamic
Knowledge Base changes to knowledge base whilst in
use
12. Reasoning- Correctness Accurate picture of how conclusions
Based were reached
Explanation Technology Easy to implement e.g. rule-tracing
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Table 4.2
Typical expert system features and cognitive research findings
EXPERT SYSTEM
FEATURE COGNITIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS
SELECTED
REFERENCES
1. Uniform Expert knowledge of many distinct
Representation types - indicating multiple
of Knowledge representations. Basic distinction
between declarative and procedural 
representation often made. Evidence 
for specialised representations of 
visual and spatial knowledge.
2. Modular Expertise in a domain characterised by
Representation integration of knowledge into larger
of Knowledge units, be they chunks, scripts,
themes [1], rules, etc. and by high 
interconnectivity between facts.
[Anderson (1983a), 
Gammack and Young 
(1984),
Pinker (1984), 
Rumelhart and 
Norman (1983)]
[Anderson (1983b), 
Chase and Simon 
(1973), Reder and 
Anderson (1980), 
Smith at. al. 
(1978)1
3. Natural Human expertise seems to rely heavily
Representation of procedurally-embedded or compiled
of Knowledge knowledge. Knowledge underlying
cognitive performance (including 
experts') often not verbalisable.
4. Unrestricted Experts have larger NMs for domain
Working Memory knowledge than novices. Nevertheless,
Capacity experts' WMs still severely limited in
number and complexity of items that 
can be held - imposing constraints on 
human information processing capacity.
5. Boolean Generally, patterns and concepts do
Representation not appear to be represented in
of Patterns cognition as simple predicates linked
in arbitary arrangements by the 
Boolean operators 'or', 'and' and 
'not' e.g. negation rarely used, 
'integral' [2] and structural patterns 
difficult to represent.
6. Complete Humans adept at coping with missing or
Pattern incorrect information in pattern
Matching matching e.g. classifying novel
instances on the basis of their 
similarity to other category instances 
or category prototype [3].
[Anderson (1983b), 
Berry and Broadbent 
(1984), Rumelhart 
and Norman (1981)]
[Chase and Ericsson 
(1982), Miller 
(1956), Newell and 
Simon (1972)]
[Barsalou and Bower 
(1984),Garner(1976), 
Hayes-Roth (1978), 
Johnson-Laird and 
Wason (1977)1
[Barsalou and Bower 
(1984), Elio and 
Anderson (1981), 
Posner and Keele 
(1970)1
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7. Probabilistic 
Handling of 
Uncertainty
8. Undirectional
Control
Structure
9. Serial 
Processing
10. Direct 
Manipulation 
of Knowledge
11. Static 
Knowledge Base
12. Reasoning- 
Based
Explanation
People, including experts, appear to 
rely heavily on nonstatistical 
heuristics e.g. availability and 
representativeness in making 
judgments under uncertainty. Human 
experts influenced by more qualitative
(e.g. configurational) aspects of data. (1984)]
[Fox (1980), Fox 
et a L  (1980), 
Kahneman et aL.
(1982), Zimmer
Compared with novices, the performance 
of human experts is often more 
dependent on data-driven processes 
e.g. pattern recognition. But 
generally expert thinking seems 
characterised by a flexible 
intermixture of forward and backward 
reasoning.
Automated cognitive processes such 
as pattern recognition, memory 
retrieval and other more specialised 
skills, e.g. reading appear 
essentially parallel in nature.
[Anderson (1983a), 
Chi Êt al. (1981) 
Larkin at al. 
(1980), Shiffrin 
and Schneider 
(1977)1
[McClelland and 
Rumelhart (1981), 
Heisser (1976), 
Shiffrin and 
Schneider (1977)]
Research suggests procedural knowledge 
first represented declaratively as [Anderson (1983a,b), 
facts, and only becomes proceduralized Larkin (1981)] 
through repeated use or practice.
Once 'compiled", knowledge not 
readily deleted or modified.
Human knowledge is dynamic in that it 
has the ability to recode, restructure 
and generally modify itself in 'real­
time'.
Cognitive processes underlying expert 
performance often difficult to 
explain. Instead, experts may base 
their explanations on causal reasoning 
using domain models and principles, or 
even post-hoc rationalisations.
[Bartlett (1932), 
Chi et y.. (1981), 
Rumelhart and 
Herman (1978)]
[Berry and Broadbent 
(1984), Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977), Wason 
and Evans (1975)]
Terms;
[1] Themes A term used to denote a thematically-integrated set of 
facts in declarative memory (Anderson, 1983a; Reder and Anderson,
1980). ,  ^ .
[2] Integral pattern A class of stimuli that are not analysed into 
independent attributes (e.g. colour, size) in cognition, but are 
processed in a wholistic manner (Garner, 1976).
[3] Category prototvne The best or clearest example of a category. 
For example, a robin probably conforms to most people's idea of a 
typical 'bird', whereas a vulture does not (Posner and Keele, 
1970; Bosch, 1977).
Other terms are explained elsewhere in this book (see index).
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same design features are related to psychological research on 
corresponding aspects of human (expert) cognition. From inspection of 
Table 4.2 it is apparent that many typical expert system features are 
highly implausible as models of how human experts think.
4.2 FACTORS FACILITATING COGNITIVE EMULATION
4.2.1 Developments in expert system technology
In an earlier section (4.3.3) the current state of expert system 
technology was identified as an important constraint on cognitive 
emulation. However, the technology is still in an early phase of 
development (Bramer, 1984). Over the next decade or two, the massive 
world-wide investment in fifth-generation research projects should 
remove at least some of the technological constraints on modelling 
human cognition. The development of parallel architectures is an 
obvious example on the hardware side (Bishop, 1986). Regarding 
software, research and development objectives include multi­
representation systems, model-based reasoning, meta-knowledge systems 
and learning by example (Hayes-Roth, 1984).
4.2.2 Cognitive research
In addition to providing constraints on a strategy of cognitive 
emulation (see Section 4.3.2), cognitive psychology can facilitate the 
strategy in several ways;
. Cognitive psychology has, 'heuristic value*. That is, the
psychological literature on human thinking can serve as a useful
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source of ideas for expert system builders. So, for example, 
there is a degree of consensus amongst cognitive psychologists 
regarding certain broad principles of human information 
processing (some of these are referred to in Table 2). With 
respect to the cognitive processes subsuming human expertise, a 
growing body of research findings are available (see Chapter 2).
The advent of. cognitive science. Some researchers in cognitive 
psychology and related disciplines (Al, philosophy, linguistics, 
etc.) now identify themselves as Cognitive Scientists. Amongst 
other things, this label denotes a commitment to implementing and 
testing cognitive ideas as computational models (Slack, 1984).
This requirement ought to make the task of cognitive emulation in 
expert programs that much easier.
Developments in the subject. The ongoing research effort by 
cognitive psychologists should significantly advance our 
understanding of the human mind in general, and expert cognition 
in particular. And such advances, if computationally expressed, 
would provide a more assured basis for adopting the cognitive 
emulation principle.
4.2.3 Cognitive emulation can coincide with other knowledge 
engineering objectives
In Tables 4.1 and 4.2 the emphasis is on areas of conflict. Nevertheless, 
it is apparent that cognitive emulation will sometimes coincide rather 
than conflict with other systems design criteria:
Knowledge-based and rule-based techniques. These were discussed
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earlier (Section 3.1.1).
Cognitive emulation would overlap with other criteria (e.g. 
development cost and effort) if it helped overcome the bottleneck 
in knowledge acquisition (see Section 3.1.5).
Cognitive emulation can coincide with computational efficiency.
In one reported study of machine induction, a hierarchially 
structured set of rules (so structured for greater 
understandability) were induced more efficiently than a single 
very large decision rule based on the original ID3 algorithm (see 
Michie, 1982). Moreover, encoding expert knowledge naturally as 
pattern-based rules can help control the explosion of 
combinatorial complexity that more formal approaches might 
entail (Michie, 1980).
Knowing the appropriate rule size for human reasoning can also 
help in knowledge elicitation from the expert (Welbank, 1983).
To provide an expert system with a sophisticated natural language 
interface may require the interface having access to the expert 
system’s knowledge and operations, implying that these must be 
represented in an appropriate (humanlike?) form (Sparck Jones,
1984).
Well-known cognitive principles are already being applied to 
’humanising’ the man-machine interface of expert systems (see 
Welbank, 1983). An awareness of the limitations on people’s 
capacity to process information underlies Donald Michie’s 
(Michie, 1980) recommendation that expert systems be designed to
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include a ’human window’, i.e. employ a conceptualisation of 
knowledge and inferencing techniques that can be both understood 
and executed by a human user. Such a facility is considered 
vital for systems employed in high-risk application areas like 
nuclear plant management.
4.2.4 Problems unamenable to formal methods
The intractible nature of a problem using formal (ie. non-cognitive) 
techniques, could facilitate more psychologically-oriented 
approaches - even though this might clash with other design criteria. 
To date, the relatively limited range, complexity and size of tasks 
tackled by expert systems has usually enabled expert-level performance 
to be achieved without significantly compromising system design 
criteria such as correctness, efficiency, etc. So, for example, the 
existing technology has proved sufficient for handling such ’analytic’ 
tasks as medical diagnosis and geological classification (especially 
in small, well-defined domains). rstefik et a l . (1982) have suggested 
a set of architectural prescriptions for building expert systems of 
this type, which makes use of current techniques.]
However, many leading practitioners in the expert system field 
(e.g. Davis, 1982; Duda and Shortliffe, 1983; Hayes-Roth, 1984), 
suggest that current techniques may prove inadequate for handling the 
much larger knowledge bases (containing several million facts), more 
varied tasks (e.g. ’synthetic’ tasks like design) and more complex 
capabilities (e.g. learning from experience) predicted for future 
applications. Since the human mind has proved equal to coping with
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such tasks, whereas formal Al techniques have not as yet, an 
opportunity for a cognitive approach exists here.
Broadly speaking, the utility of the cognitive emulation principle 
might be expected to increase as the tasks tackled by expert system 
builders become more difficult.
4.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Several constraints on cognitive emulation were identified: Some 
cognitive processes may not be amenable to emulation in principle. 
Others may be emulable in principle, but not with the available 
technology. Our current understanding of human cognition is 
incomplete, with many competing explanations and the prospect of 
established notions being falsified. The individual variation in 
expert cognition may not map comfortably onto general principles 
derived from cognitive research. Special attention was given the way 
in which cognitive emulation could conflict with established knowledge 
engineering objectives such as efficiency and modifiability.
Factors considered likely to facilitate a cognitive approach 
include: future developments in expert systems technology and the 
cognitive sciences, situations where cognitive emulation coincides 
with other design criteria, and the need to tackle problems which are 
intractable using formal methods.
Whether it is feasible to adopt explicitly a strategy of cognitive 
emulation will depend on the particular balance of facilitating and 
constraining factors operating in any given instance. Figure 4.1 
provides a rough-and-ready decision rule based on the points raised in
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this chapter*. Applying this rule, the state of the ’enabling’ 
technologies and disciplines would seem to weigh against all but a 
highly selective pursuit of cognitive emulation for commercial 
applications at the present time. In the longer term, however the 
decision rule implies that a combination of developments in expert systems 
technology and cognitive science, the need to tackle larger and more 
difficult problems, the desire to further humanise the user interface, 
etc. will make adopting a strategy of cognitive emulation increasingly 
attractive - if not essential.
* Note: to be of practical use, the criteria embodied in the decision 
rule would need to be stated much more explicitly.
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If
and
and
and
and
and
or
and
and
or
and
then
1 . Existing (formal) techniques cannot meet all major
knowledge engineering requirements for an application 
satisfactorily
2 . Cognitive process(es) can be identified that appear
relevant to meeting the application requirements
3 . Cognitive process(es) involved considered emulable in
principle
4 . Cognitive process(es) involved psychologically
understood
5 . Cognitive process(es) involved available as a
computational model
6.1 Knowledge engineering tools embodying cognitive
process(es) commercially available
6.2 Resources available to develop knowledge engineering
tools embodying cognitive process(es)
7 . Knowledge engineering tools embodying (generalised)
cognitive process(es) can be tailored to expresively 
accomodate knowledge, etc. elicited from individual 
domain experts
8.1 Emulating cognitive process(es) does not significantly
compromise other knowledge engineering objectives (e.g. 
efficiency)
8.2.1 Emulating cognitive process(es) does significantly 
compromise other knowledge engineering objectives (e.g. 
efficiency)
8.2.2 Problem unsolvable using alternative techniques
Cognitive process(es) involved should be emulated in an 
expert system.
Fig. 4.1 - A decision rule for adopting a strategy of cognitive 
emulation in expert system design.
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5 APPLICATIONS OF THE EMULATION PRINICIPLE ; A SURVEY OF APPROACHES
5.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The two previous chapters have considered the formal arguments for and 
against cognitive emulation, and some of the practical issues 
involved. We reached the interim conclusion that cognitive emulation 
is an inherent feature of design, but that an unselective strategy of 
emulation is both unrealistic and undesirable. Some of the 
circumstances in which a strategy of emulation might be useful were 
also noted. In this chapter we aim to draw out in more detail the 
implications of the strategy for such issues as knowledge acquisition, 
knowledge representation and system architecture. And through an 
examination of different applications of the emulation principle, it 
will hopefully become clearer that a workable and coherent approach to 
expert system design is being discussed.
These aims are achieved through a survey of work in experts 
systems, and closely related fields, which have addressed the 
emulation issue. What such a survey reveals is that cognitive 
emulation is far from constituting a unitary design strategy. On the 
contrary, as instanced by the published literature it is more aptly 
viewed as a loosely bundled set of approaches that share a (variable) 
committment to emulating human cognition. This point can be 
illustrated by a series of quotes from the knowledge engineering 
literature. The following statements form an approximate continuum - 
the first quotes express no concern for cognitive emulation; those 
towards the end advocate a strong version of the strategy:
[1] ...expert system: a computer program which uses artificial
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intelligence (AI) techniques to do the same task as a human 
expert does. (Welbank, 1983, p.l)
[2] ...an expert system is a set of computer programs which emulates 
human expertise by applying techniques of logical inference to a 
knowledge base. (Johnson, 1984, p.15)
[3] It is essential to model the expert's inference structure ... but 
not as important to model the search process he uses. (Clancey, 
1984, p.13)
[4] The knowledge representation and control strategy selected should 
accurately reflect what the human expert knows and how he uses that 
knowledge to solve a problem. This does not mean that the system 
has to be a psychological model ... but it does mean that the 
representation chosen must be able to capture the fullest range 
and power of the human expert’s knowledge in that particular 
domain. (Kidd, 1985a, p. 243)
[5] Cognitive emulation is an expert system design strategy that 
attempts to model system performance on human (expert) thinking. 
(Slatter, 1985, p.28)
[6] Cognitive emulation means building systems in such as way that 
they process information in ways that resemble how users process 
information. (Fox, 1983, p.8)
[7] Unless there is a clear reason not to an expert system should be 
designed to process information in ways that approximate human 
information processing as closely as possible. (Fox, 1982, p.4)
92
[1] and [2] are standard technical definitions. They imply only 
that human expert performance should be emulated - and then by using 
formal Al techniques. [3] and [4] manifest an intermediate 
commitment: [3] is selective in which aspect of human cognition it 
considers it is necessary to emulate; whereas [4] suggests that it is 
sufficient to capture the functionality of expert cognition. [5], [6] 
and [7] offer the strongest endorsements of the cognitive emulation 
principle.
The above quotes serve to illustrate another dimension along which 
approaches to emulation may be tentatively categorized, i.e. the level 
of generality at which the emulation issue is addressed. So, for 
example, some approaches emphasize the emulation of individual experts
[3]. Others are more concerned with emulating the cognitive processes 
representative of larger aggregates of people - experts in a 
particular domain [4], 'experts' [5], 'users' [6], or human cognition 
in general [7]. The survey in this chapter is organized around this 
framework, which is illustrated in Figure 5.1. The number in brackets 
next to each approach refers to the section in which that approach is 
discussed.
Some preliminary remarks about this scheme are in order. First of 
all, it is not intended to be exhaustive. In particular, such 
important topics as vision and natural language understanding, for 
which human cognition provides one obvious model, and which may figure 
prominently in the expert systems of the future, are outside the scope 
of the present survey. Our coverage is limited to the core expert 
system topics of reasoning and control strategies, knowledge
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Level Broad Approach to Cognitive Emulation
Human Emulating 'human Emulating 'neural'
Population information processing (5.7)
Level processing' (5.6)
Large Emulating 'user' Emulating 'expert'
Group cognition (5.5) cognition (5.4)
Level
Small Emulating expertise
Group of experts in a
Level particular domain (5.3)
Single Emulating the
Person individual expert
Level (5.2)
Fig. 5.1 - Approaches to cognitive emulation at different levels 
of generality
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representation, knowledge acquisition and system architecture.
Second, the six approaches cited in Figure 5.1 are clearly not 
mutually exclusive. Thus, for example, it is quite reasonable to 
attempt to emulate both user and expert cognition within a single 
system. Or again, an approach to cognitive emulation inspired by a 
cognitive model of how human expertise develops may still need 
instantiating with respect to a particular domain, and individual 
experts within that domain (c.f. Kolodner, 1984). It is usually 
possible, however, to identify the approach(es) which provides the 
main rationale for any given attempt at emulation.
Each of the six approaches is outlined and evaluated in turn. In 
most cases, each broad approach comprises several distinctive research 
and development efforts, which are described separately. As indicated 
in Figure 5.1 we start by considering the least general approaches.
This is because these connect most readily with the everyday concerns 
of knowledge engineers - how to capture, represent and use the 
knowledge of individual experts, or formalize the expertise within a 
particular domain.
A major concern of the chapter is to make explicit the contrasting 
implications for expert systems design of these different approaches to 
emulation. This is a vital issue since the satisfaction of different 
knowledge engineering objectives (efficiency, modifiability, 
intelligibility) may well require that two or more approaches to 
emulation are combined within a single system. Some of the conflicts 
that can arise are explored in the discussion section (5.8). We also 
sketch some tentative solutions.
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5.2 EMULATING INDIVIDUAL EXPERTS
5.2.1 Introduction
Emulating human cognition at the level of an individual expert 
clearly has implications for the way knowledge is represented and 
deployed in an expert system, and for the overall architecture of 
the system. But questions about knowledge representation, 
knowledge utilisation and architecture arise naturally at other levels 
of emulation also; so discussion of these issues will be deferred until 
later. Instead, we focus here on that aspect of cognitive emulation 
which can only be addressed at the level of individual experts - 
knowledge elicitation. [By knowledge elicitation is meant knowledge 
acquisition activities where the source of information is a human 
expert.] The section is organised around a discussion of what makes 
knowledge elicitation difficult. This is a key issue, since effective 
emulation is critically dependent on the quantity and quality of 
elicited knowledge. We start by outlining some of the practical 
difficulties that knowledge engineers can face. Verbal data collected 
in one way or another is an essential part of knowledge elicitation: 
the limitations of this source of data are outlined. Inaccessibility 
of certain types of knowledge is one potential limitation. We 
consider whether there are kinds of human knowledge that are 
unelicitable in principle. Whether there are or not, the problem is 
compounded by the use of techniques unsuited to eliciting particular 
types of expert knowledge. The final constraint on effective 
cognitive emulation during knowledge elicitation to be considered is 
that imposed by the use of inappropriate representational and
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inferencing tools.
5.2.2 Practical difficulties in knowledge elicitation
These are dealt with at length elsewhere (e.g. Welbank, 1983), and 
include:
Knowledge elicitation techniques are poorly understood. 
Compared with the topic of knowledge representation, the 
discussion of knowledge acquisition in the expert systems 
literature has, at least until the last year or two, been 
rather sparse.
Lack of relevant training and experience amongst 
knowledge engineers in the available knowledge elicitation 
techniques.
The inaccessibility of the expert. They are usually very 
busy people, in high demand within an organization.
Experts may be unenthusiastic. For example, they may feel 
threatened by the purpose of the project, or take exception 
to the attitude of the knowledge engineer. This puts a 
premium on interpersonal skills, in order to motivate the 
expert and retain goodwill and co-operation.
Practical problems such as these can seriously distort attempts at 
emulation. Further research into knowledge elicitation and improved 
training of knowledge engineers would help enormously.
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5.2.3 Limitations of verbal data
It is a misconception to suppose that knowledge can be directly 
captured (or "mined") from a domain expert. All that knowledge 
elicitation techniques such as interviews and protocols can capture is 
a series of verbal utterances. It is the knowledge engineer who, 
through the interpretive processes of sifting, selection, re­
representation, etc., converts this verbal data into the modules of 
knowledge that most expert systems require. Breuker and Wielinga 
(1983a) have described several of the sources of invalidity in verbal 
data which are worth restating here:
the expert's inexperience in self-report techniques
reconstruction/theorising rather than accurate reporting 
("gap-filling")
inaccessibility of procedural knowledge
the ineffability of certain events or internal 
representations
lack of ecological validity in the eliciting context (e.g. 
giving a verbal protocol on an unrepresentative task)
the taken-for-grantedness of highly familiar knowledge
straightforward forgetting of relevant information
ambiguities in verbalizations
secrecy and deliberate under-reporting
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A partial solution to the invalidity of verbal data is to be found 
in the iterative, feedback-driven nature of expert system 
construction, which facilitates the detection and correction of 
shortcomings in the system's knowledge base. We shall be 
considering other remedial measures in the next three sections. 
However, it is hard to conceive of an approach to the elicitation and 
interpretation of verbal data that would guarantee the completeness 
and accuracy of the resulting knowledge base. To this extent a 
fundamental limitation on emulation of individual experts must be 
accepted.
5.2.4 Unelicitable knowledge?
In the previous section the inaccessibility of certain types of human 
knowledge was cited as one source of invalidity in verbal data. And 
earlier, in Chapter 2, we noted that human expert knowledge tends to 
be even less accessible, due to the proceduralisation of task-related 
knowledge that takes place as expertise develops. This raises the 
question of whether there may exist types of human knowledge that are 
unelicitable in principle.
The notion of tacit knowledge has figured prominently in 
discussions of this subject. One such claim has recently been made by 
Collins, Green and Draper (1985):
The mistake is to think that if knowledge elicitation tools and 
techniques are sufficiently refined, and if enough time and 
diligence are dedicated to the task, the whole of an expert’s 
knowledge can be elicited. This is untrue; one cannot elicit that
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which no-one knows that they know - that which they cannot 
articulate, (p.328)
The notion of tacit knowledge was first developed in philosophy by 
Polyani (see Boden, 1977, for a summary). It refers to the tacit 
inferences and global knowledge that provide a nonarticulatable 
framework for human reasoning, including expert reasoning. Collins e_t 
a l . (1985) make the worthwhile point that a skilled user might be able 
to compensate for the absence of tacit knowledge in a knowledge base 
by supplying his own when interpreting an expert system’s behaviour. 
Regarding the wider issue of whether tacit knowledge is elicitable in 
principle, Polyani himself suggested that it was in fact formalizable 
(Boden, 1977, p.435).
Further clarification can be achieved by distinguishing between, 
on the one hand, nonarticulatable (or nonverbalizable) knowledge and, 
on the other, unelicitable knowledge. That is, it may be possible to 
elicit (or infer) knowledge that an expert cannot give direct verbal 
expression to by using, say, techniques derived from cognitive 
psychology. Machine induction of decision rules from examples 
supplied and classified by the expert can play a similar role.
In conclusion, the contention that some aspects of human knowledge 
are not elicitable in principle has yet to be demonstrated. But even 
if all human knowledge were elicitable in principle, the severe 
practical problems of eliciting inaccessible knowledge would remain.
5.2.5 The use of inappropriate elicitation techniques 
Another diagnosis of why knowledge acquisition represents a major
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bottleneck in expert system development stresses the use of 
inappropriate elicitation techniques. For example, informal 
interviews may be the only technique employed, despite their 
unsuitability for eliciting certain types of knowledge (Gammack and 
Young, 1984). Table 5.1 summarizes six major knowledge acquisition 
techniques that are currently available.
Once it is accepted that even within a single specialist domain 
expertise can comprise several distinctive types of knowledge, the 
need for a variety of elicitation techniques becomes evident (Gammack 
and Young, 1984; Kidd, 1985b). The problem is then one of how best to 
match techniques to knowledge types.
In summary, for eliciting the deeper, more "psychological" types 
of knowledge upon which effective cognitive emulation depends, a range 
of techniques need to be deployed. No one technique is sufficient for 
all purposes.
5.2.6 The use of inappropriate expert system development tools
Knowledge engineers have to work with the expert system development 
tools at their disposal. However, the limitations of existing software 
can seriously distort the knowledge elicitation process. For example, 
the use of, say, an EMYCIN-type shell presents the knowledge engineer 
with a predetermined format into which elicited data must be made to 
fit. Because a variant on the rule formalism is the only knowledge
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Table 5.1
Overview of six knowledge elicitation techniques
1. INTERVIEWS
advantages
disadvantages
2. VERBAL 
PROTOCOLS
The most familiar method. Widely used because it 
is relaxed and acceptable. Can take many forms; 
e.g. asking expert to give introductory lecture or 
tutorial about the task domain, or the interview 
can incorporate techniques used in cognitive 
psychology for probing memory such as 'critical 
incident reports'. The interview may follow a 
fixed plan of questioning predetermined by the 
knowledge engineer, or be unstructured, with the 
expert allowed to ramble.
Reckoned to be useful early on for eliciting the 
basic structure of a domain.
A lot of knowledge which is explicit to the expert 
can be elicited quickly.
Relatively easy.
Unsuited for eliciting detailed or 
inaccessible domain knowledge.
Time consuming: e.g. preparing interview plan, 
transcribing recordings of interview.
Relies heavily on uncued recall which is poor.
The expert is required to give a verbal commentary 
on what he or she is thinking about whilst working 
through a problem. A  recording is made of this 
'verbal protocol' which is transcribed and 
analysed. In the classic psychological method at 
least, this can result in a set of production 
rules which, when executed, simulate the person's 
problem solving strategy. A less time-consuming 
variant on the classical method employed by Myers, 
Fox, Pegram and Greaves (1983) involved 
highlighting the substantive knowledge in the 
transcript using a text editor, and coding it 
directly into rules to form a prototype expert 
system.
More natural task situation.
Permits inference of knowledge the expert cannot 
directly verbalise, especially the expert's 
procedures.
Useful where preselected examples exist.
Giving protocol can interfere with task 
performance.
Protocol analysis a skilled and difficult task; 
laborious.
Transcript can be highly ambiguous, requiring much 
'interpretation' when analyzed.
3. MACHINE Machine induced rules often have little resemblance
INDUCTION to those elicited from human experts using other
advantages
disadvantages
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advantages
disadvantages
4. OBSERV­
ATIONAL
STUDIES
advantages
disadvantages
techniques. However, it is appropriate to 
consider machine induction as a technique for 
facilitating cognitive emulation for two reasons. 
First, the large example sets fed in as raw data 
are selected and preclassified by human experts, 
reflecting their conceptualisation of a domain. 
Second, there is some evidence (e.g. Bratko et a l .,
1985) that induced rules can approximate human rules 
under favourable conditions such as having a 
complete or highly representative set of 
examples.
Only needs preclassified examples.
Can cut out the need for a knowledge engineer.
Will account for all examples.
Require a database of documented cases, structured 
around human knowledge.
Instability - a single example can radically 
change an induced rule.
Induced rules are often large and complex, leading 
to intelligibility problems.
Similar to verbal protocols, except that there is 
no interference to the expert’s normal task 
performance from a secondary activity (giving a 
verbal report). It can take such forms as 
videoing, the recording of phone conversations 
between engineers and remote users, or recordings 
of radio ’help’ programmes (e.g. Kidd, 1985c). 
Whatever the medium, the transcripts require 
detailed analysis for useful knowledge to be 
extracted.
Helps overcome preconceived ideas.
Can find out what the expert’s role is and what the 
expert actually does.
If a user involved, draws attention to their 
contribution (often overlooked).
Makes heavy demand on knowledge engineer’s time 
and resources.
Can be a highly sensitive activity, making co­
operation harder to get.
Need to have a clear idea in advance of what to do 
with transcripts.
5. CONCEPTUAL 
SORTING
advantages
A technique employed in cognitive psychology. At 
its simplest the task can involve; (a) obtaining a 
set of concepts that roughly covers a domain (from, 
say, a textbook or glossary); (b) transferring 
each concept to a card; (c) asking expert to 
sort cards into several groups, identifying what 
each group has in common ; and (d) iteratively 
combining these groups to form a hierarchy.
Useful where there is a lot of information to be 
organized.
Considered suitable for establishing global 
structure of domain knowledge.
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disadvantages
Statistical procedures such as cluster analysis 
may be applicable.
Requires some specialist skill to administer. 
Risk of producing artificially hierarchical 
structure of domain concepts.
6 . MULTI- In psychology, MDS techniques are used to identify
DIMENSIONAL perceived similarities and differences in a set
SCALING
(MDS)
advantages
disadvantages
of concepts. The Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) 
is one such technique that has transferred 
successfully to knowledge engineering (e.g. Shaw and 
Gaines, 1983; Boose, 1984). In contrast to conceptual 
sorting, which helps identify the broad conceptual 
structure, MDS techniques can uncover those fine 
discriminations between closely related concepts 
that experts make and which novices find hard to 
differentiate.
Good for eliciting subtle (nonverbal) distinctions 
between concepts.
RGT of proven value as a knowledge elicitation 
technique.
Demanding on the expert if the number of inter­
concept comparisons gets large.
Statistical expertise required to understand and 
employ MDS techniques correctly.
Main Sources: Gammack and Young (1984), Kidd (1985b), Welbank
(1983).
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representation supported in some commercial expert system software, 
there is a real danger that types of knowledge not conveniently 
expressable in the available formalism will have to be either 
represented in an unnatural way or discarded altogether (c.f. Gammack 
and Young, 1984). Knowledge engineers may also be encouraged in the 
misconception that only rules and facts are important in expert system 
building, and that other types of knowledge can safely be ignored 
(Kidd, 1985b).
The requirements of the inference engine can exert their own 
influence on knowledge elicitation. Thus the use of a backward 
chaining shell may encourage the knowledge engineer to ask "where are the 
goals?"
How can the distorting effect of available software be countered? 
Clearly, in the long term expert system software which can naturally 
accommodate the full range of human knowledge types and inferencing 
strategies must be the objective. As a practical short-term measure, 
the coding of knowledge into an intermediate representation 
independent of any implementation appears useful. The detailed 
analysis of elicited knowledge at various levels of abstraction is 
another relevant technique, which is discussed in more detail in 
Section 5.3.
5.2.7 Concluding remarks
To emulate the thinking of a human expert, his or her expertise must 
first be captured. We have reviewed several problems in knowledge 
elicitation that make effective emulation difficult. These ranged
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from the more tractable problems associated with lack of training 
amongst knowledge engineers and the use of unsuitable elicitation 
techniques and software tools, to the fundamental constraints imposed by 
the inherent limitations of verbal data and the inaccessible nature of 
certain types of human knowledge. Our purpose has been to suggest that 
through the use of appropriate remedial measures it is possible to 
capture much of the detail of expert thinking.
5.3 EMULATING DOMAIN EXPERTISE
5.3.1 Introduction
The organising principle of this chapter is the emulation of human 
cognition at different levels of generality. In the previous section 
we considered emulation at the level of the individual domain
specialist (focusing on the question of how effectively on expert's
knowledge can be elicited). This section moves up a level of generality 
(see Figure 5.1) to review approaches concerned with emulating domain 
expertise; i.e. approaches that seek to capture what is typical about the 
organization of knowledge and problem solving within a particular 
specialist area. The psychological validity of such endeavours derives 
from the domain-specific nature of expert cognition, which was 
discussed in Chapter 2.
Medical expertise in general, and clinical diagnostic skill in
particular, has received the most attention in the published
literature. Researchers have sought to embody clinical expertise in
computer systems for two main reasons. First, to gain a better
understanding of clinical cognition, with the aim of improving it.
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Second, to develop practical decision support tools for everyday 
medical use. The application of Al techniques in medicine has yielded 
a number of experimental programs that seriously attempt to emulate 
aspects of clinical cognition: INTERNIST (Pople 1982), NEOMYCIN 
(Clancey and Letsinger, 1981), PIP (Pauker et a l .. 1976) and PSYCO 
(Fox et a l .. 1980) are four prominent examples.
Three distinctive approaches to the simulation of (clinical) 
domain expertise are considered in this section:
1. Simulation programs that mimic the behaviour of human 
clinicians.
2. An alternative approach based on inferring an expert’s 
reasoning by watching.
3. Knowledge-oriented approaches, concerned with analyzing the 
typical organization of knowledge within a domain.
5.3.2 Behavioural mimicry
Two major programs that fall under this category are INTERNIST and 
PIP. INTERNIST (Pople, 1982) is a large advisory program capable of 
making diagnoses in most areas of general internal medicine. It was 
modelled on one particular clinical expert (Myers). PIP, or Present 
Illness Program (Pauker et a l .. 1976), models the way a human 
clinician takes down the Present Illness of a patient with edema - a 
procedure that includes diagnosis.
Insights derived from introspection and the observation of 
experienced clinicians provide the initial basis for such programs. 
Discrepancies between the behaviour of the system and the performance
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of the expert prompts an iterative cycle of testing and revising of 
the program. The cycle terminates when the behaviour of the program 
closely mimics that of a human expert over a range of test cases.
In short, such programs employ Al techniques of knowledge 
representation, inferencing, etc. to simulate clinical cognition 
through behavioural mimicry. These programs do not explicitly attempt 
to implement models of expert thinking taken from the cognitive 
literature. Nevertheless, the approach can result in programs that 
incorporate many psychologically plausible features. This is true of 
PIP (Pauker et a l .. 1979) for example, whose features include;
A system architecture comprising a short-term memory (STM), 
long-term memory (LTM) and control program (see Section 5.6 
below).
LTM organised as an associative network and packaged into 
frames.
Hypothesize-and-test diagnostic strategy (see Chapter 2).
Testing hypotheses by their ’degree of fit’ (e.g. 
partial matching) to disease prototypes (see Table 4.2).
Advoidance of backtracking. The high interconnectedness of 
entities in LTM supports a lateral switching between 
hypotheses.
Frames in LTM are either dormant, semi-activated or fully- 
activated. Activation is triggered by data in STM. This 
can be seen as a crude analog to the psychological theory of
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’spreading activation’ (See Section 4.1.3).
Against these plausible features, PIP also contains instances of 
many of the psychologically implausible features of expert systems 
cited in Table 4.2, including;
A complex scoring system for computing numerical likelihoods 
used in hypothesis testing.
Unnatural shifts in "attention" during information 
acquisition from the user (due to the peculiarities of the 
focusing scoring mechanism).
No theoretical limit on STM storage capacity.
Serial processing only.
Stepping back from the evaluation of one particular program, 
several difficulties with the behavioural mimicry approach in general 
are apparent. First, accurate mimicry of expert behaviour provides no 
guarantee that the system is reasoning in the same way as the human 
expert (Wilkins, Buchanan and Clancey, 1984). Second, the published 
accounts of these systems often show a lack of awareness of the 
psychological literature on human decision making, with the step from 
observation of behaviour to design decisions poorly documented.
Before leaving the topic of behavioural mimicry, a variant on the 
approach ought to be noted. This can be illustrated by a medical 
diagnostic system reported by Reggia, Nau and Wang (1984). The 
performance of the program appears to correspond quite well with 
descriptions of clinical behaviour in the empirical literature. In
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the present context, the important point about this program is that it 
has a firm mathematical basis, being based on work in set theory. 
Reggia et a l .'s program demonstrates that mathematical models can be 
successfully applied to explaining expert performance in a particular 
domain. There must, however, be a question mark over the 
psychological validity of mathematically-inspired approaches, since 
they are essentially at odds with the types of explanation of expert 
cognition currently favoured by cognitive psychologists (see Chapter 
2).
5.3.3 Inferring an expert’s reasoning by watching
Wilkins et a l . (1984) have proposed an alternative approach to 
emulating clinical expertise that addresses some of the weaknesses of 
behavioural mimicry. Wilkins et a l . introduce a system designed 
to infer automatically the mental model of an expert medical 
diagnostician by watching how the expert diagnoses a patient. This 
work is primarily an attempt to solve the knowledge acquisition 
bottleneck by modelling the knowledge organization and acquisition 
methods of a program on human expertise. Medicine is a suitable 
domain for such an experiment because of the large research 
literature on clinical expertise.
Wilkins et a l . point out that experts in many domains share an 
ability to infer the reasons for a colleague’s decisions by watching 
their task performance. In particular, the ability to learn by 
watching appears important to the acquisition of medical expertise.
In the early phases of medical training, the student studies and
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acquires textbook knowledge about human physiology and diseases. But 
at this stage real diagnostic competence has yet to be attained.
There follows a period of apprenticeship during which the student 
observes experienced clinicians handling real diagnostic cases, and 
tries to duplicate this diagnostic skill when dealing with cases on their 
own. According to Wilkins et a l . the ability to infer reasoning 
by watching is as basic a dimension of human expert skill as problem 
solving, explanations of expertise, or teaching of expertise.
The presented system is designed to acquire new domain knowledge 
in the following way:
(1) The system is supplied with a model of clinical reasoning 
(to provide the constraints necessary to infer the expert's 
model).
(2) The system watches a physician-patient consultation and 
attempts to infer the expert's reason for asking a question 
at each point during the session.
(3) Whenever it cannot do so, the system concludes that the 
expert possesses some knowledge that it does not, and sets 
about trying to acquire the knowledge.
(4) Where the program fails to correctly infer the expert's 
model, protocol analysis is used to identify where the 
program is deficient.
(5) Changes are made to the program’s domain-independent 
strategic knowledge (held separately from the domain 
knowledge).
Ill
others are experimenting with this approach. For example, Boyle 
(1985) presents a modification of Wilkins et a l .'s system to acquire 
both control and domain knowledge in a blackboard environment.
Assessment of the learning by watching approach is hampered 
because of the early stage of research efforts. But, in general, it 
compares favourably with behavioural mimicry. At least in the case of 
Wilkins et a l .'s system, an attempt is made to base the system’s 
knowledge organisation and inferencing method on a model of clinical 
reasoning. And changes in the program are made in a more principled 
fashion. Wilkins et a l . point out some of the weaknesses of the 
watching approach themselves: Individual differences between the 
reasoning styles of physicians can cause problems. Program failures 
may sometimes occur that are beyond the current state of cognitive 
psychology and expert systems technology to resolve; for example, 
situations involving complex temporal reasoning. A criticism about 
how these programs acquire knowledge is also in order, since their 
reliance on a single human-like strategy - inferring by watching - 
ignores the other means by which human expertise is acquired (see 
Chapter 2).
5.3.4 Knowledge-oriented approaches
We now turn to a third approach to emulating domain expertise, which 
focuses on achieving high-level representations of expert knowledge 
within a particular domain. In constructing expert systems it is 
useful to examine the knowledge to be embodied in the system at 
several levels. One notable classification (see Wielinga and Breuker,
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1984, pp. 10-11) suggests knowledge can be analyzed on at least five 
levels ;
Linguistic - the level at which the expert reports
on his or her knowledge.
Conceptual - the formalisation of domain knowledge
that unifies the knowledge of several 
experts, and perhaps several sub- 
domains, within a single conceptual 
framework.
Epistemological - this level of analysis is designed to
uncover the underlying structural 
properties of domain knowledge. It is 
expressed in epistemological primitives 
representing the basic elements, 
relations, strategies, etc.
Logical - refers to the formalism(s) in which the
knowledge is presented and upon which 
inferencing procedures operate.
Implementational - an analysis in terms of the
implementation language to be adopted.
Wielinga and Breuker (1984) point out that much research in expert 
systems has been concerned with mapping knowledge at the first 
(linguistic) level directly into an implementation language. The 
failure to analyze knowledge at any of the intervening levels - in
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particular, the epistemological level - may be at the root of several 
knowledge engineering problems:
(1) Knowledge acquisition. From linguistic data to 
implementation language is too large a gap to have to bridge 
in a single step; and valuable additional knowledge may be 
lost by not analyzing at intermediate levels (Wielinga and 
Breuker, 1984).
(2) Expert system design and modification. The mixture of terms 
that is generally used to describe expert systems can 
confuse implementation language with knowledge structure and 
the search process. Clancey (1984) argues that this 
confusion makes it difficult to analyze new problems or 
derive a set of knowledge engineering principles.
Furthermore, knowledge which has not been analyzed at an 
epistemological level can prove difficult to modify by other 
than the original authors - a point brought out by Clancey
(1983) in his examination of MYCIN’s rule base.
(3) Teaching and explanation. Clancey (1983) also showed that 
his initial difficulties in adapting the MYCIN rule base 
to support a teaching and explanatory role were due to the 
proceduralized form of MYCIN rules. Clancey found that by 
uncovering the strategies, supporting concepts and 
structural relationships implicit in MYCIN’s empirical rules 
(i.e. hypothesis - data links), it becomes easier to support 
such roles.
Knowledge analysis has been applied in two main ways: to the
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analysis of expert systems of a particular type, and as a tool in 
knowledge acquisition.
Analysis of expert systems On the basis of detailed analyses, both 
Bennett (1985) and Clancey (1984) concluded that most existing 
diagnostic systems employ essentially the same small set of basic 
elements and relations. In other words, while reasoning and search 
strategies were found to vary considerably between systems, the basic 
knowledge elements and inference structure were not. Bennett (1985) 
exploited this commonality in the development of ROGET, an automated 
knowledge acquisition tool. This system helps elicit from a domain 
expert the 'conceptual structure’ for a diagnostic system in a new 
sub-domain. ROGET is equipped with the general structure and knowledge 
elements that make up a typical MYCIN-like diagnostic system. The 
domain expert is able to tailor this structure in accordance with the 
unique features of a particular domain. Basic elements in the 
diagnostic domain include ’findings’, ’symptoms’ and ’hypotheses’, 
arranged in the same kind of inference structure across sub-domains. 
Other expert domains would appear amenable to a similar treatment 
(Wielinga and Breuker, 1984). Clancey’s (1984, 1985) influential 
analysis of expert systems has already been referred to (see section 
3.1.1).
Knowledge acquisition tool Some of the ideas already discussed are 
incorporated in a framework for knowledge acquisition proposed by 
Wielinga and Breuker (1984). Their approach centres on the use of 
interpretation models. An interpretation model consists of a 
classification of canonical elements, structuring relations, strategies
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and a representation of the inference structure for a class of domains 
An analysis of the task the expert has to perform can form the initial 
basis of a model. Once formulated, it provides a set of abstract 
categories and expectancies which help direct the gathering of data 
(from textbooks, interviews, verbal protocols, etc.) and its 
subsequent interpretation. Because an interpretation model is 
formalised at an epistemological level, the knowledge engineer is 
forced to analyze the data at this level in order to test and refine 
the model. Some early results using this approach in a variety of 
domains appear quite promising (e.g. HaKong and Hickman, 1985;
Wielinga and Breuker, 1984). However, Breuker and Wielinga (1984) 
point out that not all constructable interpretation models are 
implementable using existing Al techniques.
Considered as a strategy for emulating expert cognition in a given 
domain, the knowledge analysis approach has a number of limitations;
Fidelity to domain-specific features of processing (as 
opposed to knowledge organization) tends to be regarded as a 
secondary issue.
Epistemological analysis is concerned with making explicit 
the types of knowledge that may exist in a particular domain 
- not with faithfully representing what individual experts 
actually know.
Epistemological analysis can make explicit types of 
knowledge that are represented in expert cognition only in a 
highly proceduralized, highly inaccessible form. That is, 
for the expert such explicated knowledge may not in fact
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exist
In summary, knowledge analysis is a useful technique in its own 
right. As an approach to emulating domain expertise it offers a 
valuable perspective, but not a complete solution.
5.4 EMULATING EXPERT COGNITION
5.4.1 Introduction
In the two previous sections we have considered approaches to 
cognitive emulation centred on the individual expert and domain 
expertise respectively. Individual differences in expert thinking 
provide the psychological justification for the first approach; the 
domain-adapted nature of human expertise the justification for the 
second. However, a psychological rationale can also be found for an 
approach to expert system design centered on general considerations of 
expert cognitive functioning. Put another way, across many specialist 
domains the cognitive changes that accompany the development of 
expertise are broadly similar (see Chapter 2, especially Table 2.1.). 
None of the research reviewed below attempts to embody all - or even a 
majority - of the cognitive features listed in Table 2.1. Instead, 
these studies concentrate on modelling selective aspects of expert 
reasoning and knowledge organization, in accordance with the knowledge 
engineering objectives of the researchers involved. [It is important 
to bear in mind that any implementation at this level also requires 
instantiating with regard to a particular domain - and possibly at the 
individual expert level also.]
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Two broad perspectives on emulating general expert cognition can 
be distinguished. The first is concerned with modelling dynamic 
aspects of expert thinking: i.e. how knowledge structures and 
reasoning strategies change as experience is acquired and the dynamic 
aspects of expert problem solving. The second category of research is 
directed towards emulating particular cognitive functions; for 
example, tuition, critiquing or guidance. As we shall see, both areas 
are now being actively investigated.
5.4.2 Emulating the dynamics of expert cognition
Recent cognitive research (e.g. Johnson et a l .. 1981; Feltovich et 
al.. 1984; see also Chapter 2) has drawn attention to the role of 
experience in the development of human expertise. However, the 
dynamic changes in expert reasoning and knowledge organization that 
result from experience is not reflected in the current generation of 
expert systems. Here we shall review attempts to supply expert 
systems with such dynamic capabilities.
One line of approach (e.g. Kolodner, 1984; Riesbeck, 1984; Schank 
and Slade, 1984) builds on Al research into episodic memory and 
natural language processing initiated by Schank (e.g. Schank, 1982). 
Central to this research - and the expert system applications - are 
the concepts of 'semantic memory', 'episodic memory', 'memory 
organization packages (MOPs)’, 'similarity-based generalization* and 
'failure-driven learning*. Because these concepts may be unfamiliar, 
they are introduced below, before an examination of their (proposed) 
application in knowledge engineering.
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To begin with then, a distinction has been made between semantic 
memory and episodic memory (one incidently, that was first made in 
cognitive psychology):
Semantic Memory Human semantic memory is the memory for facts we 
know, arranged in some kind of hierarchical network (Kolodner, 1984). 
For example, in a semantic memory "stool" may be defined as a type of 
"chair", in turn defined as an instance of "furniture". Properties 
and relations are handled within the overall hierarchical framework.
In terms of human expertise, semantic memory represents the store of 
factual knowledge that a novice acquires. But experience is required 
to convert facts into usable expert knowledge (Kolodner, 1984).
Episodic Memory If semantic memory encodes facts, then episodic 
memory encodes experience. An episode is a record of an experienced 
event like visiting a restaurant or a diagnostic consultation. 
Generalised episodes are also created, representing typical events. 
Information in episodic memory is defined and organized in accordance 
with its intended uses in different situations or operations. On this 
view it is the development of extensive and highly tuned episodic 
memory that above all else distinguishes the domain expert from the 
novice (e.g. Kolodner, 1984). That is, even assuming that factual 
knowledge (semantic memory) remains constant as expertise develops, 
the expert possesses better episodic definitions for using it.
Episodes are implemented as MOPs:
Memory Organisation Packets (MOPs) MOPs are a knowledge 
representation formalism developed by Schank (e.g. 1982) for 
implementing episodes. They are modular frame-like structures that
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serve to organize, index and cross-reference an episodic memory of 
events. MOPs are organized in a generalization hierarchy; each MOP 
can have several other MOPs as sub-parts, and each sub-part can 
participate in several higher-level MOPs. [The MOP formalism evolved 
from Schank’s (Schank and Abelson, 1977) earlier notion of a script 
- a formalism in which each event is represented in a single large 
frame-like unit. This reformulation was prompted partly by empirical 
tests of the script concept in psychology, and partly for efficiency 
reasons.]
Two forms of experience-based learning are identified in the 
development of episodic memory - similarity-based generalization and 
failure-driven learning;
Similarity-based Generalization When similarities are detected 
between already-established concepts in episodic memory - what Schank 
(1982) calls "reminding" - these similarities are extracted to form a 
generalized episode. Thus two or three diagnostic consultations with 
patients may be sufficient for a clinician to encode a generalized 
episode about typical features of this situation. Thereafter, 
individual episodes need only record their distinguishing features: 
again, this results in economical storage. Generalized MOPs are also 
useful in interpreting and reasoning about newly encountered events, 
which are understood as instances of existing generalized episodes.
Failure-driven learning In performing cognitive tasks, people are 
often aware of strategy failures, exceptional events, etc. According 
to Schank (1982) and others, this awareness triggers failure-driven 
learning; a process which involves:
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detecting the failure
attempting to allocate blame ("explain") the failure - 
the explanation serves as an index to the failed episode
when a similar situation is encountered later it is refered 
to the failed episode via this index
if a solution was found to the initial failure, the same 
solution can be applied to the second situation; otherwise, 
the two episodes can be compared to determine the cause of 
their joint failure, and the process of indexing and referai 
repeated
Kolodner (e.g. 1984) in particular, has shown how these concepts 
can be applied to understanding the development of human expertise in 
a single domain (psychiatry). Her work is based on the verbal 
protocols of doctors making psychiatric diagnoses and recommending 
treatment. An elaboration of the MOP idea is used to represent the 
doctors' experiences: Process MOPs are an explicit representation of 
the reasoning strategies of the diagnostician; while Diagnostic MOPs 
represent domain-specific diagnostic knowledge. Developments of the 
two types of MOP are highly co-ordinated. The theory is partially 
implemented in a computer program called SHRINK. Riesbeck (1984) 
employs the same basic concepts of failure-driven learning and MOPs to 
model the development of expertise in economic reasoning - again with 
a partial computer implementation.
On this view of human expertise, today's expert systems suffer
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from two main deficiencies:
(1) Unlike human experts, most expert systems were never novices 
- starting out with one type of knowledge base and ending up 
with another (Riesbeck, 1984).
(2) Current expert systems do not have a memory - the same case 
will be treated in the same way, however often it is 
encountered (Schank, 1982). The human ability to use and 
learn from experience is missing.
Kolodner (1984), Riesbeck (1984) and others (e.g. Schanck and
Slade, 1984) take a similar view on what this characterization of
human expertise implies for expert system design. First of all, the 
program should be supplied with the kind of factual knowledge that a
domain novice can acquire from textbooks and other public sources. In
addition, the initial program will require rules for reorganizing its 
knowledge base and reasoning strategies as new experiences are 
encountered. Then the program can be given a set of experiences (e.g. 
cases to diagnose), plus feedback on its performance. Modelling how 
experience changes the way an expert reasons like this is seen as the 
most effective method for equipping an expert system with the 
capabilities of human experts.
Kolodner (1984) herself points out the main problems with this approach
it is highly complex (c.f. rule-based systems) and 
consequently difficult to implement
verifying that expert reasoning and knowledge organization 
change as predicted by the model is a nontrivial task
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explanation of the system’s reasoning presents a major 
challange
A further difficulty relates to the psychological validity of the 
underlying model of human expertise and how it develops. In 
particular, although concepts such as semantic memory, episodic 
memory, etc. are familiar ones in cognitive psychology, it has not 
yet been shown how the model can account for the empirical literature 
on expert-novice differences (see Chapter 2).
The 'competent expert systems' methodology (Keravnou and Johnson, 
1986) is also concerned with dynamic aspects of expert thinking. Here, 
however, interest is in how dynamic aspects of expert strategy execution 
can be modelled in an explicit and principled way. A  'competent' expert 
system is one that represents explicitly the reasoning strategies and 
domain knowledge structures adopted by experts in a particular domain - 
i.e. the 'model of competence' of the domain . The methodology specifies 
tools for eliciting models of competence, and mapping them into 
knowledge representation schemes. During knowledge acquisition the 
dynamics of how strategic knowledge is used are analyzed : i.e. how it 
is decomposed and integrated, how strategies are selected in context, 
etc.
Keravnou and Johnson (1986) make strong claims for this 
methodology, including enhanced system-user dialogues and explanations, 
improved knowledge acquisition, and greater power and flexibility in 
problem solving. From the standpoint of cognitive emulation, the main 
criticism is that 'competent' expert systems are likely to lack
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plausibility as psychological models. That is, the emphasis on explicit 
representation, and on a clear separation of strategic and domain 
knowledge, is at odds with the highly compiled nature of human expertise 
(see Chapter 2).
5.4.3 Emulating the cognitive functions experts perform
The approaches to cognitive emulation reviewed in the previous section 
were selective in their emphasis on the dynamic aspects of expert 
cognition. Here we concentrate on recent attempts to emulate another 
aspect of human expertise - the ability of experts to perform a 
variety of cognitive functions. Early research efforts focused on 
developing expert systems to perform the role of problem solvers.
That is to say, programs like DENDRAL, MYCIN and XCON were all 
principally designed to produce technically correct solutions to well- 
defined problems. And most of the research on cognitive emulation 
reviewed so far in this book has been directed at modelling the 
problem-solving skills of human experts. Clinical diagnostic skills 
are the most frequently cited example.
A combination of factors has prompted the recent shift in research 
interest to include other cognitive functions. Important among these 
are :
(1) User dissatisfaction with the problem-solving paradigm.
In this paradigm the user acts as a data source, supplying 
information to the program through a system-controlled 
dialogue. This sequence ends with the system supplying a 
completed solution which the user may either accept or
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reject. The problem-solving paradigm arises from a 
technology-driven approach to expert system design in which 
the user has little scope for exercising personal control 
or responsibility (Woods, 1986). As such, the often 
reported problem of ’user acceptance’ in knowledge 
engineering, may result primarily from expert systems 
performing inappropriate and unacceptable cognitive roles 
(e.g. Coombs and Alty, 1984; Woods, 1986).
(2) Detailed observational studies of what experts really do 
(e.g. Coombs and Alty, 1984; Kidd, 1985c) are beginning to 
reveal the wide range of cognitive functions experts 
actually perform. A basic finding is that users normally 
play a more active role when consulting an expert than 
present expert systems allow. For example, users may help 
define the problem to be solved, supply a set of constraints 
that any solution must satisfy, or formulate their own plan 
for the expert to critique. Expert systems designed to 
support such co-operative problem solving activity appear 
far more acceptable to users (Coombs and Alty, 1984; Kidd, 
1985c; Langlotz and Shortliffe, 1984).
The particular cognitive functions to be considered here are 
critiquing, guidance, remedy negotiation and tuition :
CRITIQUING
A critique is an explanation of important differences between a user’s 
proposed solution (or plan, etc.) and the solution the expert would 
have proposed. Initially, the critiquing function was thought to
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occur principally where the user is either a domain expert (e.g. 
Langlotz and Shortliffe, 1984) or a full or partial expert in an 
overlapping domain of expertise (Coombs and Alty, 1984). But analyses 
of naturally occurring dialogues between experts and novice users 
(Kidd, 1985c) make it clear the critiquing of user proposals takes 
place across a wide spectrum of user skill.
Among expert systems that embody a critiquing function are :
ATTENDING a program for critiquing anesthetic management 
(Miller, 1984)
ONCOCIN critiques the therapy plans of physicians for 
treating cancer patients (Langlotz and Shortliffe, 1984)
Critiquing can take a variety of forms : e.g. warning of 
prerequisite violations, reports on possible consequences and side 
effects, reminders of potentially relevant information. Thus expert 
systems designed to perform a critiquing function are able to adopt a 
less intrusive, "silent partner" role. In the case of ONCOCIN, for 
example, the system analyses the problem and develops a therapy plan 
for itself, but only makes this known if the plan entered by the 
physician differs in significant respects. As a consequence, the user 
is not interrupted in a majority of cases. Langlotz and Shortliffe 
(1984) adapted ONCOCIN to perform a critiquing role in response to 
user dissatisfaction with its original problem solving orientation.
No apparent attempt was made to emulate expert cognition in the 
implementation of ONCOCIN, which relies on sophisticated AI techniques.
GUIDANCE
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In an advanced technological society expertise becomes fragmented and 
highly specialized. As a consequence the solution to many technical 
problems can require the co-ordinated efforts of several specialists. 
Experts in one domain are often called upon to help experts in 
overlapping fields to extend and refine their understanding at the 
interface of their two domains of knowledge (Coombs and Alty, 1984). 
This guidance function relies more on educational than problem solving 
skills.
In order to implement a prototype guidance system, Coombs and Alty
(1984) concluded that :
it is necessary to isolate the fundamental cognitive procedure 
underlying interactions. To do this systematically requires 
some theory of the role of conceptualization and understanding in 
problem solving (p. 139)
The authors considered cognitive theories from psychology and A I , but 
found them insufficiently developed for application purposes.
Instead, Coombs and Alty based their program on a general theory of 
cognition developed in cybernetics by Pask (e.g. Pask, 1975). Pask's 
Conversation Theory is too complex to elaborate here, but it basically 
attempts to establish the minimum theoretical structures needed to 
support different cognitive processes. Coombs and Alty found it a 
useful framework within which to model the guidance function. The 
implemented system, MINDPAD, helps users in the task of debugging 
simple PROLOG programs. It supports the user’s problem solving 
efforts through making available resources, suggesting tasks, and 
critiquing user explanations.
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REMEDY NEGOTIATION
Diagnostic expert systems provide answers to two main questions : (a) 
what is at fault? and (b) what is the appropriate remedy? However, 
these do not appear representative of the questions users actually put 
to experts. A study of naturally-occurring consultations in several 
diagnostic domains by Kidd (1985c) reveals a rather different picture. 
In contrast to current expert systems (that output a take-it-or- 
leave-it solution at the end of a consultation), a complex process of 
remedy negotation between expert and user was observed. This can 
involve ;
the expert proposing a tentative remedy early in the 
dialogue
the user volunteering constraints (e.g. "it must be fast") 
on potential remedies
the user rejecting a remedy because it has already been 
tried and failed, or does not meet user-imposed 
constraints.
the expert critiquing remedies proposed by the user
the expert explaining why a remedy worked, or trying to 
convince a user to adopt a particular remedy
Kidd(1985c) considers the implications of these findings for the 
design of diagnostic advice systems. She rightly points out that 
present AI technology cannot support the sophisticated mixed- 
initiative dialogues, etc. needed to emulate properly the expert’s
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role in this context. Instead, Kidd considers how AI work on the 
representation of, and reasoning about, deeper level structural and 
functional knowledge (e.g. Davis, 1984) can be adapted to support a 
remedy negotiation role. This AI work overlaps with 
cognitive research into the mental models of human experts (see 
Chapter 2).
TUTORING
Like guidance, tutoring is a cognitive function which requires 
educational skills (as much as problem solving ability) from an 
expert. One major expert system to support a tutoring role is 
NEOMYCIN (Clancey and Letsinger, 1981; Hasling, Clancey and Rennels, 
1984). More specifically, NEOMYCIN is a consultation program with a 
knowledge base configured so as to promote understanding about the 
diagnostic strategies employed in a particular medical domain. The 
basic assumption is that for an "understander" to be able to solve 
domain problems for themself, they need - in addition to domain 
knowledge - some idea of the problem-solving process. To this end, 
the approach adopted in NEOMYCIN is to model human reasoning, with 
diagnostic procedures represented explicitly. [The model includes a 
working memory of activated hypotheses, forward-chaining in response 
to clinical data, and hypotheses triggered by association. Some 
empirical support for such a model of clinical cognition is provided 
in a study by Patel and Groen (1986).] So, rather than having expert 
diagnostic knowledge implicitly embedded in the control program’s code 
(c.f. MYCIN), it is expressed explicitly in the knowledge base as meta­
rules.
In short, NEOMYCIN supports a tutoring function using an explicit
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model of diagnostic reasoning. However, while this may be an 
effective approach to teaching expertise, it probably does not emulate 
the cognitive mechanisms involved in human expert tuition. For, as 
was noted in Chapter 2, experts are often completely unaware of their 
own problem solving processes.
In this section we have looked at programs designed to support 
cognitive functions beyond the simple problem solving of most earlier 
systems. The researchers involved differ greatly in their attempts 
to emulate the cognitive processes underlying the performance of a 
particular role. Thus, at one extreme, Langlotz and Shortliffe (1984) 
were able to develop a critiquing system using standard AI techniques. 
While at the other, Coombs and Alty (1984) employed a well-articulated 
theory of cognition to implement a prototype guidance system. The 
decision to adopt an emulation strategy in such cases appears to 
reflect two principal considerations :
(1) When it is possible to build a program to perform an expert
function using formal AI methods there is little point in
experimenting with cognitive models.
(2) The available cognitive models must be sufficiently robust
and powerful to support an implemented program.
130
5.5 EMULATING USER COGNITION
5.5.1 Introduction
The previous three sections of this chapter have considered 
approaches to the emulation of expert cognition. But for many 
researchers (e.g. Breuker and Wielinga, 1983b; Fox, 1983; Kidd, 1985a; 
Sleeman, 1984) it has seemed at least as important to achieve 
compatibility at the cognitive level between an expert system and the 
user. A  good match between system and user is seen as vital for 
several reasons ;
without this cognitive compatability the system’s behaviour 
can appear surprising and unnatural to the user
to counter the potential dehumanising influence of expert 
systems technology (through ensuring the knowledge and 
reasoning of the system are understandable to the user, 
user-controlled dialogues, etc.)
to ensure the system will be accepted within its intended 
social and organizational context of use
User interface design is acknowledged as an important issue in 
present generation systems. However, while a substantial amount of 
development effort and application code often goes into constructing 
’user friendly’ interfaces; work on tailoring expert systems to match 
user cognition at a deeper level is still largely at the research 
stage. Some of this research is seeking to make expert systems more 
usable by designing them so that they process information in the way 
users process information (Fox, 1983). The emulation of ’human
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information processing' is the subject of the next section (5.6).
Here we focus on how expert systems can be adapted to model the 
requirements of particular users, or types of user.
Two common uses of the term 'user model’ in the expert system 
literature need to be distinguished at the outset. First, it can 
refer to the representation an expert system may have of the system’s 
intended end user. Second, there is the human user’s conceptual model 
- or, as seems more likely, plurality of models (e.g. Hammond and 
Barnard, 1985, Young, 1981) of the specialist domain, the task to be 
performed, and the computer system itself. We are mainly concerned 
with the first sense of the term here.
5.5.2 The benefits of user models
Sparck Jones (1985) identifies three main benefits that the possession 
of user models can confer on expert systems :
(1) Acceptability. To be acceptable the form in which 
information is elicited and explanations given need to be 
tailored to the intended user - be they novice or super-expert
(2) Efficiency of system operations. For example, the most 
efficient mode of system-user interaction will usually vary 
according to the user’s level of skill.
(3) Effectiveness. User models can facilitate more effective 
task performance through more accurate interpretation of 
user behaviour, and by making the system’s requirements 
more comprehensible to a particular user.
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5.5.3 User characteristics in user models
Many types of expert system are possible. For some of these a 
representation of the user would serve little useful purpose - for 
example, autonomous problem solving systems where there is minimal user 
involvement. More often, though, expert systems act as some kind of 
'knowledgeable assistant* (Kidd, 1985a) to the user. Where this is 
the case, an expert system might benefit from the inclusion of several 
types of knowledge about the user. Specifically, about the user’s :
conceptualization of the task domain 
way of formulating problems 
goals, needs, assumptions, expectations 
model of how the system works 
typical errors and misconceptions 
level of competence
preferred method of interacting with the system 
acceptance criteria 
the user’s role
5.5.4 User modelling techniques
Breuker and Wielinga (1983b) include a stage of 'User Analysis’ as 
part of their knowledge engineering methodology. They argue for the 
use of several methods - interviews, experiments, simulation, 
protocols of real-life interactions, etc. - in order to elicit the 
kinds of user information listed above.
Many of the current AI techniques for representing user attributes
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were developed by researchers working on intelligent tutoring systems 
(see e.g. Sleeman and Brown, 1982). One classification of user models 
(e.g. Sleeman, 1984) distinguishes ;
(1) Scalar models The level of expertise of the user is 
expressed as a single number. For example, in the 
KEYSTROKE model of Card et a l . (1983), the number of key­
strokes is used as a measure of text-editing skill.
(2) Ad hoc modelling systems These exploit the specific
features of the underlying system, such as how the 
inference engine works.
(3) Profile models The user is represented by a set of
weighted attributes (e.g. "romantic"), which enables the
system to match the user to, say, a suitable book or film.
(4) Overlay models The competence of the user-novice is
represented as a subset of the expert's. So, for example, if 
the expert’s knowledge is expressed as a semantic network, 
the novice’s knowledge "overlays" a part of this network.
(5) Process models A representation of the user’s problem
solving processes. For example, student’s incorrect, or
"buggy" arithmetic procedures were modelled in BUGGY (Brown 
and Burton, 1978).
It is only with the last modelling technique, process models, that
a serious attempt at cognitive emulation is made. The other types of
model are more directed to representing what a user knows, expects.
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etc.; rather than the how question addressed by process models.
Unlike ad hoc models, process models are executable using standard 
inference engines (Sleeman, 1984). So, in principle at least, this 
emulation technique could be adopted more widely than it currently is
Where the intended user group is homogeneous, the entire expert 
system can be designed in accordance with the characteristics of that 
group. In contrast, heterogeneity in the proposed users may require 
that several a priori user models about the different types of user
are built into the system. The problem is then one of
selecting/tailoring a model to a particular user at run-time. A 
number of ways of inferring a suitable user model have been developed;
the system takes the initiative and questions the user
the system infers the user’s characteristics from their
behaviour
the system is told to expect a user of a certain type,
perhaps by setting a parameter
The appropriate mode of system-user dialogue (e.g. linear command
syntax, menus, natural language, graphical displays, etc.) can be
selected using the same basic methods (Bundy, 1984).
5.5.5 Expert system applications
Some notable applications of user modelling techniques in expert 
systems include :
(1) In a medical system developed by Wallis and Shortliffe
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(1982), difficulty level is expressed as an integer. The 
concepts used by the system to explain its reasoning varies 
according to the difficulty level selected by the user.
(2) The Interviewer/Reasoner model (Gerring, Shortliffe and van 
Melle, 1982) - as the name implies-consists of two main 
parts. The "Reasoner" is a rule-based AI program which does 
most of the computation; the "Interviewer" is a user- 
oriented display program that mediates between the user and 
the system.
(3) Intelligent Front Ends (IFEs). This type of expert system 
acts as a friendly interface to a software package that 
would otherwise be incomprehensible to many potential users 
(Bundy, 1984). IFEs use AI techniques to enable the user to 
communicate with the underlying package using their own 
terminology. Through a user-oriented dialogue a model of
the user's problem is constructed, and translated into a form 
the package understands.
(4) UMFE (Sleeman, 1984) is a user modelling front-end sub-system 
which tailors its explanations to the user's level of 
understanding. Concepts used by the back-end expert system are 
graded by UMFE acording to difficulty. Depending on the use r ’s 
response to initial concepts, UMFE is able to infer additional 
concepts the user may/may not find comprehensible.
5.5.6 Problems in user emulation
The requirements of effective user modelling are often beyond the 
scope of existing AI techniques to deliver :
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AMBIGUITIES IN USER MODELLING
Sparck Jones (1985) observes that a simple one-to-one match between a 
given user and user model could be impossible to establish in certain 
expert system applications. In medical advisory systems, for example, 
it is necessary to distinguish between the patient and doctor (system 
user) as separate people, and possibly between the different roles a 
single user performs. Thus user emulation can require manipulating a 
muliplicity of user models with different functions and different 
bases. Moveover, the system’s knowledge of a user may need to be 
dynamic - responding to changes in the user’s understanding, skill, 
etc. as they occur (Sparck Jones, 1985).
FALSE EXPECTATIONS
Sophisticated user-oriented dialogues (e.g. natural language 
interfaces) and other user modelling techniques can give the user a 
misleading impression of an expert system’s capabilities. Where the 
intelligence exhibited by the user interface is unmatched by the 
performance of the underlying system, there is a danger that the user 
will place an unjustified reliance on the system’s decisions (Boden, 
1985). Boden suggests that the system should ’flag’ its limitations 
to the user in these circumstances.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNDERLYING SYSTEM
According to Sparck Jones (1985), user modelling cannot be effective 
unless the modelling component has proper access to the knowledge and 
operations of the "back-end" system. The provision of a non-trivial 
natural language capability may require an equally close coupling 
between interface and back-end sub-systems (Sparck Jones, 1984).
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REPRESENTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
It is unlikely that all the user’s knowledge about the problem domain, 
about the task to be performed, and about the computer system can be 
integrated into a unitary user model (Hammond and Barnard, 1985). For 
instance, Young (1981) found that users’ knowledge of pocket 
calculator usage fell into two distinct types. On the one hand, he 
describes ’task-action mapping rules’ - a set of rules/procedures 
for reaching certain task goals. These are complemented by 
’conceptual models’ representing knowledge about the relations between 
system entities. [These models often have an analogical basis, e.g. 
the "Typewriter" model used in word processing (Hammond and Barnard, 
1985)]. Moreover, as the tasks tackled by expert systems become more 
open-ended and complex, multiple knowledge representations will become 
increasingly necessary to capture the user’s knowledge (Sleeman,
1984).
CONFLICTING DEMANDS
A basic conflict can arise between the user modelling and task 
performance components of a system : the former requires 
responsiveness to the user, while the latter is computationally- 
oriented. Gerring et al.’s (1982) Interviewer/Reasoner model 
addresses this issue by implementing these components as separate 
(though interacting) programs. A similar rationale underlies the 
notion of Intelligent Front Ends to complex software packages (Bundy, 
1984).
More important here, emulating the user may conflict with 
emulating expert reasoning. For as Kiss (reported by Fox, 1983)
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points out, although emulating user cognition may improve 
intelligibility, it can also lead to systems which lack power and 
which fail to complement human processing methods. In view of the 
contrasting benefits available from emulating experts and user, 
techniques are required to enable both forms of emulation to co-exist 
within a single system. A system architecture in which user and 
expert cognition are modelled in separate components, along the lines 
suggested above, offers one potential solution. We shall return to 
this and related issues in the discussion (Section 5.8).
5.6 EMULATING HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING
5.6.1 Introduction
Invoking the principle of cognitive emulation at this level (see Fig. 
5.1) implies one, or both, of the following :
Seeking compatability between the architecture of expert 
systems and the architecture of human information processing 
(c.f. Fox, 1983)
expert system work directly inspired by research in cognitive 
psychology : i.e. specific findings, models and hypotheses.
As such, expert systems adopting this approach are analogous to 
the "representative programs" developed by cognitive scientists. 
Representative programs attempt to embody general mechanisms of human 
thinking without simulating any individual person. They thus perform 
a role in cognitive science comparable to that of the "representative 
firm" in economics (Simon, 1979).
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The discussion of cognitive emulation at this level centres on 
five key issues :
(1) The extent to which the standard three-element system 
architecture of expert systems corresponds to the 
architecture of human cognition.
(2) The psychological plausibility of particular knowledge 
representation formalisms and system architectures.
(3) Attempts to make expert systems compatible with the 
limitations of human information processing.
(4) The explicit representation of knowledge.
(5) Approaches to the handling of uncertainty in expert systems 
inspired by cognitive psychology.
5.6.2 The architecture of expert systems and human cognition
5.6.2.1 Structural comparisons
There is a basic similarity in the system architecture of, on the one 
hand, performance-oriented expert systems and, on the other, computer 
simulations of human cognition developed by cognitive scientists. In 
both types of program it is frequently possible to distinguish three 
fundamental architectural components :
(1) A static store of permanent knowledge represented in some 
explicit form, e.g. production rules, frames.
(2) A dynamic store for holding temporary data.
(3) A processing element which uses the knowledge in (1) to make 
inferences based on (2).
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As noted in Chapter 2, in the context of applied expert systems the 
names given are typically (1) knowledge base, (2) dynamic database, 
and (3) inference engine; while in cognitive science these elements 
more often translate as (1) long-term memory, (2) working (or short­
term) memory and (3) cognitive processor. This correspondance is 
illustrated in Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.3 respectively.
Why research in these two areas should have converged on the same 
basic system architecture is open to various interpretations (e.g. 
Davis and King, 1977; Hayes-Roth, Waterman and Lenat, 1978). Hayes- 
Roth et a l . (1978) make the point that the two areas offer nearly 
complementary theories of information processing : with cognitive 
psychology focusing on problems of knowledge acquisition, retrieval 
and storage; and Al/expert systems on issues of knowledge 
representation and utilization.
On one interpretation, the correspondence between Figures 5.2 and
5.3 could be taken as evidence that current expert systems emulate 
human cognition in a fundamental respect. But this would represent an 
over-simplification of the more complex picture uncovered by cognitive 
research. In particular, the modularity of the three structural 
elements implied in Fig 5.3 is called into question by some 
empirical findings. A few selected examples from the cognitive 
literature will serve to illustrate this apparent non-modularity :
LONG-TERM MEMORY I WORKING MEMORY
The concept of working memory has gone through many transformations in 
the psychological literature. In earlier accounts it was seen 
essentially as a uniform, limited-capacity and separate store for the 
storage and processing of short-term information (see e.g. Newell and
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KNOWLEDGE DYNAMIC
BASE DATABASE
INFERENCE
ENGINE
Fig. 5.2 - Expert system architecture
LONG-TERM WORKING
MEMORY MEMORY
COGNITIVE
PROCESSOR
^iê* 5.3 - Human cognitive architecture shown as comprising three
independent elements
142
LONG-TERM MEMORY
WORKING
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COGNITIVE
PROCESSOR
5.4 - Human cognitive architecture shown as comprising three
overlapping elements
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Simon, 1972). But this view has become increasingly superceded by 
more complex formulations in which, for example, working memory is 
defined as the currently 'activated' portion of long-term memory (e.g. 
Anderson, 1983a; Card et a l .. 1983). Indeed, Card et a l . (1983) 
represent the relation between the two types of memory as shown in 
Figure 5.4, with working memory nested within long-term memory.
WORKING MEMORY I COGNITIVE PROCESSOR
Studies of individuals with highly skilled memories led Chase and Ericsson 
(1982) to propose a model of working memory that includes rapid- 
accessing retrieval mechanisms to long-term memory. On this view, 
there is an intimate connection between working memory and attentional 
processes. Baddeley (1981) has reached a similar conclusion. In his 
account - based on a mature research programme - working memory is 
partitioned into three sub-stores; one of which (the "Central 
Executive") is assumed to have a limited amount of processing capacity 
of its own.
COGNITIVE PROCESSOR/LONG-TERM MEMORY
The acquisition of cognitive skill and expertise is accompanied by the 
proceduralization of knowledge (see Chapter 2). And there is plenty 
of evidence for the importance of procedurally-represented knowledge 
in human cognition generally (e.g. Elio, 1986; Norman and Rumelhart,
1981). While it is possible to model procedural knowledge using some 
kind of declarative formalism - production rules, say - there remains 
a strong likelihood that human procedural knowledge is held in a 
highly compiled and contextually dependent form : with control and 
knowledge packaged closely together.
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On the basis of findings such as these, one could argue that Fig.
5.A offers a more accurate diagrammatic representation of how long-term 
memory, working memory and cognitive processes are related than Figure 
5.3. However, the modularity of cognitive architecture implied by 
Figure 5.3 is less contentious if viewed as a simplifying assumption 
necessary in cognitive modelling. While this clearly weakens the 
claim that the system architecture of standard expert systems emulates 
the human cognitive architecture, a certain structural similarity 
remains.
5.6.2.2 Formal comparisons
It is informative to compare performance-oriented expert systems with 
cognitive simulations from a formal as well as a structural viewpoint. 
In particular, there are some notable difference in the formal 
properties of production systems adapted for either purpose (Davis and 
King, 1977; Haves-Roth et a l .. 1978; Young, 1979). The early, 'pure* 
production systems used to model human problem solving, 
perception, etc. (e.g. Newell and Simon, 1972; Newell, 1973) were 
characterised by :
. a single-level rule base (long-term memory)
. constrained rule format (e.g. no negation, disjunctive 
conditions, or nesting of conditions permitted)
. simple pattern matching capabilities (e.g. variable substitution, 
but no evaluation of complex predicates)
. syntactic conflict resolution (e.g. based on rule of the 
specificity of conditions)
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. condition driven control (i.e. forward-chaining) using a linear 
cycle of recognize-act cycles
. size-limited working memory
These features represent a set of purity and simplicity restrictions 
adopted to capture the invariants of human cognition (Hayes-Roth e^ 
a l ., 1978; Young, 1979). The constraints placed on rule format, for 
instance, enable a stronger analogy to be drawn with psychological 
stimulus-response behaviours than would otherwise be possible. At 
its strictest, this amounts to a highly principled approach to 
cognitive modelling; one in which every aspect of the system is 
assumed to have a psychological correlate (Davis and King, 1977).
The main cost is loss of computational power - not usually a 
critical problem in cognitive modelling, but a serious drawback in 
performance-oriented expert systems. This helps explain why many of 
the purity restrictions are relaxed in applied systems to allow, for 
example :
additional types of knowledge representation (including 
semantic nets, frames, procedural attachment)
probabilistic measures of uncertainty attached to rules
backward-chaining and bi-directional control structures
specialized and multi-layered working memories (e.g. 
blackboards)
meta-rules that control the invocation of object rules
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. partial matching between working memory elements and rule 
conditions (or consequents in backward-chaining systems)
. knowledge in different states of activation (e.g. quiescent, 
semi-active, fully-active)
no limit on the number of symbols created and maintained in 
working memory for pattern matching
Interestingly, many of these relaxations have started to appear in 
more recent cognitive simulations. This point is very well 
illustrated by one major attempt to model the human cognitive 
architecture : developed by Anderson (1983a). While ACT* retains an 
overall production system architecture it includes, along side the 
standard production rule memory :
a long term declarative memory expressed in a network 
representation
. analogical(spatial) representations
. a working memory consisting of currently activated knowledge 
in long-term memory, and thus of variable size
. a pattern matching mechanism capable of partial matching and 
sensitive to probabilistic criteria
This is not an isolated example. Another is a cognitive model of 
human planning behaviour (Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979). This 
illustrates well the relaxation on working memory uniformity, since 
the model employs a blackboard architecture with multiple, multi­
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layered working memories (i.e. blackboards). In general, the belief 
that a single, simple system architecture or knowledge formalism is 
sufficient to capture all human cognitive functioning - or even a 
substantial part of it - is no longer widely subscribed to in 
cognitive psychology.
The willingness of cognitive modellers to adopt a wider range of 
AI techniques serves to blur the distinction between knowledge 
engineering and cognitive science. A  continuation of the convergence 
between the two fields would provide a compelling argument for the 
cognitive emulation principle. Research developments in the near 
future should make it clear whether the architectural requirements of 
applied expert systems and cognitive models coincide fundamentally or 
n o t .
It may turn out that the cognitive scientist's more principled 
approach to program design is the limiting factor on this process of 
convergence. For whereas the expert system builder is entitled to use 
all the programming devices at his or her disposal, the cognitive 
scientist must - in principle, at least - be able to justify program 
features on theoretical grounds. While this stricture has discouraged 
ad hoc program fixes ("kludges") in simulation programs, it has not 
prevented psychological validity being claimed for a wide variety of 
system architectures and knowledge formalisms. It is these claims 
that we shall now consider.
5.6.3 Psychological validity of different system architectures and 
knowledge representation formalisms
AI researchers have developed a large number of system architectures
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and knowledge formalisms (see e.g. Barr and Feigenbaum, 1981; or 
Rumelhart and Norman, 1983). Some of these have been advanced as 
general models of human information processing, such as production 
systems (Newell and Simon, 1972) and the blackboard architecture 
(Hayes-Roth, 1983). More often though, an individual architecture or 
formalism is adopted because it appears well-adapted to modelling a 
particular cognitive function. Table 5.2 illustrates the different 
areas of research various architectures/formalisms have found special 
favour in. Cognitive scientists justify these choices on theoretical 
grounds, but also in terms of sufficiency (Young, 1979). In other 
words, because so little is known about human cognition, a successful 
simulation program has some claim to psychological validity solely on 
the grounds that it works.
Many cognitive scientists (e.g. Anderson, 1983a; Rumelhart and 
Norman, 1983; Sloman, 1984) now take seriously the hypothesis that 
human thinking is a multi-representational system - one that may parallel 
the range of representations used in psychological modelling. On this 
view, each aspect of the represented world is mapped into the 
representation best suited to a particular use.
Table 5.3 makes the point that variants on all the architectures/ 
formalisms included in Table 5.2 have also found employment in expert 
systems research. It is thus not possible at present to assess the 
psychological validity of an expert system simply by whether it 
employs a particular architecture/formalism or not. Instead, the 
question of psychological validity needs to be addressed on a more
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Table 5.2
Research areas in cognitive science in which selected system 
architectures and knowledge representations are typically adopted
Representation/
Architecture
Reasearch
Area
Sample
Reference
Production Systems Problem Solving 
Perceptual Processes 
Skill Acquisition
Newell and Simon (1972) 
Newell (1973)
Anderson (1983a)
Semantic Networks Long-term Memory Anderson and Bower (1973)
Schema-based 
Formalisms 
(frames, scripts, 
MOPs)
Text Understanding 
Memory for Episodes
Schank and Abelson (1977) 
Schank (1982)
Spatial
Representations
Imagery
Vision
Kosslyn (1980) 
Marr (1982)
Blackboard Model Reading
Planning
McClelland and Rumelhart 
Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth
(1981)
(1979)
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Table 5.3
Examples of expert system research employing different system 
architectures and knowledge representations.
Representation/
Architecture
System
Name
Application
Area Reference
Production System MYCIN Medicine Shortliffe (1976)
Semantic Networks PROSPECTOR Geology Duda et al. (1979)
Frames PIP Medicine Pauker et al. (1976)
Spatial ACRONYM Image Brooks (1983)
Representations understanding
Blackboard Model JOBBES Job selection Boyle (1985)
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contextual basis. One might ask, for example:
does the selected architecture/formalism perform the 
designated task adequately? (i.e. is it sufficient? )
is the architecture/formalism selected based on a 
psychological considerations? Is it being used in a 
principled way?
is the architecture/formalism selected representative of 
those used by cognitive scientists to model human 
performance on comparable tasks?
5.6.4 Limitations on human information processing
Human information processing capacity is limited (see Chapter 2).
This has led to several suggestions as to how expert systems might be 
adapted to reflect these limitations. To consider a few:
Fox, Alvey and Myers (1983) discuss the need for a "low-demand" 
expert system package to cater for situations where the computer may 
only be one of a number of activities. So, for example, it is 
unrealistic to assume that in routine clinical practice, with a 
patient present perhaps, that a doctor's activities will be centred 
around the computer. [This is an assumption often made in MMI 
research.] What is required under such conditions, suggest Fox 
a l .. (1983), is a system which makes minimal demands on the user. The 
authors describe PROPS, a prototype expert system package human- 
engineered to facilite speedy querying and user control of the system.
A comparable problem can arise in real-time process control
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applications. For instance, Paterson, Sachs and Turner (1985) point 
out that operators at one particular gas development installation have 
access to around 35,000 items of data. These authors suggest the need 
for an expert system to reduce the problem of cognitive overload that 
can arise where operators are faced with large amounts of rapidly 
changing data. Paterson et a l .. (1985) have developed a demonstrator 
system, ESCORT, which analyzes plant data to identify potential 
control and instrumentation failures, and provides operators with 
advice on crisis handling and avoidance.
To keep the technology within the realms of human understanding 
and control, Michie (e.g. 1982) argues for a human window into an 
expert system s operations. The human window is determined by the 
human brain's own limitations on memory and calculation, which Michie 
(1982) defines as 10 bits and 20 binary discriminations 
respectively *. Put another way, the notion of a human window depends 
on a system being both 'executable' by, and 'intelligible' to, a system 
user. Intelligibility is said to increase as the number of patterns 
to be processed decreases; while executability is inversely related 
to the amount of search required. On this basis, exhaustive minimax 
search procedures are intelligible but not (humanly) executable, and 
table-lookup procedures are executable but not intelligible. In order 
to preserve intelligibility, Michie (1982) proposes a structured 
approach to machine induction, one which restricts rule complexity.
Each rule would be allowed a maximum of seven subpatterns - in 
accordance with Miller's (1956) estimate of human short-term memory
* Qualitative estimates such as these are highly controversial.
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capacity.
The understandability of rules in expert systems has received a 
lot of attention. Some of the main findings and recommendations in 
this area (see e.g. Welbank, 1983) include:
rule size In the medical field, a typical rule may have 
three conditons and one action (Welbank, 1983, p.40). 
Following Michie (see above), seven conditions would seem to 
be a desirable maximum. Rules can be made smaller by 
introducing intermediate concepts.
grain size Granularity refers to the level of detail at 
which a system represents its concepts. Whether this is 
'coarse' or 'fine', it should correspond to the level 
employed by the system user.
complexity Disjunctive conditions ('or'), negation 
('not'), quantifiers ('some', 'all', etc.) and nested 
conditions are all well-known in cognitive psychology as 
causing difficulties in understanding (e.g. Johnson-Laird and 
Wason, 1977), and should be used minimally, or not at all.
How uncertainty is expressed within a rule formalism also has 
implications for intelligibility. However, because the representation 
of uncertainty is a major research theme in its own right , this 
research is dealt with separately in a later section (5.6.6.)
5.6.5 The explicit representation of knowledge
Conventional computer systems can be viewed as comprising two main
154
components: ’program’ and 'data'. The program is typically an 
algorithmic procedure, perhaps written in a language like COBOL or 
PASCAL. Data refers to the information manipulated by the program - 
held in database files, working storage, etc. This organization fails 
to make explicit the relationships inherent in the data, or the 
control knowledge which is contextually-embedded in the program code. 
Such systems, particularly when they are very large, prove difficult 
to develop, maintain or understand.
By constrast, a characteristic feature of expert systems, from 
DENDRAL and MYCIN onwards, has been the attempt to improve 
intelligibility through a knowledge-based approach. An expert 
system's knowledge base encodes information in a way designed to 
capture its meaning - that is, as modular chunks of knowledge (facts, 
rules, etc.), which make explicit the relationships among items of 
data and other entities within some domain. Furthermore, much of the 
control knowledge embedded in an algorithmic procedure, can be 
represented declaratively as say, rules, within an expert system.
This means that in comparison with previous types of information 
processing system, expert systems typically have a larger declarative 
component (the knowledge base) and a smaller procedural component (the 
inference engine). [For further discussion of the relative merits of 
procedural and declarative formalisms see Winograd (1975) or Barr and 
Feigenbaum (1981].
Despite the gains in system intelligibility the use of declarative 
formalisms has brought, it has become apparent that a great deal of 
knowledge remains effectively 'compiled' into conventional rule-based
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expert systems (e.g. Aikins, 1983; Clancey, 1983). For example, 
Clancey (1983) found that the following types of knowledge were not 
explicitly represented in MYCIN;
the strategic knowledge underlying the ordering of rules, 
and the ordering of rule conditions (these jointly exert a 
major influence on system behaviour given MYCINVs backward- 
chaining inferencing mechanism)
the structural knowledge implicit in the hierarchical 
organization of the MYCIN rule base
the support knowledge which provides the justification 
for the inclusion of individual rules in the knowledge base
Clancey (1983) suggests that the implicit nature of such knowledge 
helps explain why MYCIN proved difficult to modify by other than the 
original rule authors. It also prevented Clancey from directly 
adapting MYCIN to support a tutoring role. A complete reorganization 
of the MYCIN knowledge base was required for this purpose, implemented 
in the NEOMYCIN system (Clancey and Letsinger, 1981). Here 
intelligibility is enhanced by representing strategies explicitly as 
meta-rules (i.e. as rules that control the invocation of other rules). 
An alternative approach is adopted in CENTAUR (Aikins, 1983). In this 
system a hybrid knowledge representation - frames and production rules 
- is used to make explicit the context in which individual rules are 
routinely invoked. Small sets of rules are stored in the slots of 
different hypothesis frames, and are only considered for "firing" when 
the parent frame is itself activated.
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Keravnou and Johnson (1985) have taken the explication of strategic 
knowledge a step further. In their ’competent expert systems’ methodology 
each diagnostic strategy (or sub-strategy) is represented as a task frame, 
which makes explicit the dynamic context in which a particular 
strategy is invoked. So, different frame slots specify the conditions 
that ’enable’ a strategy to be invoked, and which ’disable* it, or 
which allow a disabling condition to be ’relaxed’, the sub-tasks that 
must be achieved if the strategy is to succeed, and so on.
How much futher expert system researchers can take the process of 
knowledge explication is not yet clear. At present, the tendency is to 
see every move in the direction of greater explicitness as necessarily 
beneficial. However, a highly explicit representation of domain knowledge 
is at odds with what is known about the compiled nature of much expert 
knowledge. There is also a danger that explicit representations will 
result in distorted models of expert reasoning, since inferencing 
methods are closely linked to particular representation formalisms.
5.6.6 The qualitative treatment of uncertainty
A great deal has been written about the representation of uncertainty in 
expert systems. Conventional decision support systems have used 
techniques based on probability theory, such as Bayes’ Theorem, to 
handle uncertainty in a rigorous, quantifiable fashion. In 
knowledge-based expert systems various ad hoc combinations of logic 
and probability theory have been employed. MYCIN (Shortliffe, 1976) 
and PROSPECTOR (Duda et a l .. 1979) are two well-known systems using 
such ad hoc quantitative methods. MYCIN is illustrative of the kind 
of techniques currently in use. Rules in the knowledge base have
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’Certainty Factors’ attached to them. A certainty factor is a number 
in the range -1.0 to 1.0 expressing the strength of belief that the 
conclusion of the rule is true, assuming all its premises are true. 
During a consultation these values combine to yield an overall 
confidence estimate attached to the system’s advice.
Our concern here is not with the shortcomings of existing 
techniques from a theoretical or technical standpoint - although these 
are by no means trivial (e.g. Rich, 1983; White, 1984). Rather, it is 
with the lack of correlation between such techniques and how 
uncertainty is normally processed in human cognition. Earlier 
(Section 2.4.2) we reviewed psychological research indicating that 
people are more skilled and feel more comfortable handling uncertainty 
in a qualitative, rather than a quantitative fashion. [This is not to 
identify qualitative approaches exclusively with human cognition, or 
quantitative methods with formal Al. For instance, many models of 
human pattern recognition are amenable to rigorous statistical 
expression and testing (Reed, 1972); and, equally, a formalized, 
qualitative treatment of uncertainty in Al is also possible (e.g.
Cohen, 1985, see below).]. A number of qualitative techniques are now 
available for improving the psychological validity and/or 
intelligibility of how expert systems handle uncertainty:
(1) Fox et a l .. (1980) found that a forward-chaining production rule 
system, PSYCO, in which medical diagnostic knowledge was 
expressed entirely non-numerically as production rules, performed 
as well as a Bayesian statistical system fed with comparable data. 
Each production rule simply encoded the empirical link between a
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small set of clinical data (condition part) and a particular 
disease (action part). Fox (1982) suggests that this categorical 
form is more like experts' own representations of facts than are 
purely quantitative estimates of likelihood. At the same time it 
is a more intelligible form, making it easier for the user to 
test and trace the system’s reasoning on other cases (Fox, 1982).
(2) Human judgment under uncertainty appears governed in part by 
availability (see Section 2.4.2). This theory states that the 
more available a bit of stored information is, the more readily 
it comes to mind, and the more impact it will have on subsequent 
decision making. Fox (1980) captured this idea in an 
experimental production system simulating aspects of clinical 
decision-making. The bulk of rules in the rule base expressed 
learnt symptom-disease links, with the relative strength of 
particular disease-symptom pairs reflected in the ordering of 
the rule conditions. The interpreter was sensitive to this 
ordering, so that the more "certain" hypotheses got triggered and 
tested first. Again, this simulation compared favourably with a 
Bayesian system in an experimental trial.
(3) Along with availability, representativeness is the other main 
’heuristic’ identified by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman et a l ., 
1982; see Section 2.4.2) as exerting a major influence
on human decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. This 
has been explicitly formalised into a qualitative technique for 
handling uncertainty in expert systems. The paper by Cohen _et 
a l . (1985) should be consulted for further details. More 
generally, any system in which test cases are judged on their
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computed similarity (or degree of match) to hypothesis 
'prototypes' is operating in accordance with the 
representativeness principle. PIP (Pauker et a l .. 1976) is one 
example discussed earlier in the chapter (Section 5.3.2).
(4) Most recently, Fox (1984a) has sketched another qualitative 
approach to uncertainty, based in part on his intuitions as an 
English speaker. He suggests that the 50 to 100 words in English 
for describing facts and data ('possible', 'probable', etc.) can 
be arranged into a hierarchy of belief terms. These can then be 
used to represent people’s beliefs "qualitatively with an 
explicit semantics, not numerically with an implicit semantics" 
(Fox, 1984a, p.22). He observes that for such a scheme to become 
generally accepted, agreement about the relative precedence of 
belief terms would first be needed. In the meantime, designers 
could be left to define these relations explicitly - but 
arbitrarily - in rules, as the domain requires. The following 
rule from Fox (1984a) illustrates the approach:
IF Patient couldfbe suffering from Disease
AND Disease is definitely fatal
THEN Patient maylbe in danger
(5) Earlier (Section 5.6.5) it was noted how Clancey (1983) and 
others have sought to explicate the knowledge compiled into 
uniform knowledge bases consisting largely of empirical rules. 
Cohen and Greenberg (1983) make a similar point in relation to 
uncertainty. They argue that numerical estimates of uncertainty 
are just a summary of the reasons people have for believing/
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disbelieving a particular hypothesis, which become inaccessible 
when represented numerically. On this view if an intelligent 
reasoner is normally able to discriminate among these reasons 
then the summary representation is inadequate (Cohen, 1985).
This would be true, for example, where two statements are ajudged 
equally "probable", but only one can be proven. Cohen (1985) 
presents an AX approach to reasoning about uncertainty based on 
such qualitative considerations. The implication of this type of 
approach for knowledge acquisition is that experts should be 
required to justify their expressions of uncertainty. But this 
is likely to prove difficult in view of the inaccessible and 
highly compiled nature of much expert thinking (see Chapter 2).
(6) A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods has also 
been advocated. In the context of medical expert systems, 
Szolovits and Pauker (1978) propose a heuristic process of 
hypothesis formation, followed by the weighing of evidence for 
and against each hypothesis. In short: "categorical proposes, 
probabilistic disposes". Similarly, Spiegelhalter and Knill-Jones 
(1984) conclude that a synthesis between statistical and 
knowledge-based techniques could overcome many of the long­
standing criticisms of statistical décision-support systems. It 
should be apparent, though, that cognitive emulation is not the 
primary concern of these researchers.
5.7 EMULATING NEURAL PROCESSING
5.7.1 Introduction
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So far we have tacitly assumed that if a cognitive model can be 
implemented in an expert system, then traditional Al will provide the 
necessary techniques. [Traditional Al seeks to represent knowledge of 
the world in formal symbols, enabling programs to be written which 
instruct a computer how to make inferences by manipulating these 
symbols.] In this section we briefly consider a radically different 
Al paradigm - one inspired by current neurological models of how the 
brain works. This approach to cognitive emulation has yet to be 
applied in expert systems work (to the author's knowledge), but is 
outlined here because of its potential future importance.
5.7.2 Rationale
Al has been an active area of research since the 1950s. The relative 
lack of progress in the intervening period has led to some 
disillusionment with the dominant Al paradigm based on symbol 
manipulation. One doubt is whether serial processing programs - 
however fast - can ever approach the power of human thinking. Another 
concerns the impracticality of writing all the detailed instructions 
needed for a program to respond intelligently to unexpected events.
The slow progress of symbolic Al has provided the impetus for an 
alternative ’connectionist' approach, which is modelled closely on the 
computational properties of the human brain. These properties 
include (Feldman, 1985; Hinton, 1985):
a neural impulse takes a few milliseconds to be generated 
(about a million times slower than the basic computing speed 
of modern computers)
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a human can perform a simple task such as picture naming in 
around 500 milliseconds, or about 100 steps (the best 
available Al programs require millions of time steps to 
perform comparable tasks)
the cortex of the human brain contains some 100 billion 
neurons
each neuron is connected with up to about 10 000 others
the human brain is a massively parallel natural computer
The connectionists argue that our knowledge is stored in the 
strength of inter-neuronal connections, and that thinking somehow 
emerges from the process of these connections forming and reforming. 
Massively parallel computational models of vision, natural language, 
knowledge representation, learning, etc. are currently under 
construction (see, for example, the papers in Rumelhart et al., 1986).
5.7.3 Distinguishing features
The main features that distinguish the connectionist approach from 
traditional Al are (Economist, 1985);
(1) A belief that hardware matters - that symbolic processing cannot 
be abstracted from the hardware in which it is carried out.
(2) Connectionist models imply massively parallel computer 
architectures (although they can be simulated on serial digital 
computers).
(3) In connectionist machines memory and processing are diffusely
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distributed throughout the network, with little central control.
(4) Connectionist models are largely unprogrammed: only general 
instructions are given. The system reaches a solution by 
ungovernedly trying out different connections in the network 
until it settles into a stable state, i.e. no detailed algorithms 
or rules are involved.
Figure 5.5 illustrates in highly simplified form some typical features 
of connectionist networks. Elements (e.g. neurons, processing units) 
are linked by connections of differing strengths, represented here by 
an integer. The plus and minus signs denote a positive or negative 
link respectively. A double-headed arrow indicates a symmetrical 
connection rather than an asymmetrical one (single-headed). The 
diagram also hints at the essentially probabilistic nature of problem­
solving activity in many connectionist models.
5.7.4 Assessment
The connectionist approach has not gone unchallenged. Theoretical 
critisms include:
It has not yet been adequately explained how high-level 
symbolic manipulation (e.g. perception) can arise from low- 
level energy states (e.g. pattern recognition).
To build a connectionist network able to simulate human 
thinking would require a machine with more connections than 
currently seems possible.
Connectionist models do not offer an alternative to symbolic 
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Fig. 5.5 - An illustrative connectionist network
AI, because the difference is essentially one of level.
That is, connectionists network may represent how symbolic 
processing is implemented in the human brain - but symbolic 
processing is not dependent on this (or any other) 
"implementation language".
The development of a connectionist network may depend 
heavily on careful prior structuring by the theorist, rather
than developing purely in accordance with general 
principles (Anderson, 1983a).
More immediately, the special hardware required to make massively 
parallel connectionist models a practical option for knowledge 
engineering is still being developed, while many theoretical issues in 
connectionist modelling remain to be resolved (Feldman, 1985;
Hinton, 1985). There is a more fundamental objection, however. That
is to say, the human engineering objectives of expert systems -
explicit knowledge representation, intelligible reasoning, 
explanation, etc. - are inconsistent with the nature of connectionist 
models. As already noted, knowledge is embedded in the strength of 
connections: the reasoning process is diffuse, probabilistic and 
highly parallel - in short, system operation is unintelligible to a 
normal adult. Nevertheless, if it becomes apparent that some types of 
intelligent problem solving can only be simulated using a 
connectionist framework, then expert system designers will need to 
resolve the human engineering problem that is posed. This issue is 
explored further in Section 5.8.
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5.8 GENERAL DISCUSSION
A large amount of work in expert systems and related fields is 
relevant to the subject of cognitive emulation. Even restricting the 
scope of this chapter to such central expert system topics as 
knowledge elicitation and representation, problem solving and system 
architecture, has left a lot of ground to cover. This chapter has 
aimed to provide a representative survey of important work in this 
area. Six broad approaches to cognitive emulation have been 
distinguished based principally on the level at which the emulation of 
human cognition is addressed (see Fig. 5.1). In each case I have 
tried to describe and evaluate the major development work, as well as 
identify some of the outstanding research issues.
Having considered each approach individually, it remains to 
consider the different approaches in combination. This is an 
important and unavoidable issue for two reasons. First, it may be 
difficult to emulate human cognition at one level without giving 
thought to emulation issues at proximate levels. Second, different 
approaches can confer different knowledge engineering benefits - 
offering a big incentive for a combined design solution. In simplified 
form, the main benefits offered by the six outlined approaches to 
emulation are:
[1] Individual expert Emulation facilitates the effective 
elicitation, representation and utilization of an individual 
expert's knowledge for system construction.
[2] Domain expertise Accurate formalization of domain knowledge, 
explication of typical reasoning strategies, etc.
167
[3] Expert cognition Fast, accurate and ’non-brittle’ expert-level 
performance.
[4] User cognition Ensuring usability by modelling the knowledge, 
expectations and preferences of the intended user group.
[5] Human information processing Matching system characteristics to 
human cognition for intelligibility. To perform difficult 
’human* tasks.
[6] Neural processing models Still at an early research stage, but 
ultimately for solving complex synthetic problems.
There are thus clear benefits to be achieved from a strategy of 
emulation encompassing a variety of approaches. Unfortunately, the 
design implications of different approaches are often contradictory - 
a point illustrated by Table 5.4, which contrasts the design features 
best suited to achieving expert-level performance and user 
intelligibility respectively. The performance-oriented features are 
characteristic of approaches which emulate expert problem solving 
([1 ], [2] or [3]), or which reflect more general models of human 
problem solving ([5] and [6]); whereas the features facilitating 
intelligibility are associated more with emulating specific user 
groups [4], and adaptations to the limitations of human information 
processing [5].
The question then arises : how can approaches to cognitive 
emulation with such conflicting design implications be combined? The 
basis for an architectural solution was mentioned in relation to user 
emulation (Section 5.5). In this solution - exemplified by the system
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Table 5.4
Design features facilitating expert-level performance and
intelligibility
EXPERT SYSTEM 
ATTRIBUTE
PERFORMANCE INTELLIGIBILITY
System Architecture Non-modular (e.g. 
distributed 
processing and 
memory)
Modular
Processing Mode Parallel Serial
Reasoning Strategies Expert-oriented User-oriented
Problem Formulation Expert-oriented User-oriented
Domain
Conceptualization
Expert-oriented User-oriented
Representation Language Low level High level
Knowledge Compiled
Procedural
Explicit
Declarative
Knowledge Chunks Relatively large 
and complex
Relatively small 
and simple
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architecture of intelligent front ends (Bundy, 1984), the 
Interviewer/Reasoner model (Gerring et al.. 1982), UMFE (Sleeman, 
1984), etc. - two main system elements are distinguished. As shown in 
Fig 5.6., the user interacts only with a front-end sub-system 
modelled on the intended user group and optimised for intelligibility. 
This module would also communicate with a back-end performance program 
modelled on expert cognition or any other useful model of human 
problem solving (e.g. a connectionist model).
There are many research issues outstanding with this type of 
architecture - not least the development of Al techniques for 
translating between the two modules (see Bundy, 1984). But 
modularization along these lines may offer ,the only viable solution 
for combining emulation approaches which fundamentally conflict in 
their design implications.
In Section 4.1.4 we noted the related problem of emulating the 
(distinctive) knowledge organization and reasoning strategies of 
several experts within a single system. A  modular solution may also 
be considered here. One possibility is described by Lambird, Lavine 
and Kanal (1984): for certain purposes expert system can be organized 
as a co-operating community of experts, with each ’specialist’ 
comprising its own knowledge base and corresponding inference 
mechanism. Lambird et a l . (1984) are primarily concerned with such 
distributed problem solving expert systems for use in applications 
with very large information and processing loads; for example, image 
understanding. Equally, however, it might provide a technique to 
enable the cognitive emulation of a number of experts within an 
integrated system. Fig. 5.7 illustrates this possibility as an
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USER > > FRONT-END ^ BACK-END
SUBSYSTEM SUB-SYSTEM
Fig. 5.6 - An outline system architecture for combining user- 
intelligibility (front-end) and expert-level performance (back-end).
BACK-END SUBSYSTEM
E2El
►USER FRONT-END
SUBSYSTEM
E4
Fig. 5.7 - An outline system architecture for integrating the 
cognitive models of four experts (El-4) and the intended user group.
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elaboration of Fig. 5.6.
Modularization of the sort being discussed could also serve to 
combine emulation approaches with formal methods. Indeed, this is 
essentially what intelligent front ends (Bundy, 1984) are already 
doing. The 'front end’ is a friendly interface modelled on the user’s 
understanding of a domain and preferred mode of interaction, while the 
’back end’ is a complex statistical package, a relational database 
system, etc..
The potential for substantial design conflicts within the 
emulation strategy has gone largely unremarked in earlier discussions 
of the subject (e.g. Fox, 1982; Slatter, 1985). One reason is that 
under favourable conditions the different levels of approach to 
emulation can probably be fluently combined. Consider, for example, 
the following conditions:
the task is of a relatively simple, analytic kind such as 
classification
domain knowledge is largely empirical in nature, 
expressable as IF-THEN rules
the amount of domain knowledge is relatively small
the system users are themselves experts or partial experts
Under such conditions expert knowledge can be expressed in a 
declarative intelligible form without too much distortion; there is no 
significant conflict in conceptualization, reasoning strategies, etc. 
between experts and system users; and the cognitive models suitable
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for modelling the task - i.e. 'pure' production systems - can be 
tailored to give intelligble behaviour. These conditions are 
approximated in the case of PSYCO (Fox et a l ., 1980), a clinical 
diagnostic system which manages to combine the emulation of 
established cognitive principles, intelligible knowledge 
representation and reasoning, and fidelity to expert cognition within 
an adapted production rule system.
However, the emulation approach can be expected to become 
increasingly fragmented as one moves away from these favourable 
conditions towards situations involving:
complex synthetic tasks such as design
more varied types of knowledge (e.g. temporal, spatial, 
causal)
very large amounts of knowledge
system users who are complete domain novices
It is under conditions such as these that the use of modular 
system architectures becomes a relevant design option.
There are thus grounds for supposing that different approaches to
emulation can, in principle at least, be combined - though in 
different ways according to circumstances. It is also necessary to 
consider whether any conditions exist in which a single one of the six
described approaches would be sufficient for a given knowledge
engineering purpose. A possible scenario is where a piece of expert 
software is required to fulfill a highly specialised, but essentially
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limited task. For example, an autonomous expert system module 
embedded in a real-time process control application might have little 
need for a user interface, allowing optimization on expert cognition.
The role the expert system is designed to perform for the user is 
clearly important in this regard. Arguably, pure problem solving 
systems require less elaborate user interfaces than systems engaging 
in co-operative problem solving with the user (see Section 5.4). Even 
so, the requirement of the system designer for modularity, 
intelligibility, etc. suggests that usability will almost always be a 
consideration.
The flowchart in Fig. 5.8 is an attempt to formalize in summary 
form the guidlines for selecting and combining emulation approaches 
given above. It can be seen as a companion to the earlier decision 
rule (Fig 4.1.). The difference is this: Fig 4.1. is intended to help 
identify when a strategy of cognitive emulation is worth pursuing; 
while Fig 5.8. aims to assist in identifying which particular emulation 
approach(es) to pursue. The flowchart reflects the fact that formal 
methods alone will sometimes be sufficient to generate a design 
solution. It also allows for a combination of formal methods with 
emulation approaches. Failure to find a workable singular or combined 
solution leads to either abandonment of the proposed system or a 
respecification of requirements.
5.9 SUGGESTED READING
At present no general textbooks covering this subject area in greater 
depth are available. The reader is thus advised to follow up references 
given in this chapter which coincide with their specific interests.
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Fig. 5-8 - Flowchart for selecting/combining emulation 
approaches.
175
6 CONCLUSION
This book has provided an assessment of the cognitive emulation 
strategy in expert system design. In this final chapter the main 
conclusions of previous chapters are reviewed. A more designer- 
oriented summary is also provided, for the benefit of knowledge 
engineers interested in adopting an emulation approach. Finally, 
there is a summary of the original contributions made by the thesis.
6.1 SUMMARY OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS
6 .1.1 The principle of cognitive emulation
Chapter 1 introduced the term cognitive emulation, which denotes an 
approach to expert system design in which human thinking is the 
guiding principle. Domain experts are one obvious focus for attempts 
at emulation; system users another. An emulation approach implies a 
close coupling between knowledge engineering and cognitive psychology. 
The psychological models, methods and techniques of the cognitive 
scientist provides a rationale for the emulation strategy. Cognitive 
emulation is distinguished from cognitive modelling per se by its 
engineering perspective. At present the number of research projects 
in which cognitive emulation is an explicit concern is growing, but 
outside of research centres awareness of the emulation principle 
remains limited.
6.1.2 Human expert thinking
Chapter 2 reviewed our present understanding of human expert thinking 
Cognitive research in this area confirms the belief that human
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expertise is essentially a knowledge-based skill, acquired through 
many years of practice in a specialist domain. Prodigious amounts of 
knowledge are acquired, and this goes a long way in explaining the 
superior performance of domain experts compared to novices. However, 
qualitative changes in knowledge organization and reasoning strategies 
also play an important role. They enable the expert to rely less on 
formal problem solving methods, and more on pattern recognition and 
memory. Expert cognition is better adapted than novice cognition to 
the unique characteristics of a particular domain.
Frequently observed correlates of developing expertise include 
enhanced working memory capacity, speed-up and tuning of decision 
processes, and proceduralization of task-related knowledge. Such 
changes can be classed as 'benefits', since they tend to improve task 
performance. However, the development of expertise also has its 
associated costs. In particular, proceduralized knowledge and 
automated processes are relatively inaccessible, making it harder for 
experts to report accurately on their thinking. So, in a sense, 
expert-level performance is achieved at the expense of 
intelligibility.
6.1.3 Arguments
Chapter 3 assembled the principal arguments for and against cognitive 
emulation. The main conclusion reached was as follows. Cognitive 
emulation is a strategy for expert system design that can be neither 
explicitly rejected nor unselectively pursued. On the one hand, a 
significant element of cognitive modelling seems inherent in knowledge
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engineering, and is desirable in order to promote expert-level 
performance, user acceptance, effective knowledge acquisition, and a 
principled approach to design. Militating against a pure, unselective 
strategy, on the other hand, are the known weaknesses, limitations and 
inefficiences of human thinking, the desire to improve on expert-level 
performance, and the requirement that an expert system should embody 
the specialist skill of several experts.
6.1.4 Constraining and facilitating factors
Chapter 4 examined the viability of cognitive emulation at a more 
practical level; considering which are the factors likely to constrain 
and facilitate a cognitive approach. Some of these factors cut both 
ways :
The areas in which an emulation approach might come into 
conflict with established knowledge engineering objectives 
such as efficiency, modifiability and accuracy were 
carefully detailed. In other areas, though, cognitive 
emulation was shown to coincide rather than conflict with 
existing knowledge engineering objectives.
The relative immaturity of both cognitive science and expert 
systems technology represent constraints on applying an 
emulation strategy at present. However, developments in 
these fields are likely to facilitate a cognitive approach in 
the future.
The inherent emulability (or not) of human cognition in artificial 
systems is another possible constraint on emulation. However, in
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practice, the effects of this factor are difficult to disentangle from 
the constraining effects of present day technology and scientific 
understanding. Two clear benefits of cognitive emulation emerged. 
First, despite its limitations, cognitive psychology can serve as a 
useful source of ideas and techniques for expert system builders. 
Second, the utility of an emulation approach tends to increase with 
task difficulty - especially for very large, highly complex and 
'synthetic' tasks that are unamenable to formal methods. A decision 
to adopt a strategy of emulation needs to consider the constraints and 
facilitating factors operating in a particular case. Figure 4.1 is 
designed to help with such a decision.
6.1.5 Applications and different approaches
Chapter 5 reviewed existing and potential applications of cognitive 
emulation in expert system design. As currently applied by expert
systern Researchers, cognitive emulation is far from being a unitary---
strategy. On the contrary, a survey of the published literature 
reveals a multiplicity of approaches, inspired by different cognitive 
models, knowledge engineering objectives, etc.. Six basic approaches 
were identified. These centred on modelling the cognitive processes 
representative of :
an individual domain expert
experts in a particular domain (e.g. clinical
diagnosticians)
human experts in general
users
179
people in general - human information processing perspective 
people in general - neural networks perspective
Several important points emerged from an assessment of these six
approaches:
(1) Much of the valuable detail of human thinking can be captured and 
embodied in an expert system if appropriate tools and techniques 
are employed.
(2) Earlier research focused on emulating the individual expert’s 
ability to solve a problem. However, this ignores the fact that 
in the real world experts perform a much wider range of cognitive 
functions, including tutoring, guidance and remedy negotiation. 
Some recent research efforts have attempted to emulate the 
ability to engage in co-operative problem solving of this sort.
(3) A variety of techniques are also under development for emulating 
the knowledge organization and reasoning strategies 
characteristic of some specialist domain, dynamic aspects of 
expert cognition, and relevant aspects of user cognition.
(4) The three-part system architecture of standard expert systems 
parallels the outline ’architecture* for human cognition proposed 
by cognitive psychologists. This similarity is somewhat 
deceptive, however, as there are also significant differences 
between the two.
(5) For certain kinds of expert problem solving, it may prove 
necessary to model human thinking at a non-symbolic level - that
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is, in 'massively parallel networks' modelled on human neural 
processing.
The issues raised by combining alternative approaches to emulation were 
considered, since each approach confers different knowledge 
engineering benefits. Under favourable conditions, different 
approaches can be integrated within a single system. On the other 
hand, where the approaches to be combined have contradictory design 
implications, a modularized design solution is recommended. Some 
general guidelines for selecting and combining emulation approaches 
were given.
6.2 SUMMARY OF DESIGN ADVICE
Implicitly and explicitly, earlier chapters of this book contain many 
pieces of advice about designing expert systems from a cognitive 
perspective. For the benefit of expert system practioners interested 
in adopting a cognitive approach this advice is summarized below. The 
advice given should be read as a provisional set of suggestions, 
rather than as precise methodological guidelines.
Deciding whether to adopt an emulation strategy (see also Section 4.3)
Only adopt an explicit strategy of cognitive emulation if the answer 
to all the following questions is yes.
Is it impossible to satisfy all the requirements of a 
proposed expert system application using formal methods?
Can a cognitive model be found corresponding to the
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requirements of the proposed application?
Can the cognitive model be implemented as a computer 
program?
Is the cognitive model powerful/predictive enough to support 
the proposed application?
Selecting a particular emulation strategy (see also Section 5.8).
if All the requirements of a proposed application can be satisfied
using a single emulation approach 
then Adopt that emulation approach
if The requirements of a proposed application can only be satisfied
by a combination of emulation approaches
and The approaches have compatible design implications
then Adopt an integrated system design solution
if The requirements of a proposed application can only be satisfied
by a combination of emulation approaches
and The approaches have incompatible design implications 
then Adopt a modularized system design solution
Knowledge elicitation (see also Section 5.2).
Match the elicitation technique to the type of knowledge to
be elicited.
Use a variety of elicitation techniques (expert knowledge is
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rarely of just one type).
Give consideration to techniques widely used in cognitive 
psychology such as protocol analysis, Repertory Grid 
Technique, conceptual sorting and memory probing.
Be alert to rejection or distortion of elicited knowledge 
due to the constraints imposed by inappropriate expert 
system tools (knowledge representations, inference engines,
etc.).
Knowledge Analysis, and the use of intermediate 
representations for coding elicited knowledge, are two 
techniques for overcoming such distorting influences.
Be alert to the potential sources of invalidity in verbal 
data.
Knowledge representation (see especially Section 5.6)
Match the knowledge representation to the type of knowledge 
to be represented.
Use a variety of knowledge representations (expert knowledge 
is rarely of just one type).
For user intelligibility, represent human knowledge 
explicitly.
For expert-level problem solving, represent human knowledge 
in a compiled, proceduralized form.
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For both, consider a modularized system design - with 
knowledge represented in a user-oriented and in an expert- 
oriented form.
The size, complexity and grain size of knowledge units (e.g 
production rules) should accord with human cognition.
Production rules are a natural representation for certain 
kinds of human pattern-directed knowledge.
The interconnectivity of human long-term memory is 
appropriately modelled in an associative network.
Spatial and temporal knowledge should be represented 
analogically.
Cognitive prototypes can be represented as frames, with the 
slots set to default (typical) values.
Knowledge utilization
Model the problem solving approach of an expert system on an 
appropriate domain expert.
Represent expert reasoning strategies explicitly as meta­
rules, task frames, etc..
The prominence of pattern recognition in expert problem 
solving implies that forward inferencing should be a feature 
of any expert system modelled on human expertise.
Breadth-first retrieval strategies (through a network) are a
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better approximation of human memory retrieval than either 
depth-first or serial searches through a set of independent 
knowledge elements.
In general, human reasoning involves a subtle interplay of 
forward and backward inferencing, serial and parallel 
processes. Modelling this interplay should be an important 
objective for 'cognitive emulators'.
The powerful pattern representation and pattern matching 
facilities offered by AI languages such as PROLOG can be 
exploited in emulating human pattern processing.
Avoid Bayes' Rule, or any other formal method of 
approximate reasoning - unless there is evidence that the 
human expert is explicitly using such an approach. Consider 
the qualitative approaches listed in Section 5.6.6.
. An autonomous problem solving system is not always the most 
appropriate design solution. Try to identify and model the 
cognitive functions (e.g. critiquing, tutoring) that human 
experts are actually performing for users in a given 
application area.
The cognitive function(s) the system is to perform should be 
identified at an early stage, so that knowledge acquisition 
can focus on relevant aspects of expert/user cognition.
Using the design advice
There are two main ways in which the above advice might be used.
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Taken collectively, the suggestions represent elements of a principled 
approach to cognitive emulation in expert system design.
Alternatively, individual bits of advice can be acted on in an ad hoc 
fashion, as opportunities or needs arise in a particular project. For 
most practical purposes, an ad hoc approach will remain the realistic 
option for some time to come. It accords with current knowledge 
engineering practice - which is eclectic and pragmatic - and with the 
current limitations of expert systems technology and cognitive 
psychology. As these constraints drop away, however, the scope for a 
principled approach will increase.
6 .3 ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS
6.3.1 Major contributions
(1) Through a detailed review of the theoretical arguments involved, 
establishing the major conclusion that ; Cognitive emulation i 
strategy for expert system design that can be neither explicitly 
rejected nor unselectively pursued.
(2) A clear articulation of the major factors constraining and 
facilitating a cognitive approach to knowledge engineering, and 
how these might be assessed in deciding to adopt an emulation 
strategy in a particular case.
(3) A detailed analysis of the similarities and differences between 
human cognition and typical expert systems. In particular, a 
comparative analysis of the system architecture of standard expert 
systems with the outline architecture for human cognition proposed
is a
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by psychologists.
(4) Development of a six-fold classification of approaches to 
cognitive emulation within the expert system field, and of sub­
classifications where applicable.
(5) Presentation of general guidelines for selecting and combining 
emulation approaches, and of proposals for modularized design 
solutions where the necessary combination of approaches has 
contradictory implications.
6.3.2 Minor contributions
(1) Compilation of an extensive bibliography (over 200 items) of 
relevant research literature in this area.
(2) Inferring an initial set of guidelines about designing expert 
systems from the standpoint of cognitive emulation.
(3) Examining the cognitive changes that accompany the development of 
human expertise from a cost-benefit perspective.
(4) Presenting various novel hypotheses, for example : that the
utility of the emulation principle will tend to increase as task 
difficulty increases.
(5) Emphasis on the heuristic role of ideas from Cognitive Psychology/ 
Expertise Research in expert system development.
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GLOSSARY
algorithm A detailed step-by-step procedure for performing a task 
that is guaranteed to succeed.
analogical This is a class of knowledge representation formalisms
representations in which there is a structural similarity between the 
representation and the situation that is represented. 
Examples include maps, models and diagrams. Analogical 
representations contrast with 'propositional’ 
representations, such as semantic networks and logic, 
which do not require this structural correspondence.
backward
chaining
Backward chaining is an inferencing strategy which 
involves working back from a conclusion or goal to see 
if the conditions that would make it true are satisfied. 
The strategy is appropriate in problem domains where the 
conclusions can be specified in advance; for example, 
electronic fault diagnosis.
declarative In a declarative representation knowledge typically
representations comprises a static collection of facts accompanied by 
a small set of procedures for manipulating them.
epistemology Epistemology is the theory of the method or grounds for 
knowledge. In knowledge engineering, epistemological 
analysis is carried out to identify the basic classes of 
elements (e.g. 'solutions'), relations (e.g. taxonomic),
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etc. underlying the verbal statements elicited from 
domain experts. Epistemological analysis offers a means 
of conceptualizing knowledge at a level distinct from the 
available representational technology.
forward
chaining
Forward chaining is an inferencing strategy which builds 
up from the available data about a problem to deduce 
conclusions. It is appropriate where the possible 
conclusions cannot be pre-specified, or where the number 
of conclusions is large relative to the number of initial 
problem states. For example, designing a computer 
hardware configuration.
frames A common knowledge representation formalism in expert 
systems. A frame is a data structure for representing 
stereotyped situations in terms of 'slots’ and 
'fillers'. For example, the frame for 'chair' might 
contain a 'number-of-legs' slot which, in the case of a 
prototypical chair, would have a filler value of 
'4 legs'. Various types of information are attached to 
a frame, including information about how to use the 
frame.
heuristic A 'rule of thumb' method or aid to solving a problem. 
Unlike an algorithm, a heuristic is not guaranteed to 
succeed, but is useful in the majority of cases.
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logic One of the first knowledge representation formalisms 
used in AX. It enables conclusions to be deduced from 
initial premises using purely syntactic rules of 
inference. Logic is also the basis of such AI 
languages as PROLOG (PROgramming in LOGic).
procedural In a procedural representation knowledge is
representations contextually-embedded in procedures, e.g. computer
algorithms.
production A production rule is an item of knowledge which takes
rule the form - IF this condition is true, THEN this
action is appropriate. For example:
IF (a) the sun is shining, and 
(b) the day is Sunday 
THEN consider going fishing
production
system
A  production system is a type of AI progam consisting 
of three main elements :
(1) a knowledge base, comprising a set of 
production rules;
(2) a 'working memory' consisting of data relevant 
to the current problem;
(3) a control program, called an 'interpreter' or 
'inference engine'.
The control program selectively fires rules in (1) 
based on the current state of (2). This cycle 
repeats until the program terminates.
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scripts A script is a frame-like structure specifically 
designed for representing typical sequences or events
semantic
network
A knowledge formalism in which information is 
represented as a set of nodes and links. The 
nodes represent concepts, and the links stand 
for the relationships between the concepts. For 
example, the concepts 'eagle' and 'bird' could be 
linked by the relationship 'is a kind o f .
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